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Introduction 
 
Prevention and control of contagious diseases, such as classical swine fever, foot 
and mouth disease and highly pathogenic avian influenza, is included into the 
Common Agricultural Policy (CAP) in the European Union. In the context of 
liberal trade policy, agreements concerning free traffic had become imperative for 
international trade in animals and animal products. In 1992 this resulted in an 
enforcement of stringent regulations for a number of animal diseases.  
In 1992 the European Union adopted a non-vaccination policy for a number of 
infectious animal diseases. This entailed no longer vaccinating animals against these 
diseases. In case of an outbreak, the control strategy was a standstill (movement 
restrictions) and breeding restrictions, followed by a stamping-out of the epidemic, 
which is the culling of all infected and healthy but susceptible animals within a 
radius of 1 to 3 km from the source(s) of the infection. This policy was considered 
to have two advantages over preventive vaccination. First, a non-vaccination policy 
was believed to stimulate free market trade of animal and animal products between 
countries who adopted this policy. Second, calculations indicated that the costs of 
preventive vaccination would be higher than the costs involved in controlling an 
epidemic by stamping out the disease. (Berentsen 1991, Koninklijke Nederlandse 
Akademie van Wetenschappen 2002). Accordingly, during each of the recent 
epidemics in Europe animals were not protected by vaccination, and millions of 
infected as well as healthy animals were culled in an effort to eradicate the diseases 
(Mepham 2004 Woods 2004). The financial setback for the individual animal 
keepers was outweighed by the benefit to the trade position of a country as a whole.  
This policy was based on knowledge from the early nineties. However, since then, 
substantial changes have taken place. Agricultural production systems have 
developed considerably. In The Netherlands this has led to scale enlargement, 
intensive contact structures over often great distances, and an intensifying of the 
livestock sector. At the same time, the rural area was changing with an increasing 
number of livestock animals kept for non-commercial purposes. Poultry, cattle, 
goats and sheep normally kept for the production of food, were now also kept for 
company, breeding of special breeds, sport, recreation and therapeutic purposes. As 
a consequence the spectrum of stakeholders has broadened. Furthermore, more 
knowledge is available about the diseases and their spreading, about the efficiency of 
the control policy and about the financial setback after the epidemic, which proved 
to be larger and more complicated than expected. 
To distinguish between infected animals and healthy, vaccinated animals, marker 
vaccines have since been developed. Additionally, the last century has seen a major 
change in attitude towards animals. Where people once regarded animals from a 
purely instrumental point of view, now a shift has taken place towards a more 
protective and respectful attitude. This has resulted in changing views on the proper 
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treatment of animals during their life, and on acceptable reasons to kill them. Rollin 
(2007) argues that technological developments, especially the intensification of the 
livestock sector and animal experimentation, have led to social concern about the 
treatment of animals. These views he calls the new social ethics. 
 
Animal disease epidemics 
From 1997 on, the European Union faced major outbreaks of foot and mouth 
disease, highly pathogenic avian influenza (bird flu) and classical swine fever. In the 
Netherlands there were .outbreaks of classical swine fever in 1997-98, foot and 
mouth disease in 2001 and highly pathogenic avian influenza in 2003. The United 
Kingdom suffered a major foot and mouth disease epidemic in 2001, and Italy was 
confronted with highly pathogenic avian influenza epidemics in 1997-98 and again 
in 2000. In 2006 classical swine fever was reported in Germany and highly 
pathogenic avian influenza was identified in several member states. The control 
policy was in line with the then current EU non-vaccination policy. Therefore, the 
animals had not been protected by vaccination and in Europe about 50 million 
infected and healthy animals were culled in the stamping-out strategy. (www.oie.int 
retrieved November 2007). A large number of reports described these epidemics 
and the issues involved (Curry 2002) 
 
Social and psychological issues 
The epidemics left a deep impression on those involved; livestock farmers, 
veterinarians, non-commercial animal keepers and many others, and even on society 
as a whole. A number of studies in The Netherlands (Van der Berg 2000 Huirne and 
Mourits 2002 Van Velzen and Dekker 2003 Welboren et al. 2003 Van Haaften and 
Kersten 2002, in the United Kingdom and in the OIE (Cumbria Foot and Mouth 
Disease Inquiry Panel 2002 Institute for Health Research OIE 2003) have addressed 
these issues. The on-farm culling of healthy animals on a large scale, the animal 
welfare problems, the lack of autonomy on one’s own farm, the severe restrictions 
on people and animal movement, and the burning pyres in the UK caused major 
psychological problems.  
Not only animal keepers, but also veterinarians were involved in the culling. 
Although the culling was a means to stop the disease from spreading, thus 
preventing other animals from catching the disease, it still weighed heavily on the 
latter. They felt the burden of having to cull perfectly healthy animals, which ran 
contrary to their professional calling to protect and heal animals, for the sake of the 
animals as well as for the keepers.  
 
Animal welfare 
During the epidemics, the Farm Animal Welfare Council in its report to the British 
authorities (Farm Animal Welfare Council 2002), the Royal Society for the 
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Prevention of Cruelty to Animals (Laurence 2002) and the Dutch Society for the 
Protection of Animals (Van den Berg 2002 Nederlandse Vereniging tot 
Bescherming van Dieren 2004) monitored the animal welfare situation. It was clear 
that no one was equipped to deal with so many animals to be culled within a very 
short time, in conditions that were far from ideal. Moreover, handling and culling 
were sometimes in the hands of unskilled people not accustomed to working under 
these circumstances. As a result, a number of animal welfare problems occurred, 
due to the handling, killing, stunning and transport of the animals. Furthermore, 
movement restrictions led to the death of healthy animals due to overcrowding, 
causing physical problems in rapidly growing poultry, and aggression and 
cannibalism in pigs (Crispin 2002). In the Netherlands, due to movement 
restrictions, about one million healthy piglets and chickens were culled to prevent 
further animal welfare problems as a result of overcrowding. 
 
Culling of healthy animals as a moral problem 
In the debate about the acceptability of the non-vaccination policy and culling there 
was controversy between animal keepers. Some agreed that culling was the best way 
to restore international trade. Others resisted, because they failed to understand why 
healthy animals were culled, while a vaccine was at hand. Non-commercial animal 
keepers and zoo keepers protested, because in the control policy no distinction was 
made between production animals and other animals, even though the latter were 
not kept for food or export (Velzen and Dekker 2003). The resistance was not 
restricted to those directly involved; it had resulted in nationwide protests, based on 
the view that the lives of these animals should be respected for their own sake, and 
should not be sacrificed for economic purposes. However, production animals are 
killed by definition, to provide society with food. So how then, can the resistance be 
understood? For a majority in Dutch society, killing production animals for food is 
considered acceptable (Rutgers et al 2003). Culling healthy animals, however, was 
not, because the animals were subsequently destroyed without having fulfilled their 
natural function, which is the production of food for society. This showed that 
killing animals is morally justified in the one situation, and not in the other. 
People’s moral convictions concerning how one ought to treat animals are changing 
(Rollin 2007 Franklin 2006 Armstrong and Boltzer 2003). Animals are no longer 
merely valued for their economic merits. They are now equally valued as living 
beings with a value of their own, as a companion to people, and as a member of a 
human community. These changing values require a rethinking of people’s moral 
responsibilities towards them.   
 
Expert committees in the United Kingdom (Anderson 2002 the Royal Society 
2002), and in the Netherlands (Raad voor het Landelijk Gebied and Raad voor 
Dieraangelegenheden 2003, 2004) have issued technical advice on future policy, 
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including risk assessment and preventive measures, vaccination, contingency 
planning, communication and animal welfare. However, it is acknowledged that in 
order to be acceptable in present day society, new policy needs a moral perspective 
which reflects changing moral convictions. In the Netherlands, discussion is 
underway of a revision of the current prevention and control policy, which gives 
due consideration to the diversity of moral convictions. To this purpose, more 
should be known about the diversity of moral convictions in Dutch society. 
 
Objective of the study 
 
The objective of the current study was to contribute to new prevention and control 
policy for notifiable animal diseases, which would be morally justifiable in society, 
by gaining a greater understanding of people’s moral convictions concerning animals 
in Dutch society. Also, the role of these convictions in judgement on the culling of 
healthy animals is described.  
 
Outline of the thesis 
 
The study was performed in four steps.  
In a first step, more insight was obtained into moral issues concerning the 
epidemics, and into priorities for the future that need to be addressed in new policy.  
For this purpose, a European survey (chapter two), a study among keepers of 
backyard animals in the Netherlands (chapter three) and a literature study were 
conducted.  
In a second step (chapter four), a model was developed for use in further empirical 
research on moral convictions in Dutch society.  
In a third step, a survey was carried out among the Dutch general public (chapter 
five), and a stakeholder survey was carried out among Dutch livestock keepers and 
veterinarians (chapter six).  
In a fourth step, a control policy based on risk-of-harm principle and its relevance 
for backyard animal keepers is discussed (chapter seven). In chapter eight a concept 
of three-layered moral convictions and their dynamics, and a three-layered concept 
of normative policy is discussed. The four steps are described below. 
In chapter two, the EU survey is presented. The aim was to gain more insight into 
and differences between the EU member states with respect to their views on moral 
issues concerning animal disease, prevention and control policy, and priorities for 
future policy. In 24 member states relevant stakeholders were approached, such as 
chief veterinary officers, farmers’ organisations, veterinary organisations and NGOs. 
The study focussed on whether the Netherlands differed from other EU member 
states in this respect. 
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In chapter three, a quantitative and qualitative study among keepers of backyard 
animals is described. The aim was to gain more insight into the nature of this 
practice and to identify the moral vocabulary used by these animal keepers to 
express one’s resistance, and the moral issues that were important to them. It is an 
emerging non-commercial animal practice which, given its nature, interests and 
human-animal relationships, is distinct from the livestock sector. This group was an 
important actor, prominent in the resistance against the culling. In this chapter their 
nature, their relationship with animals, and their priorities for future policy were 
described.  
In chapter four, a model is discussed. The aim was to develop a model that, in the 
form of a questionnaire, can be used in empirical research to identify the diversity of 
moral convictions and the moral values that lie at their base, and to determine their 
role in judgement. The model formed the base of both the national survey and the 
stakeholder survey among veterinarians and livestock farmers. Its theoretical 
framework is based on the results of the EU and backyard animal surveys, on 
criteria from animal ethics theories about the moral importance of animals (Warren 
1997) and on other studies about the moral issues during the epidemics (for 
references see the introduction of this chapter)  
In chapter five, the results are described of the national survey among a random 
group of people in Dutch society. The aim was to identify the diversity of moral 
convictions concerning animals and judgement on the culling of healthy animals in 
Dutch society.  
In chapter six, the stakeholder survey among veterinarians and livestock keepers is 
presented. These two groups were important actors, closely involved in the 
epidemics and in the debate on the culling. Their practices are different in nature, 
which may influence their moral convictions and judgement. The aim was to 
identify the diversity of and possible differences between moral convictions 
concerning animals and judgement of livestock keepers and veterinarians. 
In chapter seven, a risk-of-harm approach of animal disease policy is discussed. The 
aim is to contribute to new policy with a moral statement. Included in the discussion 
is what policy based on this principle means for the backyard animal practice 
In chapter eight, the results of all surveys are discussed. The aim is to lend a moral 
perspective to scenarios for future prevention and control policy. This is discussed 
at four levels: the European, the national, and the stakeholder level, and at the level 
of animal disease outbreaks. On the grounds of the results of the surveys, the 
diversity of moral convictions and their dynamics in judgement of individuals and 
stakeholder groups are reviewed. In a theoretical discussion, a three-layered concept 
of moral convictions and judgement is proposed. Next, the dynamics of change in 
the public morality are discussed. Lastly, a three-layered concept for normative 
policy is proposed. A schematic representation of the chapters of the thesis is 
presented in figure one. 
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Note: In the course of writing the chapters some terms originally used in chapter 
four were changed. The term fundamental moral attitude FMA was changed into moral 
convictions, element was changed into domain, dimension was changed into statement  and 
arguments in support of a statement was changed into moral values in support of a 
statement. In discussing the results of the surveys, the term rating refers to the 
numerical valuation of moral convictions/moral values and the numerical valuation of 
arguments for judgement. Value is used for the appreciation of one’s values. 
  
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Figure one: Schematic representation of the outline of the thesis
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Abstract In 2004 a survey was conducted in the member states of the European 
Union designed to gain greater insight into the views on control strategies for foot 
and mouth disease, classical swine fever, and highly pathogenic avian influenza with 
respect to the epidemiological, economic and social-ethical consequences of each of 
these animal diseases. This article presents the results of the social-ethical survey. A 
selection of stakeholders from each member state was asked to prioritize issues for 
the prevention and control of these diseases. A majority of stakeholders chose 
preventive measures as the preferred issue. An analysis was done to determine 
whether there were differences in views expressed by stakeholders from member 
states with a history of recent epidemics and ones without such a history, and 
whether there were regional differences. There were no differences between 
member states with or without a history of recent epidemics. There were indeed 
regional differences between the priority orders from Northern and Southern 
Europe on the one hand, and from Eastern Europe on the other. 
European survey 
15 
 
Introduction 
 
The European Union (EU) has recently faced major outbreaks of foot and mouth 
disease, highly pathogenic avian influenza (bird flu), and classical swine fever. The 
Netherlands recently experienced three major epidemics: classical swine fever in 
1997–98, foot and mouth disease in 2001, and highly pathogenic avian influenza in 
2003. The United Kingdom suffered a major foot and mouth epidemic in 2001, and 
Italy was confronted with highly pathogenic avian influenza epidemics in 1997–98 
and again in 2000. In 2006 classical swine fever has again been reported in 
Germany, and highly pathogenic avian influenza has been identified in several 
member states.  
In 1992 the European Union adopted a non-vaccination policy. This meant that 
animals were no longer vaccinated against certain infectious diseases and the control 
strategy was based on the stamping-out of an epidemic. This involved a standstill 
(movement restrictions) followed by the culling of all infected and healthy but 
susceptible animals within a 1 to 3 km area from the source(s) of the infection. This 
non-vaccination policy was considered to have two advantages over preventive 
vaccination. First, a non-vaccination policy is believed to stimulate free market trade 
of animal products between countries who have adopted this policy. Second, 
calculations indicated that the costs of preventive vaccination would be higher than 
the costs involved with controlling an epidemic (Koninklijke Nederlandse Akademie 
van Wetenschappen 2002). Accordingly, during each of the recent epidemics in 
Europe animals were not protected by vaccination, and stamping-out was the 
strategy of choice. Under this strategy, not only infected animals, but also millions 
of healthy animals were culled in the efforts to eradicate the diseases. During the 
foot and mouth disease epidemics more that 4 million animals were culled; during 
the classical swine fever epidemics more that 13 million animals were culled; and 
during the highly pathogenic avian influenza epidemics more that 41 million animals 
were culled.1 These numbers include not only production animals destined for the 
food chain, but also backyard animals kept for non-commercial recreational 
purposes. The European Council Directive which introduced community measures 
against certain animal diseases does not distinguish between production animals and 
backyard animals, even though the latter group is not usually destined for food 
production or export purposes.  
This stamping-out strategy has had a devastating impact on society as a whole. It has 
caused severe trauma to the people involved and has raised many questions about 
the morality of culling so many healthy animals and about the animal welfare 
problems resulting from improper handling and slaughtering of animals. The 
general public was confronted with footage of burning pyres of slaughtered animals 
and with the anger and grief of traumatized farmers and other animal keepers. In 
some member states this strengthened the position that adopting alternative 
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strategies for future epidemics was imperative, to better take into account society’s 
changing ethical views on the culling of healthy animals, animal welfare, and the 
psychological impact on those persons directly involved. This led to an increasing 
demand to reconsider the European non-vaccination policy and discuss alternative 
future prevention and control strategies that would be acceptable to and supported 
by society at large.  
 
Socio-psychological issues 
Several studies have been performed to describe the social and psychological 
consequences of animal epidemics (Van Haaften and Kersten 2002 Cumbria Foot 
and Mouth Disease Inquiry Panel 2002 Institute for Health Research 2002 Huirne 
and Mourits 2002 Van Velzen and Dekker 2003). 
After the last foot and mouth epidemic in the United Kingdom in 2001, an inquiry 
was performed in North Cumbria into the health and social consequences the crisis 
had on farmers and their families, on workers in related businesses, and on 
veterinarians and others directly involved (Cumbria Foot and Mouth Disease 
Inquiry Panel 2002). The findings of the studies identified several social and 
psychological issues. The mental health indicators indicated post-traumatic stress 
symptoms in farmers and in frontline workers involved in the culling and disposal 
of the animals. These symptoms were caused by stress created by circumstances 
over which these individuals had little control. Farmers had experienced a loss of 
confidence in central and local decision-makers and a loss of self-esteem and self-
confidence due to a number of recent agricultural shocks that called their way of life 
and their social identity into question. Recent crises resulted in a decrease in public 
confidence in large-scale agricultural production methods. Stress was caused not 
only by the social isolation, the damage done to the social network, and insufficient 
communication from and with the authorities. The severe restrictions on animal 
movement, denying farmers access to their animals, the traumatic on-farm slaughter 
of healthy animals, and the burning pyres all combined to cause major traumas. On 
top of the social stress, farmers and affected non-farming businesses such as the 
tourism sector experienced a loss of work and income. Diversified farms combining 
farming and bed and breakfast facilities suffered double losses. The conclusion was 
that the authorities had offered insufficient assistance in business recovery, leaving 
many farms and businesses faced with debts. 
In 2001 Van Haaften and Kersten (2002) performed a study among 661 Dutch dairy 
farmers who had been affected by the 2001 foot and mouth epidemic in the 
Netherlands to assess the social and psychological impact of the epidemic. The 
farmers were interviewed about their mental well-being (or lack thereof). The results 
showed that between 20% and 30% of the respondents suffered from socio-
psychological problems such as stress, restlessness, tension, anxiety and depression, 
feeling downhearted and isolated, and sleeping disorders. 
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In another study, conducted by Huirne et al. (2002), a questionnaire was sent to 662 
respondents among the Dutch general public. The results showed that the foot and 
mouth epidemic left a deep impression, especially with respect to the way the 
animals had been culled and disposed of (73%). Other domains of concern were the 
emotional and financial impact on the farmers, the way the crisis had been handled 
by the authorities, the isolation of the farmers, and the fact that animals were no 
longer seen in the countryside. The preferred strategy during a future outbreak was 
vaccination of all animals (70%) and isolation (54%), while a majority (72%) 
dismissed culling healthy animals to stop the spread. 
The foot and mouth and the highly pathogenic avian influenza epidemic in the 
Netherlands have led to the mass destruction of not only production animals, but 
also of many backyard animals, some of which were rare breeds. The control 
strategy has been the cause of much unrest and protests among the keepers of 
backyard animals. Most were in favour of vaccination and were not at all convinced 
of the necessity of the culling of their animals based on economic considerations 
(Van Velzen and Dekker 2003). 
 
Communication 
Insufficient communication with the authorities has contributed to heightened 
stress and trauma for all involved, and has been described by the Cumbria Foot and 
Mouth Disease Inquiry Panel (2002) and by Van Haaften and Kersten (2002). The 
latter study describes how prior to the 2001 foot and mouth disease epidemic in the 
Netherlands, stakeholders were insufficiently prepared for an emergency situation 
and had not anticipated that a crisis would occur so soon. In the United Kingdom 
the authorities started planning only after the onset of the epidemic and failed to 
involve all stakeholders in the decision-making process for a draft contingency plan 
(such as the tourism sector and nature and environmental organizations). The 
resulting contingency plan thus operated from a veterinary approach only, without 
the support from other relevant stakeholders. 
During the 2001 epidemic in the Netherlands there was insufficient communication 
between the Ministry of Agriculture and local authorities. The contingency plan had 
played a central role in the control strategy, but it was too focused on the veterinary 
aspects. There had been little cooperation between stakeholders and the Ministry of 
Agriculture at the national level and stakeholders took no part in the decision-
making process, even though their expertise would have been very valuable. The 
contingency plan failed to anticipate either the importance of a joint strategy or the 
emotional consequences to those involved. On a positive note, however, 
cooperation at the regional level was effective. 
After the crisis compensation payments were often delayed and were not 
transparent. By this time many stakeholders had changed their views about the 
stamping-out policy and had turned against the massive culling of so many healthy 
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animals and rare breeds. The policy to allow the import of vaccinated products from 
Argentina was considered inconsistent. Only then did the Ministry of Agriculture 
come to realize the importance of an interactive approach with active involvement 
of all stakeholders and that the contingency plan should include social as well as 
veterinary aspects. 
 
Animal welfare  
During and after the recent animal disease epidemics, the animal welfare problems 
encountered were a major topic in the public discussion and remain so to this day. 
The Farm Animal Welfare Council in its report to the British authorities (Farm 
Animal Welfare Council 2002), the Royal Society for the Prevention of Cruelty to 
Animals (Laurence 2002), and the Dutch Society for the Protection of Animals (Van 
den Berg 2002 Nederlandse Vereniging tot Bescherming van Dieren 2004) have 
monitored, evaluated, and criticized the animal welfare situation during the 2001 
foot and mouth epidemic. 
The scale of the slaughter to be performed within a limited time-frame, combined 
with a control strategy which was not adequate to deal with the scale of the 
epidemic, led to animal welfare problems involving cases of improper handling, 
killing, stunning, and transport of animals. Handling, restraint and killing methods in 
the field are very different from those in slaughterhouses. Concern was expressed 
over the unsuitable conditions for on-farm slaughter and inappropriate killing 
methods. These problems were exacerbated by the fact that handling and slaughter 
were sometimes in the hands of unskilled personnel not accustomed to working in 
disease control/field situations, and because delays had taken place in the slaughter 
of infected animals. Movement restrictions due to a transport ban and to a shortage 
in forage and bedding were reported to cause major animal welfare problems. 
Concern was expressed that uninfected animals had suffered severe welfare 
problems, or were killed unnecessarily for want of feed or land. Overcrowding 
caused grave physical problems in rapidly growing poultry and aggression and 
cannibalism in pigs. Transport sometimes took place over long distances and was a 
cause of further welfare problems.  
 
Ethical issues 
The last century has seen a major change in the mentality and attitude towards 
animals. Where people once regarded animals from a purely instrumental point of 
view, a shift has taken place towards a more protective and respectful attitude 
towards them. This has resulted in changing attitudes concerning the proper 
treatment of animals during their life and also in different views with respect to the 
killing of animals. Many considered the culling of healthy animals in the stamping-
out of an epidemic as senseless, even though production animals are destined to be 
slaughtered for the food production anyway. 
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Noordhuizen-Stassen et al. (2003) performed a study into the societal and moral 
acceptability of the killing of kept animals. The views about the culling of so many 
(healthy) animals during the epidemics were taken as one example of the changing 
views concerning human-animal relationship. 
A total of 1,939 respondents selected from the Dutch general public participated in 
the study, and in-depth interviews were performed with 43 experts. The majority 
(84%) of the respondents were of the opinion that the culling of healthy animals is 
morally unacceptable when the control strategy is based exclusively on economic 
motives, which are governed by European trade policies serving the livestock 
industry, which can be fairly described as large-scale and focused on the export 
market. The prevailing view was that the control strategy values economic interests 
over the lives of living creatures. It was not, however, considered unacceptable to 
kill animals for food production. The moral basis of this view was a respect for life 
taking into account the natural course of life of the animal. In this view, the killing 
of a healthy animal for the production of food is considered acceptable because it is 
the natural life cycle of a production animal; but the culling and destruction of 
healthy animals as a control measure during an epidemic for economic reasons is 
considered unacceptable because the “natural function” of the animal would not yet 
have been fulfilled. 
These findings were corroborated by Stafleu et al. (2004), who described the 
opinion of three groups of four to seven Dutch pig farmers about their relationship 
to their animals. These farmers felt that the farmer and the animal each have a role 
to fulfil in the world as providers of high quality food. The animal is therefore 
functionally determined to live the life of a production animal. Culling healthy 
animals during an epidemic is considered senseless, since the animals had not been 
able to fulfil their task as production animals.  
 
European survey 
In 2004 a survey was conducted in the member states of the European Union to 
describe and analyze the economic, epidemiological, veterinary, and social-ethical 
consequences of the control strategy applied during recent epidemics of foot and 
mouth disease, highly pathogenic avian influenza, and classical swine fever in the 
European Union (Van Asseldonk et al. 2004). The questions of the socio-ethical 
survey addressed the above-mentioned issues of concern and in this article the 
results are presented.  
The aim of this socio-ethical survey is to give more insight into the respective views 
held in the different member states of the European Union on future prevention 
and control strategies with respect to the socio-psychological and the ethical 
consequences to the people and animals involved. The survey thus aims to 
contribute to the discussion about alternative future strategies that society may 
come to support.  
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It was analyzed whether there is consensus on future strategies among the different 
member states in the European Union or whether different views exist. It was 
hypothesized that member states with a recent history of major animal disease 
epidemics would have developed certain views about the strategy applied therein 
and strategies for the future, especially with respect to the social, ethical, and animal 
welfare issues. Under this hypothesis, member states with no recent history of 
epidemics might hold different views, or might not have a sense of urgency to 
participate in the discussion. Furthermore, it was hypothesized that member states 
in different regions in the European Union might, due to their different 
geographical, economic, cultural, social, and religious backgrounds, hold different 
views. It was also considered whether views on the culling of animals and on the 
socio-psychological consequences, reflect different priorities in different regions in 
the European Union. 
 
Method 
 
For this survey a total number of 639 stakeholders were approached. To ensure that 
the choice of stakeholders was a representative selection of stakeholders present in 
the European Union as a whole and per member state, thus reflecting the ideas of a 
broad range of people and views, each stakeholder should be a member of one of 
the following organizations: the Groupe Permanent “Questions Veterinaires”2 or a 
national representative of a European organization whose mission statement 
includes issues concerning epidemic animal diseases and their economic, social or 
ethical consequences; or a national organization directly linked to other relevant 
organizations or departments. 
 
Clustering member states  
The European Union does not categorize its member states by region in a manner 
relevant and applicable to this survey. Such categorization could be based on various 
criteria, for instance geographical, agricultural, or economic differences. In this 
survey the member states were regionalized into a northern, southern, and eastern 
region, based on their presumed geographical and cultural differences. The northern 
region included Austria, Belgium, Denmark, Finland, Germany, Ireland, 
Luxemburg, the Netherlands, Sweden, and the United Kingdom. The southern 
region included Cyprus, France, Greece, Italy, Portugal, Malta, and Spain. The 
eastern region include the Czech Republic, Estonia, Hungary, Latvia, Lithuania, 
Poland, the Slovak Republic, and Slovenia. 
The member states were clustered into either a positive- or a negative-outbreak 
cluster, based on data from the OIE Handistatus II. Only member states which 
experienced one or more major epidemics (in terms of number of animals and/or a 
history of more than one epidemic) between 1996 and 2003 were clustered in a 
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“positive-outbreak cluster.” Incidental small outbreaks, which involve only a limited 
number of farmers and animals, have no major social impact on the community. 
Therefore member states with incidental outbreaks or no outbreaks at all were 
clustered in a “negative-outbreak cluster.” The positive-outbreak cluster included 
Belgium, Germany, Ireland, Luxemburg, the Netherlands, United Kingdom, France, 
Greece, Italy, Spain, Czech Republic, and Slovak Republic. The negative-outbreak 
cluster included Austria, Denmark, Finland, Sweden, Cyprus, Portugal, Estonia, 
Hungary, Latvia, Lithuania, Poland, Slovenia, and Malta. 
Moreover, the United Kingdom, the Netherlands, and Italy were clustered into a 
separate ‘high-incidence cluster’. This was based on the fact that these member 
states had each experienced recent outbreaks of (multiple) major epidemics with a 
high impact on society. It was postulated that this experience might distinguish 
these member states from the other member states in the European Union. Thus 
three country clusters were made: a negative-outbreak cluster, a positive-outbreak 
cluster, and a high-incidence cluster. 
 
 
Clustering stakeholders 
The stakeholders were clustered as follows: 
• Representatives of the authorities. In this case the respondents were the 
Chief Veterinary Officers (CVOs)3 
• Livestock industries and unions; 
• Sectors directly linked to the livestock industry, such as the food-processing 
industry, slaughterhouses, and the transport sector (SL);  
• Sectors not directly linked to the livestock industry, such as the tourism 
sector and retailers (SnL);  
• Veterinary organizations and scientific veterinary institutes; 
• Non-governmental organizations (NGOs), such as organizations for nature 
conservation, zoos, the environment, animal welfare and protection, breeders and 
keepers of rare breeds or backyard animals, consumer organizations, 
organizations dedicated to social issues, human health, or religion;  
• Scientific academies or institutes in the field of agricultural or animal science, 
social studies, animal welfare, philosophy, ethics, food safety, and other relevant 
fields. 
 
Questionnaire 
A total of 639 questionnaires, translated into four languages, were sent by mail or e-
mail. The survey consisted of closed questions, i.e. the respondent could only 
choose among a limited number of answers (indicators). This may have excluded 
certain issues of importance, but in such a large-scale survey this is unavoidable for a 
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useful comparative analysis. The questions focused on (1) the position of the 
stakeholders in the decision-making process; (2) their views about the current 
control strategy applied during an epidemic; and (3) their priorities for future policy.  
Respondents were invited to score priority indicators, thus identifying the 
stakeholders’ priorities in the discussion about current and future strategies. It is 
likely that different stakeholders will have different priorities and missions, which 
will lead them to having different ideas about the strategy to be chosen. This may 
create a situation of conflicting interests between stakeholders. Economic motives 
may prevail in the views of some; animal or human welfare motives may be 
prominent in the views of others. Each stakeholder will present arguments which 
are considered relevant from one particular point of view. These views will be 
reflected in the choice of indicators. 
The total of scores was used to create a priority list. In the public debate, this 
priority list can be used as a starting point for a further discussion about future 
alternative strategies.  
It can be argued whether a certain stakeholder is or is not involved in the decision-
making process for an updated contingency plan for future epidemics, will reflect 
his or her position in the public debate about animal diseases. Stakeholders with a 
direct economic interest in the applied control strategy, such as farmers, agricultural 
organizations, and food-processors, are likely to have a prominent position in the 
decision-making process. Local authorities and veterinarians, who are responsible 
for communicating and executing the strategy, are also indispensable partners in the 
discussion. But the impacts of recent epidemics have made clear that economic and 
veterinary arguments by themselves afford insufficient grounds to justify the choice 
of a strategy. Sociological, psychological, and ethical issues have taken an 
increasingly prominent position in the public debate. A strategy based on non-
vaccination, movement restrictions, and massive culling of healthy animals that is 
insufficient in its attention to communication, animal welfare, and social 
consequences will meet with less support from the farming community and others 
directly involved as well as from the general public. A national government can 
recognize and accommodate these views by including representatives of 
organizations such as animal welfare organizations, breeders and keepers of 
backyard animals, human health organizations, zoos, nature conservation, the 
tourism sector, and consumer organizations in the discussion. Therefore, it is argued 
here that those issues that have received a prominent position in the national public 
debate, and as such are acknowledged by the national authority, are reflected in the 
spectrum of stakeholders involved in the decision-making process.  
 
Data analysis 
Comparative rating scales were used for deriving relative judgments by asking the 
respondent to divide 100 points between the indicators according to his or her 
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assessment of their importance. These comparative rating scales required the 
respondents to make judgments on each indicator with direct reference to 
judgments on the other indicators being evaluated (Van Asseldonk et al. 2004). 
The data were analyzed by member state and by stakeholder cluster, and presented 
in percentages. The number of questionnaires received per member state and per 
stakeholder cluster as well as the number of stakeholders per cluster was unevenly 
distributed. Therefore, the results are presented at the regional level and not at the 
stakeholder level.  
 
Results 
 
One or more responses were received from 24 member states and from 6 
stakeholder clusters. No representatives from Malta or from the SnL cluster 
responded to the questionnaire. A total number of 86 questionnaires were received, 
which is a response rate of 13%. The highest response rate came from Northern 
Europe (19%) and more specifically the Netherlands (47%). In the stakeholder 
cluster the government and the veterinary organizations had the highest response 
rate: 76% and 25%, respectively. Because many member states have not experienced 
recent outbreaks and involvement of a broad spectrum of stakeholders in these 
member states in a discussion about alternative strategies presumably has not been 
an issue, the response rate from those member states was (as expected) low. 
Northern Europe was represented with 59 respondents from 11 member states, 
Southern Europe with 16 respondents from 5 member states and Eastern Europe 
with 12 respondents from 8 member states. 
Most respondents were involved in the decision-making process (74%), especially 
the CVOs (100%) and the veterinary organizations (92%). Fourteen percent of the 
respondents were not involved, and 12% did not indicate their involvement. The 
next-highest levels of stakeholder involvement were by the livestock industry (69%), 
NGOs (63%), the SL (58%), and scientific organizations (57%).  
The respondents were asked which stakeholder groups in their country are the most 
important actors in the decision-making process of a control strategy. All 
stakeholders were unanimous in their opinion that the government is the most 
important actor, followed by the farmers unions and the veterinarians. This 
outcome was to be expected, since it is ultimately the national and European policy-
makers who govern the regulations and make the decisions about the control 
strategy to be applied. It was interesting to see which stakeholders were considered 
to have the least influence of all, i.e., the keepers of backyard animals and the SnL 
sector. The protest of the former group against the culling of healthy backyard 
animals has only been prominent in the Netherlands and not so much in other 
member states. As noted above, no representatives from the SnL category 
responded to the questionnaire. 
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The efficiency of a control strategy to successfully eradicate a disease was seen by 
most as the most important issue in recent epidemics, followed by the social and 
financial consequences for the people involved (Table 1). Animal health and welfare 
scored third place. In the Netherlands, animal welfare scored second place and was 
considered a more important issue than efficiency. Animal health and welfare were 
considered less important issues in the United Kingdom and Italy. The veterinary 
organizations and the NGOs gave a higher priority to animal health and welfare as 
compared to the other stakeholders. 
 
Table 1 Relevant issues in the control strategy applied by percentage 
 Eff SE ME CI AH AW T lC 
N. Europe 23 15 9 8 9 9 6 5 
S. Europe 25 14 8 11 9 11 3 5 
E. Europe 18 15 9 10 4 13 6 5 
Pos  23 14 9 9 9 10 4 4 
Neg 20 15 7 9 6 11 9 7 
NL  12 14 14 9 12 13 2 7 
UK  26 16 6 9 9 8 9 5 
Italy  24 19 6 18 9 7 3 3 
Total HI 21 16 9 12 10 9 5 5 
Gov  21 16 14 15 8 13 7 7 
Livestock 26 35 4 5 6 5 11 10 
SnL 32 11 19 17 6 8 4 4 
Veterinary  31 17 4 5 12 20 6 5 
NGOs  31 9 5 8 15 18 7 6 
Scientific  18 34 8 12 10 7 5 5 
Total SH 27 20 9 10 10 12 7 6 
N S E = Northern Southern Eastern Europe Pos= positive outbreak cluster Neg= negative 
outbreak cluster NL=Netherlands high incidence UK=United Kingdom high incidence, Italy=Italy 
high incidence Total HI= total high incidence Gov=government SnL= Sectors not directly linked 
to the livestock industry NGOs non-governmental organisations Total SH=total stakeholders 
Eff=efficiency SE=socio-economic ME=macro-economic CI= commercial interest AH=animal 
health AW=animal welfare T=tourism lC=live-cycle animal 
 
All respondents chose epidemiological criteria as the most important consideration 
in the choice of a control strategy, followed by economic criteria. The exception was 
the NGOs who rated socio-ethical criteria in second place. This result does not 
necessarily reflect the situation the respondents would prefer, but may instead 
reflect the present situation as viewed by the stakeholders. Not all respondents are 
involved in the decision-making process, and they may feel that socio-ethical criteria 
should, but in practice are not given a high enough priority. 
The priority order of important issues for future strategies was largely similar in the 
positive- and the negative-outbreak clusters, but different in the different regions 
and in the high-incidence cluster (Table 2).  
In the positive- and negative-outbreak clusters the order was (1) preventive 
measures and (2) social, psychological, and financial consequences. Respondents 
from Northern and Southern Europe considered preventive measures the most 
important issue. In Northern Europe communication was deemed almost as 
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important and rated second place. Respondents from Eastern Europe chose social, 
psychological, and financial consequences as the number one priority issue and 
preventive measures second. Overall, animal welfare and related ethical issues 
scored third or fourth place. The Netherlands considered animal welfare to be the 
highest priority issue and socio-psychological and financial issues and preventive 
measures shared second place. In the United Kingdom the socio-psychological and 
financial issues were chosen as the first priority issue and communication rated 
second place. In Italy preventive measures and communication were considered first 
and second, respectively. In the stakeholder cluster preventive measures scored the 
highest. Animal welfare scored relatively low with the stakeholders in or related to 
the livestock industry. The NGOs considered a communication procedure to be the 
first priority and animal welfare scored second place. 
 
Table 2 Priority issues for future strategies by percentage 
 Com SPF AWE PM A Other 
N. Europe 24 21 17 25 8 5 
S. Europe 21 23 12 29 8 6 
E. Europe  14 34 18 26 8 0 
Pos  21 23 18 25 8 5 
Neg  24 24 11 29 8 4 
NL: 14 23 30 23 9 0 
UK 20 28 16 18 17 3 
Italy 23 18 14 38 7 0 
Total HI 19 23 20 26 11 1 
Livestock  22 29 9 27 11 1 
SnL  18 25 9 29 8 12 
Veterinary 23 18 20 29 9 2 
NGOs  27 22 23 21 4 3 
Scientific 15 27 21 27 10 0 
Total SH 21 24 16 27 8 4 
N S E =Northern Southern Eastern Europe Pos=positive outbreak cluster Neg= negative 
outbreak cluster NL=Netherlands high incidence UK=United Kingdom high incidence Italy=Italy 
high incidence Total HI= total high incidence SnL= Sectors not directly linked to the livestock 
industry NGOs non-governmental organisations Total SH=total stakeholders 
Com=communication SPF=Socio-psychological and financial consequences AWE=Animal welfare 
and related ethical issues PM=Preventive measures RA Reputation and position agricultural sector 
 
Discussion 
 
In this discussion, the results from this survey are compared to other studies and to 
recommendations made by expert committees.  
Studies performed in the Netherlands and the United Kingdom have focused on the 
sociological and psychological consequences of animal epidemics and on the ethical 
issues of culling healthy animals. Expert committees in the United Kingdom 
(Anderson 2002 The Royal Society 2002) and in the Netherlands (Raad voor het 
Landelijk Gebied and Raad voor Dieraangelegenheden, 2003, 2004) have issued 
advice on future policy, including risk assessment and preventive measures, 
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vaccination, contingency planning, communication, and animal welfare. Animal 
welfare organizations have advised specifically on animal welfare issues (Farm 
Animal Welfare Council 2002 Laurence 2002 Van den Berg 2002). 
 
Preventive measures 
Preventive measures serve to reduce the risk of transmission of the virus and 
include hygiene measures and measures to regulate human-animal and animal-
animal contact. Preventive measures are of course all-encompassing in tackling all 
the issues under discussion, because the prevention of an animal disease epidemic 
will prevent human trauma and the culling of animals at the same time. Therefore, 
the respondents’ choice for preventive measures as the most important priority issue 
reflects their conviction that it is better to reduce the risk of an outbreak than to 
eradicate a disease, and is in line with the recommendations made by the expert 
committees.  
The expert committees considered it imperative to provide farmers and keepers of 
backyard animals with relevant information about prevention, spread, and hygiene. 
A zero-risk situation was not considered feasible, but preventive measures taken 
within the farming business, such as better hygiene and hygiene protocols, attention 
to contact structure between farms (animal-animal and animal-human), a strong 
reduction of animal transport, and improved diagnostics should result in reducing 
the risk factor. The committees argued that there should be a differentiation in 
control and preventive measures per animal species, business type, region, and 
disease. In the long run, compartmentalization of agricultural regions of cattle-farms 
is required. An ‘Early Warning System’ as formulated by the Royal Society (2002), 
should monitor international animal transport to facilitate timely measures. 
Vaccination as a preventive measure is also presented as a valid tool to prevent 
diseases from occurring or spreading. In recent public discussions, many questioned 
the European non-vaccination policy. It was felt that international trade and market 
priorities drove the World Trade Organization decision to maintain an infection-free 
status without preventive vaccination in the European Union member states. 
Preventive vaccination is more expensive as compared to pre-emptive culling and 
stamping-out of an emerging disease. Veterinary and socio-psychological motives 
which favour preventive vaccination and other consequences of this policy, such as 
the consequences for tourism, zoo animals, wildlife, rare breeds, and the reputation 
of the agricultural sector, were not taken into consideration (Koninklijke 
Nederlandse Akademie van Wetenschappen 2002). Furthermore, inclusion on the 
OIE list of ‘foot and mouth disease-free countries without preventive vaccination’  
gives countries the right to ban the import of meat products from countries where 
vaccination is applied or where foot and mouth disease has emerged, thus 
protecting a listed country’s own market. 
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The expert committees have recommended further possible use of emergency 
vaccination-to-live during an epidemic, since vaccination contributes to a reduction 
in the number of animals culled. In the Netherlands the control strategy had 
included emergency vaccination of all susceptible animals to stop the disease from 
spreading, but these animals were subsequently culled. Furthermore, vaccination-to-
live should include non-infected animals, backyard and recreational animals, zoo 
animals, and rare breed ruminants. 
Having emergency vaccination-to-live as part of a control strategy necessarily 
implies that meat and meat products from vaccinated animals will enter the food 
chain normally. As a consequence, the trading of products of vaccinated animals on 
the international market should receive extra attention, including consumer 
information. During the foot and mouth disease crisis in the United Kingdom, the 
Nestle Company expressed serious reservations about accepting milk from 
vaccinated cows because it presumed and feared a consumer reaction. This was 
referred to as the ‘Nestle factor’. It was unanimously agreed that there is a complete 
absence of any danger associated with vaccinated products, and it was considered 
important to encourage retailers to facilitate the marketing of vaccinated products. 
Vaccination is also supported by animal welfare organizations. According to the 
Farm Animal Welfare Council (2002) an effective national policy of compulsory 
vaccination is an option, provided it has been granted European Union approval 
and provided the public is reassured that products from vaccinated animals present 
no food safety issue. During an epidemic, ring fencing by vaccination, leading to 
fewer animals being culled, has significant welfare benefits. The Dutch Society for 
the Protection of Animals (Van den Berg 2002) favours a Europe-wide policy for 
preventive vaccination, including preventive vaccination of rare breeds, zoo animals 
and backyard animals, and emergency vaccination-to-live. 
Animal epidemics and the culling of animals are not restricted to farm animals; they 
afflict backyard animals and animals in nature reserves and zoos as well. In the 
Netherlands, the discussion whether or not to vaccinate zoo animals, endangered 
species, (semi) wildlife and rare animals was just as intense as the public outrage at 
the destruction of backyard animals. Rare breed ruminants often inhabit nature 
reserves for the purposes of cropping the fields, for biodiversity, and the enjoyment 
of experiencing animals in a natural environment. Zoos house many rare and 
valuable species and are involved in international breeding programs for endangered 
species. Schaftenaar (2002), in a paper for the special OIE series on foot and mouth 
disease issues, stated that the international community recognizes the importance of 
these breeding programs. In his paper Schaftenaar recommends that the zoo 
community should propose an international research program to study the efficacy 
of vaccines and the application of diagnostic tests in non-domestic animals kept in 
zoos; zoos could then apply to the OIE for recognition of their participation in such 
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a research program as zones free of foot and mouth disease, where vaccination is 
applied. 
At the time of this writing in 2006, a pilot study on vaccinating backyard animals is 
taking place in the Netherlands. The results of this pilot study will be presented to 
the other member states.  
 
Communication 
In their advice, the Dutch Councils acknowledged that during the recent crises, lack 
of communication led to frustration among those involved. There is a need to give 
more attention to improved communication between central and local authorities. It 
was further emphasized that the development and execution of future strategies are 
a shared responsibility and that all stakeholders should thus participate in the 
discussion about updating contingency plans. In this discussion, the moral outrage 
at the massive culling of healthy animals requires special attention, since this 
involves society as a whole. Keepers of backyard and zoo animals and nature 
conservation organizations demand more attention to their specific situation.  
Furthermore, it was recommended that authorities should be better prepared, 
specifically by organizing a local crisis team consisting of people with knowledge of 
the situation who would give more attention to social aid during and after a crisis. 
 
Reputation and position of the agricultural sector  
Stafleu et al. (2004) have described the changing reputation of the farming 
community and society’s critical attitude towards the agricultural business, partly as a 
result of recent crises. Farmers are criticized because of the relationship assumed to 
exist between current farming practices (large-scale factory farming) and the 
disastrous effects of recent epidemics. It is thought that farmers are guided mainly 
by economic motives, and less so by a concern for animal welfare, food safety, and 
the environment. 
The pig farmers (three groups of four to seven people) interviewed for this study 
claimed that their priorities and motivation for farming include respect for animals, 
business continuity, and living with the seasons. Farmers value free enterprise, and 
farming is often a family business. They appreciate working with the living nature 
and animals. Respect for animals, in their view, usually finds expression in matters 
of health and welfare. They respect the functions prescribed to the production 
animal and the farmer; i.e., the farmer and the animal have a shared role to fulfil in 
the world as providers of high quality food. This is considered more a calling than a 
profession; it is a way of life and the very essence of being a farmer. In this respect 
the culling of a healthy animal (even in a crisis) is considered a sin, because the 
natural function of the production animal will not be fulfilled. 
Another Dutch study (Van Haaften and Kersten 2002) identified two categories of 
dairy farmers. The farmers in the first category were described as motivated by 
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economic motives, and they considered animals as a production factor. The farmers 
in the second category were emotionally attached to their animals, acknowledged the 
intrinsic value (a value in their own right) of animals, and granted animals a central 
position in the farming business, even considering them as members of the family. 
These different points of view were reflected in the preferred choice of control 
strategy to be applied. The first category regretted the culling of animals but 
emphasized the importance of a strong position on the international export market. 
The second category was deeply angered by the culling of healthy animals, especially 
since there was a vaccine at hand. Farmers whose philosophy of life includes respect 
for the natural course of life were especially outraged. Under the current policy, this 
category of farmers felt they were forced to run their business in a non-animal 
friendly way and could not understand the non-vaccination policy in order to 
protect export interests. 
The reputation and position of the agricultural sector was considered the least 
important issue in the European survey and usually came up last in the priority 
listing. Expert committees did not address the issue explicitly, but implicitly a future 
policy should rely on a better understanding and a shared responsibility between all 
stakeholders. Therefore, a control strategy which is acceptable in the public domain 
will likely improve the reputation of the livestock industry. 
 
Conclusion 
 
The results of this survey show that the recommendations made by expert 
committees and animal welfare organizations are in line with the results of this 
study, especially with respect to preventive measures and social, animal welfare, and 
ethical issues. Therefore, even though the response rate was low, some conclusions 
can be drawn.  
The hypothesis that the positive-outbreak cluster and the negative-outbreak cluster 
might hold different views concerning animal welfare and socio-psychological issues 
could not be substantiated from the results of the priority listing. The results 
furthermore showed that the priority orders expressed in the three member states of 
the high-incidence cluster (the Netherlands, the United Kingdom, and Italy) differed 
from one another.  
The hypothesis that stakeholders from different regions of the European Union 
might hold different views concerning the priority issues was substantiated as each 
of the three regions responded with a different priority order. It is interesting to 
note that socio-psychological and financial issues rated highest with respondents in 
Eastern Europe, even though no member state in this region has recently had a 
major epidemic. We recognize that this survey is just a first step and the results may 
have been affected by the limited number of stakeholders from this region who had 
responded, and because the representation of stakeholders was not evenly 
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distributed in and between the member states. Therefore, we can only speculate to 
explain the results. 
These differences in views may be attributed to variations in agricultural history and 
structure of the rural areas of the individual regions. In Northern Europe for 
example and in the Netherlands in particular, the agricultural sector has shifted 
towards large-scale agri-businesses depending mainly on the export of animals and 
animal products. Consequently, animal epidemics affect the livestock sector as 
whole. Opting for preventive measures requires a (financial) commitment of all 
parties involved in the livestock sector because the effectiveness of preventive 
measures is dependent on the cooperation of all. The livestock industry in Eastern 
European countries is not homogenous. The dual farm structure found there is no 
doubt one of the characteristics of agriculture which impacts the views held in these 
member states. For example, there are many small farms which are often part-time 
in nature; but there are also very large enterprises. The emphasis in these countries 
may be less on the export of products than on individual efforts to improve the 
efficiency of one’s business in terms of modernization and production. It can be 
plausibly concluded that different priorities on control strategies might be attributed 
to different levels of perception: export-oriented countries may think in terms of the 
benefit to the livestock sector as a whole, while Eastern European countries may 
consider the consequences for the individual farmer first. The outcome may mirror 
farmers’ individual interests versus sector interests. This duality of interests was 
observed at the national level in the study of Van Haaften and Kersten (2002), who 
described a clash of interests between farmers who valued a strong international 
trade position over the lives of their animals against farmers who had failed to see 
the justification of a non-vaccination policy and who had suffered deeply over the 
loss of their animals. 
 
Recommendations 
 
The survey has given a first impression of the spectrum of views held in the 
member states of the European Union on the subject of future control policies. We 
recommend further research not only at the European, but at the national level as 
well, for several reasons. First, relevant stakeholders are more easily identified and 
approached at the national level. This should stimulate their involvement in the 
survey, thereby increasing the response rate and in turn resulting in a more 
representative number of respondents from all stakeholder categories. Second, a 
stakeholder study at the national level may very well uncover issues of importance 
not addressed in this study, in which the stakeholders’ possible responses were 
limited to the indicators presented them. While these were comprehensive, other 
relevant issues and indicators are certainly possible. Lastly, a series of comparative 
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national surveys would potentially offer greater understanding of the regional 
differences observed herein. 
The diversity in the spectrum of views observed and described herein may be the 
result of the various respondents’ individual experiences with outbreaks, of a 
stakeholder’s position in the public debate, and of social and cultural differences 
between the member states. Such social and cultural differences may be reflected in 
differing perspectives on what constitutes morally acceptable treatment of animals. 
The relationship between man and animal has in recent years evolved from a purely 
functional relationship in which the animal is valued mostly for its instrumental 
utility to humans, towards one in which respect for the value of the animal as a 
being in its own right plays a significant role. The debate about animal welfare and 
respect for life varies in prominence from one member state to another and may 
also vary with respect to animal species (e.g., cloven-hoofed animals versus poultry). 
While beyond the scope of this study, it would be interesting and useful to examine 
how views on our moral responsibility towards animals differ in various member 
states and whether differences should be understood in terms of differences in 
culture, rural structure, or otherwise. 
Actions taken to control recent epidemics consistently indicated a balancing 
between the interests of the various stakeholders; but in the Netherlands, 
acknowledgement that keepers of backyard animals, who keep animals for non-
commercial purposes, and professional livestock farmers have different interests 
came only after the epidemics had been contained. Over the last few decades, the 
scale of livestock farming in the Netherlands has grown considerably, even though 
the number of farms and farmers has decreased. At the same time, ever more 
people are keeping backyard animals for company, for breeding, or for recreational 
purposes. These people usually have a strong emotional bond with their animals and 
fail to see the justification for culling healthy animals for economic reasons. This has 
led to major traumas and to strong resistance to the culling of healthy backyard 
animals within this group. In order to avoid or at least mitigate this, any successful 
control strategy need take into account the non-economic interests of this group. 
Towards this end, a national-level survey could identify to what extent keepers of 
backyard animals in the different member states can and should be seen as a 
separate group with their own interests. It might also explore whether differences in 
the sociology of respective rural areas, farming practices, perceptions of their way of 
life, and views on human-animal relationships result in members within this group, 
but from different member states, have different values and perspectives. Such a 
survey would require a sound definition of this potential new stakeholder group, in 
order to distinguish its members from professional farmers.  
The balancing of interests applied in controlling epidemics has involved not only the 
interests of the different stakeholders, but also the interests of humans (economic, 
financial, and social) on the one hand and animals (welfare issues, respect for life) 
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on the other. Recent outbreaks of highly pathogenic avian influenza H5N1 in 2005 
and 2006 posed a novel health hazard to humans. In a future outbreak of highly 
pathogenic avian influenza H5N1, a potential human health risk may lead to a re-
balancing of interests. An additional survey with a focus on the outbreaks of highly 
pathogenic avian influenza of type H5N1 in Europe in 2005 and 2006 may clarify 
how a potential human health risk is appraised in the balancing of human versus 
animal interests.  
Vaccination as a means of preventing or controlling an animal disease – whether 
with or without an attendant human health risk – has been extensively discussed in 
recent conferences, as well as by expert committees. Both preventive vaccination 
and emergency vaccination-to-live are considered valuable and sensible choices for 
addressing these concerns in the future, as they offer the advantages of avoiding 
further social and psychological trauma to those involved and the culling of healthy 
animals.  
 
Notes 
 
1. Data about the number of animals infected and culled during animal disease 
epidemics and data about countries with outbreaks of animal diseases were obtained 
from the World Organisation for Animal Health (Office International de Epizooties 
at www.oie.int: Handistatus II). 
2. National representatives of the European organizations organized in the Groupe 
Permanente “Questions Veterinaires” are: Committee of Agricultural Organizations 
in the EU (COPA), General Committee for Agricultural Co-operation in the EU 
(COGECA), European Liaison Committee for the Agri-food Trade (CELCAA), 
Confederation of Family Organizations in the European Community (COFACE), 
Confederation of the Food and Drink Industries of the EU (CIAA), 
Eurocommerce, European Community of Consumers Co-operatives 
(EUROCOOP), European Consumers Organization (BEUC), European Federation 
of Trade Unions in the Food, Agriculture and Tourism Sectors and Allied Branches 
(EFFAT), Federation of Veterinarians of Europe (FVE), Syndicat Européen des 
Travailleurs de l’alimentation de l’hôtellerie et des Branches Connexes (SETA-
UITA) dans l’UITA (observer). 
3. CVOs are the chief veterinary officers who are responsible for the veterinary 
policy advice to the minister, formal admittance of veterinary medical products, 
veterinary disciplinary law, animal welfare and crisis management.  
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Abstract During three recent animal disease epidemics in the European Union, 
millions of healthy non-human animals were culled. This was done to stop the 
disease from spreading and to restore free trade between ‘disease-free’ countries. 
The culling was met with major resistance by animal keepers and society at large. 
This was partly due to the fact that this culling strategy did not distinguish between 
commercial and non-commercial animal practices, even though these practices 
differed with respect to their nature and specific human-animal bond. Many 
backyard animal keepers resisted the culling of their animals. They felt that culling 
was not justified, because backyard animals were not kept for the food production 
and were therefore not exported.  
Presently, new prevention and control strategies are developed at the European 
level that aim for more public support. To this purpose more should be known 
about the various animal practices with respect to the nature of the practice and its 
specific human-animal bond. In this paper the results are presented of a study 
performed among backyard animal keepers in the Netherlands. The practice is 
described in terms of a number of demographic characteristics, the species kept, the 
reason to keep backyard animals, and the specific human-animal bond. 
Furthermore, the backyard animal keepers were asked to give their views on their 
relationship with animals and nature, the killing and culling of animals, their trust in 
the government with respect to the culling, and their preferred prevention and 
control strategies. 
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Introduction 
 
From 1997 onwards, Europe faced three epidemic outbreaks of classical swine fever 
(1997-1998), foot and mouth disease (2001) and highly pathogenic avian influenza 
(2003). Millions of infected and healthy non-human animals were culled in the 
stamping-out strategy (www.OIE.int  Handistatus I I, retrieved November 2007). 
This included not only animals kept for the production of food, but also backyard 
animals, animals in nature reserves, and rare breeds. The Netherlands and the 
United Kingdom especially were two countries that were faced with the 
consequences of major outbreaks. This choice to cull instead of to vaccinate was 
motivated by veterinary and economic reasons. At that time no marker vaccine was 
available by which an infected animal could be distinguished from a vaccinated 
animal. Moreover, a non-vaccination policy enabled free trade between countries 
that had adopted this policy. Free trade was only allowed between countries with a 
disease-free status. Calculations of the financial consequences of a presumed 
outbreak showed that preventive vaccination was more expensive than culling 
(Berendsen 1991). From an economic and veterinary point of view culling was 
defendable. From a social point of view it was contested and resisted to such an 
extent that nationwide social unrest and civil disobedience followed. Trauma was 
the result, not because the economic reasons in themselves were contested but 
because economic reasons were no longer considered sufficient justification to cull 
healthy animals at such a large scale. It had become a collision of moral convictions 
about the right or wrong reasons to kill animals. This made clear that economic 
decisions are value-laden, because it weighs the economic value of animals against 
their value as companions, as members of a rare species, as animal co-farmers, and 
as living beings with a right to life.  
 
Our moral convictions about what is right and what is wrong in the use and 
treatment of animals is deeply embedded not only in our bond with animals in our 
human community but also in all kinds of social, cultural, religious, regional or other 
structures (Armstrong and Boltzer 2003). It is also a part of the whole of public 
morality about how people should live peacefully with each other, with animals and 
with the natural world. As social change occurs all the time, our convictions about 
animals change accordingly. This may remain unnoticed for some time until an 
acute animal issue demands the attention and requires one to take position. The 
epidemics were such a situation. It revealed the existence of new animal practices 
with a human-animal bond different from the farming practice and with different 
values with respect to their animals. Backyard animals for instance are mainly kept 
for non-commercial reasons, and are usually not sold or exported. Their keepers felt 
that the stamping-out policy had favoured professional farmers over other animal 
keepers, because it was mainly designed for the benefits of the livestock sector. It 
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became clear that this practice had up till then been invisible to policy-makers in the 
drawing up of the then current control strategy. As a result, a re-evaluation of the 
prevention and control strategies is taking place at the international level, because it 
is acknowledged that future policy-making requires knowledge of existing and new 
animal practices and their moral convictions (Raad voor Dierenaangelegenheden 
2003, 2004). Therefore, it is helpful to learn more about these practices, to better 
anticipate their interests to avoid further unrest. 
 
Backyard animal keeping 
In a changing Dutch rural area, new animal practices are emerging (Raad voor het 
Landelijk Gebied 2001). An animal practice is a set of activities involving animals, 
with a certain aim, and with its own internal human-animal bond (Waelbers et al. 
2004 Velde et al. 2002). These new animal practices are distinct from the 
commercial livestock sector, in that animals are now also kept for other purposes 
such as hobby breeding, company, recreation, education, therapeutic reasons or 
sport. These new developments in animal keeping have led to a shift in the human-
animal bond, from a functional to an individual and emotional valuation, in which 
animals serve a different purpose and are valued as an individual and an experience. 
In spite of these developments, policy makers have not given much attention to this 
diversity of animal keeping in the rural area and its specific human-animal bond. 
The practice of backyard animal keeping has only been described by a few authors 
in the Netherlands (Ziel  2003 Treep et al. 2004 Sijtsema et al. 2005 Raad voor 
Dieraangelegenheden 2003). There is no comprehensive definition of the practice, 
and the term ‘backyard animal’ has a different meaning in different countries. It may 
refer to animals who are kept outdoors for non-commercial purposes, but is also 
used to refer to animals who are kept by smallholders for the small-scale 
commercial production of animal products. The term ‘hobby farming’ is used to 
describe small scale farmers who breed and sell animals not as a major source of 
income, but as a side activity which is also seen as a way of life (Holloway 2000, 
2001 Wilkie 2005). In the Netherlands, the term ’hobby animal’ is used to emphasise 
that these animals are kept for recreational and not for commercial purposes. In the 
current study, the term ‘backyard animal’ is chosen to describe animals who are kept 
outdoors for non-commercial purposes and to avoid any confusion with the term 
‘hobby farming’. The Dutch Council for Animal Affairs (English translation of Raad 
voor Dieraangelegenheden) defines backyard animals as ‘animal species normally kept for 
production purposes, especially cloven-hoofed animals - such as cattle, pigs, sheep, and goats - and 
horses and poultry. Backyard animals are not kept for production purposes and therefore do not 
serve an economic purpose. They are kept for educational, recreational or hobby reasons’ (Raad 
voor Dierenaangelegenheden 2003/02, translated by the authors). There are no 
definite data about the total number of non-commercial backyard animals and their 
keepers in the Netherlands. The number of keepers is estimated to be up to 400,000 
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people (Treep 2004). The number of animals kept is estimated as: poultry and 
waterfowl: 1,000,000-1,500,000, sheep: 450,000, horses and ponies: 200,000, goats: 
112,000, pigs: 2,000-4,000, and cows: 3,000-4,000 (Treep 2004). 
 
Aim of the study 
The aim of this study is to provide more insight into the practice of backyard animal 
keeping in the Netherlands. This was done by describing the nature of the practice, 
its specific human-animal bond, and the views of the keepers on their relationship 
with animals and nature, the killing and culling of animals, their trust in the 
government, and their preferred prevention and control strategies. Moreover, the 
moral vocabulary used by these keepers who had experienced the epidemics was 
studied to describe their moral objections to the culling. In this paper, the results of 
an empirical study performed in 2006 among keepers of backyard animals in the 
Netherlands are presented. 
 
Methodology 
 
In 2006 a qualitative study and a quantitative survey were performed among keepers 
of backyard animals in the Netherlands. For the qualitative study, 24 interviews were 
held with representatives of 20 organisations, which served the interests of non-
commercial breeders and keepers of backyard animals. Sometimes more than one 
interview was conducted per organisation, when the interviewees had specific 
knowledge or experience relevant for the study. The organisations included four 
umbrella organisations (which are organisations that include and represent the 
interests of backyard animal keepers: ten organisations for cloven-hoofed animals, 
and ten for poultry or other birds). The aim of the interviews was to constitute a 
basis for the survey, and for a better understanding of the results of the survey. The 
survey was performed among 214 backyard animal keepers, who were contacted 
through the above-mentioned organisations and a call on www.marktplaats.nl. 
Marktplaats.nl is comparable to eBay, and is a place to exchange, sell or buy goods, 
products and animals, such as backyard animals. The survey consisted of closed 
questions about the nature of the animal practice, described by means of a number 
of demographic characteristics of the respondents (i.e. gender, age, and education 
level), the animal species kept, the reason for keeping animals, and the human-
animal bond. Other questions concerned the nature of the human-animal bond. 
This bond can be described as relational, functional, or a combination of the two. In 
this study a bond was defined as relational when the main aim is the personal 
contact between the human and the animal, such as between companion animals 
and their keepers. Still in this relation all kinds of functional activities with the 
animals can be performed, such as breeding a rare species, or horseback riding. In 
the current study a bond is called relational, when the main aim is the contact 
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between the person and the animal. A bond was defined as functional when it is 
mainly based on the utility of the animal, such as between farmers and animals kept 
for the food production. A farmer may have a personal bond with his or her 
animals, but the ultimate aim of the practice is to provide food on a commercial 
basis.  
 
Other questions were about the views on the interrelation of people with animals 
and nature. To describe these interactions the typology by Kupper was used 
(Kupper 2009). These typologies describe four viewpoints on animals: the 
biocentric, the relational, the functional and the holistic view. In the biocentric view, 
the emphasis is not so much on a relation between two individuals, but on an 
interconnection between animals and humans who are dependent on each other in 
the natural order of things. From the functional viewpoint, animals are subordinate 
to humans and are mainly valued for their utility to humans. From the relational 
viewpoint, the core domain is the interpersonal relation between one person and an 
animal. The holistic viewpoint takes this one step further and holds that animals are 
our teachers and show us that man and animal are both domains of a greater unity. 
In a next step, the respondents were invited to give their opinion on their preferred 
animal disease control strategy, their trust in the government and their views on the 
justification on the culling of healthy animals during an animal disease epidemic. 
Furthermore, they gave their views on the killing of healthy animals in general to 
compare this with their views on the culling.  
 
The results were analysed using cross references and Chi square (p<0.05). The 
following categories were compiled: the category ‘animal species’ with: ‘poultry’, 
‘cloven-hoofed animals’, and ‘other species’ (including all other animal species not 
necessarily backyard animals, such as horses, rabbits, and companion animals), the 
category ‘reasons to keep animals’ with: ‘breeding’, ‘sport’, ‘commercial’, ‘grazing’, 
‘company’, ‘consumption’, ‘shelter’, and ‘therapy’, the category ‘typology’ with: 
‘biocentric’, ‘relational’, ‘functional’ and ‘holistic’, the category ‘gender’ with ‘male’ 
and ‘female’, the category ‘age’ with: ‘31-40’, ‘41-70’, and ‘71-90’ (these age 
categories were compiled on the basis of the age spectrum of the respondents), the 
category ‘highest education level’ with: ‘primary education’, ‘lower to middle 
secondary education’, and ‘higher secondary education to university degree’, and the 
category ‘yes/no experienced an animal disease epidemic’. This included the culling 
of one’s own animals, indoor keeping, transport restrictions or other related matters 
during previous outbreaks of classical swine fever, foot and mouth disease and 
highly pathogenic avian influenza.  
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Results 
 
The nature of the practice and the human animal bond 
The respondents were predominantly male, and between 41-70 years of age, with 
33% in the ‘51-60’ age group. The education level was quite high, with most 
respondents with a higher education level or university degree (54%). Of the 
respondents, 86% kept poultry, 44% kept cloven-hoofed animals, and 29% kept 
other animal species. Usually more than one animal species was kept. Most men and 
women kept poultry. More women kept cloven-hoofed animals and other animals 
than men (23%). Table one gives the results of the demographic data, species kept 
and gender differences. 
 
Table 1 Demographic data and gender differences in column percentages 
Categories subcategories Total  N Male  N Female 
 
N 
  100 214 73 157 27 57
31-40 4 9 5 8 2 1 
41-70 80 171 84 132 68 39
Age 
71-90 15 32 11 17 28 16
Primary school 11 24 8s 13 20s 11
Lower to middle 
secondary education 
34 73 37 58 27 15
Highest 
education 
level 
Higher secondary 
education to university 
54 116 54 85 54 31
Poultry 86 184 88 138 79 45
Cloven hoofed 44 94 37s 58 65s 37
*Species 
Other animals 29 62 23s 36 46s 26
 s=significant p<0.05 * Categories not mutually exclusive. Results rounded off 
 
Table two gives the reasons to keep backyard animals. The animals were kept in the 
first place for company, followed by breeding and sports. Company was the main 
reason for respondents between the age 41 and 70, and for respondents with a 
higher education or university level. More men (66%) kept poultry for company 
than women (34%). but the relative contribution of women in this category is 
significantly higher; in absolute numbers this is 60 men out of 137 and 31 out of 45 
women keep poultry for company. Breeding was performed in all three species 
categories. The reasons for breeding were to preserve a rare species from being 
extinct, to breed a fancy species, or to return an Old-Dutch breed to its original 
state and region. Sometimes, the animals were merely bred for the pleasure of 
having young animals around the house. Often the breeders bred for the purpose of 
their sport and to present their animals at special shows. Breeding was dominated by 
the male respondents in all three species categories, and was the highest in the 
‘poultry’ group (90%). Sport includes all the recreational activities with animals, such 
as shows, horseback riding, pigeon racing, etc. Sport was performed substantially 
more with poultry (shows for special breeds) and with animals from the ‘other  
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 Table 2 Reasons to keep animals for the three species categories in column percentages 
Reasons/species Poultry* N Cloven-hoofed* N Other species* N 
Company 50 91 58 54 61 38 
Breeding 37 68 30 28 18 11 
Sport 1 21 39 3 3 32 20 
Consumption 20 36 12 11 2 1 
Grazing 4 8 32 30 3 2 
Shelter 1 2 2 2 3 2 
Therapy2 1 2 2 2 3 2 
Commercial 0 0 4 4 2 1 
   1 Animal shows, horseback riding, pigeon races etc. 2For instance green care farms  
* Categories not mutually exclusive Results rounded off 
 
species’ group (e.g. jumping and dressage for horses and ponies): 21% and 32% 
respectively, than with cloven-hoofed animals (3%). Most had experienced an 
animal epidemic (66%, of which 89% had experienced by the highly pathogenic 
avian influenza epidemic).  
Most respondents, both men and women, had chosen the biocentric view. The 
women scored the relational view and the holistic view higher. The men scored the 
functional view higher. Figure one shows the distribution between the typology 
views and the differences between the men and the women. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Figure 1 Gender differences in the choice of preferred typology in percentages 
 
Animal disease epidemics and the culling of healthy animals 
Most respondents did not consider culling justified (89%). The respondents who did 
not consider this justified stated that when taking preventive measures healthy 
animals were not considered a risk factor (87%), healthy animals were considered to 
have a right to life (45%), culling healthy animals will lead to emotional problems 
with the keepers (39%), and healthy animals can still be used for the food 
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production (26%). The 11% who considered it justified to cull healthy animals 
supported their opinion that the culling was necessary to protect the export position 
of a country, but only production animals should be culled. Furthermore, it was 
stated that these animals can be carrier of the disease (50%). Lastly, 9% pointed out 
that government is a democratically chosen institute, therefore representing the 
interests of society as a whole.  
The respondents were asked about their preferred prevention and control strategy. 
A percentage of 60% of the respondents was in favour of preventive vaccination for 
susceptible animals (23% made an exception for wild animals). A percentage of 32% 
preferred a strategy to have infected animals culled and to give other (susceptible) 
animals an emergency vaccination to live. For highly pathogenic avian influenza 
(table four), which can be hazardous to human health and can even be lethal, 68% 
the respondents chose a combination of preventive measures, especially less animal 
transports (79%), protection of people against the disease (48%), and training 
slaughter men (27%). In an outbreak of this disease, a combination of measures was 
chosen: indoor keeping (76%), transport restrictions (67%). In the infected area 
infected poultry should be culled.  
 
Killing animals 
A majority of the respondents (90%) considered it acceptable to kill healthy animals, 
but only for specific purposes. Most acceptable was the food production (95%), 
followed by human health hazard (50%), animal welfare (39%), to stop a contagious 
animal disease (29%) surplus animals (27%). The respondents who did not find it 
acceptable to kill healthy animals supported this by the argument that healthy 
animals in general have a right to life (80%).  
The respondents were asked about their trust in the government. A majority of 64% 
had indicated that their opinion about the government had changed because of to 
the epidemics. They had lost faith in the government and/or suspected that the 
government had used the epidemics to reorganise the livestock sector. 
 
Discussion 
 
The assumption of our study was that for successful future prevention and control 
policy of contagious animal diseases one needs to obtain more insight into the 
nature of the different animal practices involved. One should not only know what a 
practice is about: why are the animals kept, what animals are kept and who are the 
keepers. One should also know whether the nature of a practice has consequences 
for the justification of a policy.  
The respondents and the interviewees were representatives of interest organisations 
for backyard animal keepers. They may not have been completely representative, 
because most backyard animal keepers are not organised. These organisations were 
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contacted and a call for participation was sent out through the Internet. This 
method was most likely to attract people who were already interested about issues 
concerning backyard animals, and may have already formed an opinion about future 
strategy for animal diseases. Furthermore, the organisations contacted usually 
represented the interests of breeders, because breeders require pedigree registration, 
exchange of animals and information, and like to participate in organised activities, 
such as shows or sport.  
The decision to keep backyard animals at a certain moment in life may find its basis 
in childhood or can be a way to appreciate rural life. Most interviewees (76%) were 
born and brought up in the country, and had often kept livestock animals and pets 
as childhood companions. This was the main reason why, as an adult, they decided 
to keep animals. Other studies (Endenburg 1994, 1995 Miura et al. 2002 Fidler 
2003) found a positive association between childhood pet-keeping and current 
favourable attitudes to animals. Some interviewees though, had moved from the city 
to the countryside and kept animals as part of their new life in the rural area. On the 
whole, keeping backyard animals was seen as a way of life, which was explained as 
the experiencing of nature through animals in a rural environment. This finding was 
supported by Sijstema et al. (2005). 
The majority of the respondents were men and were older, with a higher education, 
and who mostly kept poultry. This does not necessarily mean that this is a fair 
description of this practice, because, as said, the participants may not have been 
completely representative. These results are partly supported by those of Treep et 
al., (2004) and Sijtsema et al., (2005), but Treep et al. found that pigeons were the 
species kept by most, followed by poultry, and the respondents in the study of 
Sijtsema were on average 35 years of age, and 64% female. The dominant 
representation of men in our study could be explained by the fact that the 
participants in our study were for a part contacted through the membership of an 
organisation, which were usually clubs for breeders and breeding is mostly 
performed by men. With respect to age and education; backyard animals need 
sufficient outdoor space, are time-consuming and - dependent on the species - may 
be expensive in terms of feed, veterinary care, housing and otherwise. People who 
have settled down and have a sufficient income, which may be more prevalent in 
people who are somewhat older and with a higher education, may have enough 
time, space and means to finance this hobby. Poultry as the most popular species 
kept, does not need much space, and can even be kept in an urban area. In keeping 
poultry is not as expensive as cloven-hoofed animals or horses. This in part could 
account for their popularity.  
The human-animal bond in this practice is relational as well as functional. Company 
is the main relational reason to keep backyard animals. The interviewees support 
these findings and describe the essence of the bond with their animals in terms of 
‘contact’, ‘company’, ‘care’ and ‘attachment’. Backyard animals serve a functional 
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purpose as well; for breeding, grazing, sporting, providing animal products, or for 
therapeutic reasons. These functional qualities do not serve a commercial purpose 
though, and are another way to interact with animals.  
When comparing the nature of the backyard animal practice and its specific human-
animal bond to the commercial livestock sector (Holloway 2000, 2001, Wilkie 2005), 
and to the keeping of companion animals (Eddy 2003 Rollin 2003 Copeland 2003 
Sanders 2003 Hart 2003 Lawrence 2003 Endenburg et al. 1994), backyard animals 
are positioned somewhere between the two.  Breeders of backyard animals are 
closer to commercial farmers than non-breeders in their functional attitude to their 
animals, but commercial farmers breed to sell animal products, and non-commercial 
breeders usually wish to restore or improve a special breed, for sport or for the 
biodiversity in a certain area. At the same time, backyard animals are close to 
companion animals, due to the relational nature of the contact, which is personal 
and individualised. Furthermore, backyard animals, as well as companion animals, 
are usually not killed for food. Still the status of backyard animals is lower, which is 
also described by Sijtsema et al. (2005), and can be explained by the fact that 
companion animals live in the house, and are therefore included into the innermost 
circle of the family. This role of physical proximity is described by Lookabaugh 
Triebenbacher (1999) and Shore et al (2006), who found that close proximity of an 
animal intensifies the attachment.  
The biocentric view was chosen the most often. This view emphases the 
interconnectedness of humans and other animals in a natural system. It describes a 
relationship with animals which is still slightly hierarchical, but respects that animals 
have their own place in the natural world, independent of their use to humans. 
Humans and animals are both indispensable domains in nature. But even though 
animals have an acknowledged value in their own right, humans are still allowed to 
use them for their own purposes, provided the animals’ species-specific needs are 
acknowledged. In this respect, keeping backyard animals is allowed as a way to 
interact with the living nature.  
These findings are reflected in a study by De Groot et al. (2003) among 172 
inhabitants of a small town in The Netherlands. De Groot et al. propose three types 
of relationships between people and nature: 1) man the adventurer and explorer of 
nature 2) man responsible for nature and 3) man the participant in nature. This 
spectrum of typologies moves from an anthropocentric to an ecocentric view and is 
comparable to the typologies used in our study. De Groot found that the second 
typology was predominant, and the third typology had gained more ground than the 
first. These results show that in this view, animals and other natural domains are all 
part of nature and are therefore equal partners. This view describes a new 
relationship with nature; i.e. moving away from a wish to master nature to a more 
participatory or interactive bonding, and shifts from a functional use to a more 
relational experiencing of nature. 
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The functional type was chosen by more men and by the breeders, and highlights 
the functional qualities of animals in a hierarchical relationship with humans. This 
functional appreciation was reflected in a high acceptability of killing healthy animals 
for functional reasons.  
The holistic view is positioned at the other end of the spectrum. Respondents with a 
holistic view, though their number was very low, held a very high appreciation for 
the company of animals, through which the (spiritual) connection with the natural 
world is felt. The functional aspects of animal keeping were valued very low. 
Furthermore, killing healthy animals was considered not acceptable by one third of 
these respondents, which is the highest percentage.  
The justification to kill healthy animals is the result of a weighing of interests of 
animals and humans. In this study, one of the objects was to clarify which reasons 
to kill were considered justified in this particular animal practice. The killing of 
animals for food was supported by most. One of the criticisms against the culling 
and destruction of production animals was that the culling of these animals, which 
served a purpose as the providers of food, was a waste of a valuable food source. 
Even though a percentage of 92% of the interviewees and 95% of the respondents 
deemed it acceptable to kill animals for consumption, this did not necessarily 
include one’s own animals. Sijtsema et al. (2005) found that only 25% of the 
respondents (N=682) did eat their own animals. In our study, 20% of the 
respondents consumed their own poultry products, and 12% consumed products of 
their cloven-hoofed animals.  
In a study performed by Rutgers et al. (2003) in 2001, among 1939 randomly 
selected Dutch respondents, the opinion about the killing of healthy animals was 
studied. A percentage of 84% disagreed with the culling of healthy animals in an 
animal disease (for economic reasons). This could be explained by the fact that most 
respondents had experienced an animal epidemic, be it personally or indirectly. This 
means that experience may lower the acceptability of culling healthy animals. One 
agreed with killing an animal when it is ill. This explains that an infected animal may 
be killed but healthy animals not. Killing for human health reasons was acceptable 
by 50%. In an animal disease which may be harmful to humans as well, as with the 
H5N1 highly pathogenic avian influenza virus (bird flu), human health interests may 
override animal life. However, the wording of the questions in the questionnaire was 
rather general, and did not specify whether a human health risk entailed mild or 
serious consequences, such as eye infections or lethal effects. Had a more detailed 
description of the human health risks been given, then the justification of culling 
would probably have been more dependent on the risks involved. To conclude, 
killing animals as such is not rejected but shows that sound justification is needed 
and that people’s convictions about what exactly is justified is context dependent 
and change over time. 
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The male and (relatively more) female respondents kept their animals first for 
company. The male respondents kept poultry for breeding and company alike. The 
preference for poultry by men could be that men may choose an animal species on 
the basis of the possible activities one can perform with this species, and poultry is 
the species kept the most for breeding and sport, and is relatively easy to keep. The 
higher appreciation for company by the women may explain their preference for 
cloven-hoofed animals and animals from the ‘other’ category. Being mostly 
mammals, these animals are possibly easier to identify with, and may be more 
capable of reciprocating the affection, which is suggested by Sijstema et al. (2005).  
The men chose the biocentric view the highest, but also held a more functional view 
of their animals. The women on the other hand valued the functionality of the 
animals the least, and preferred all other forms of relations with animals: either on 
an individual basis or as part of a natural or spiritual unity. One can conclude that 
for the female respondents the human-animal bond was mainly relational, and for 
the men it was a combination of a relational and functional bonding. 
Other studies described gender differences as well (Hills 1993 Herzog 1991, 2007 
Fidler 2003). The authors describe the attitude of women as based on identification 
with the animal and empathy for their treatment, while the valuation by men seemed 
to be more instrumental.  
 
Implications for policy 
Backyard animal keepers as an emerging animal practice in the Dutch rural area 
have interests which are separate from those of commercial farming. Both groups 
demand certain autonomy to run their practice as they see fit and to care for and 
treat their animals in accordance with the human-animal bond specific to this 
practice. This situation has a potential to cause friction when policy choices have to 
be made at a level that included non-commercial as well as commercial keepers. 
From a liberal point of view this autonomy to act should be respected with a 
government intervening only to prevent harm done to others. This approach though 
is no so clearly justifiable from a moral point of view. These animal practices exist 
next to each other but differ with respect to the nature of the practice, the human 
animal bond and with different outlooks on the moral responsibilities towards their 
animals. This requires an approach that does justice to all involved (Meijboom 
2009), and has become a matter of urgency since the epidemics have already led to a 
breach in trust between the government and the keepers. Would justice be done if a 
government were to base its policy on an equal distribution of a risk of harm? In 
that case then the burden and the benefit would be carried by both practices. Then 
one should know how the different practices define risk. For instance, a potential 
economic setback is a risk for farmers, but a non-vaccination policy is a risk for 
backyard animal keepers who are denied the choice to protect their animals from a 
serious disease by immunisation. Second, the acceptance of a certain type of risk can 
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be fundamentally wrong to one because it may touch upon deeply felt moral 
convictions, but not to others. For example, farmer and their animals find 
themselves to have an important function in society as providers of high quality 
food. The reason to be of the animal is to live the natural life of a production animal 
(Stafleu 2004). It is the conviction of these farmers that it is morally justified to keep 
and kill animals for food. Culling and subsequently destroying these animals then is 
morally wrong (Van Haaften and Kersten 2002) because the purpose of their 
existence has been thwarted. This conviction takes its point of view from the 
individual animal that lives to reach its specific goal in life. To other farmers the 
stamping-out strategy was the best way to resume business as usual: a disease is 
swiftly eradicated and food can be provided again (Van Haaften and Kersten 2002). 
In this view animals have value as a macro-economic unit. Risking the sector’s and 
the country’s interests then is considered wrong. Backyard animal have a different 
value as living beings, companions or as rare breeds. Therefore, it is clear that 
economic risks did not so easily convince their keepers as a sound reason for 
culling.  
In the interviews the interviewees expressed serious doubts about the role of 
backyard animals in epidemics. This was not only based on the nature of the 
practice, which does not entail intensive transport and contact structures between 
animals, but also on the idea that backyard animals are more robust than production 
animals. They stated that inbreeding, intensive keeping and an underdeveloped 
immune system due to the use of antibiotics and little exposure to natural pathogens 
has rendered production animals a more susceptible group. A recent study 
performed by Bavinck et al (2009) showed that the contribution of backyard poultry 
flocks during the highly pathogenic avian influenza outbreak in 2003 in the 
Netherlands was marginal. This was due to the fact that these flocks were 
considerably less susceptible to infection than commercially kept poultry. Bavinck et 
al. pointed out that backyard poultry can just as easily be infected when in contact 
with the virus. The susceptibility of infection was dependent on a complex of other 
determinants, such as the contact structures, and not on the robustness of backyard 
animals. It is important to know about the factual risks involving backyard animals 
and about the perception of the keepers about these risks, because this influences their 
support for a certain strategy. 
 
Conclusion 
 
In the current study the backyard animal keepers were predominantly male, and 
between 41-70 years of age. The education level was quite high.  
Most keepers kept poultry. The animals were kept in the first place for company, 
and in the second place for breeding. More men than women kept animals for 
breeding purposes.  
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Most respondents, both men and women, had chosen the biocentric view on 
animals and nature. The men had a functional and relational view and more women 
than men had a relational view.  
Most respondents did not consider culling of healthy animals in an animal disease 
epidemic justified A percentage of 60% of the respondents was in favour of 
preventive vaccination.  
A majority considered it acceptable to kill healthy animals, but only for specific 
purposes. Most acceptable was the food production.  
A majority of the keepers had indicated that their opinion about the government 
had changed because of the epidemics.  
The keepers had a personal relation with their animals which resembles that of 
companion animals.  
Backyard animals are valued for their company, their value as a rare, Old-Dutch or 
special breed, their visibility in the countryside, the contribution of certain breeds to 
the biodiversity, to a region with cultural-historical value or in a nature reserve. 
Keeping backyard animals is a highly valued way of life to connect with nature and 
its inhabitants. 
 
Recommendation 
 
It is recommended to acknowledge the differences between the livestock and the 
backyard animal practices in the decision-making process for future policy.  
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Abstract In this paper we present and defend the theoretical framework of an 
empirical model to describe people's fundamental moral attitudes (FMAs) to 
animals, the stratification of FMAs in society and the role of FMAs in judgement on 
the culling of healthy animals in an animal disease epidemic. We used philosophical 
animal ethics theories to understand the moral basis of FMA convictions. Moreover, 
these theories provide us with a moral language for communication between animal 
ethics, FMAs and public debates. 
We defend that FMA is a two-layered concept. The first layer consists of deeply felt 
convictions about animals. The second layer consists of convictions derived from 
the first layer to serve as arguments in a debate on animal issues. In a debate, the 
latter convictions are variable, depending on the animal issue in a specific context, 
time and place. This variability facilitates finding common ground in an animal issue 
between actors with opposing convictions. 
Model 
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Introduction 
 
From 1997 to 2003 three major animal disease epidemics: classical swine fever, foot 
and mouth disease, and highly pathogenic avian influenza swept over Europe, 
leaving behind millions of infected and healthy animals culled and numerous animal 
keepers traumatized. What had happened? In the early nineties the European Union 
adopted a non-vaccination strategy to control these highly contagious diseases. 
Stamping out a disease, which means culling infected and healthy animals within a 
radius of 1-3 kilometres from the source of the infection, was from a financial-
economic perspective, preferable to vaccination (Mepham 2004 Woods 2004 
Koninklijke Nederlandse Akademie van Wetenschappen 2002). It stopped the 
disease infecting other animals, and enabled the member states to quickly regain 
their “disease free” status. The latter was imperative to resume international trade in 
animals and animal products. The rationale behind the stamping-out policy was a 
weighing of economic pros and cons with respect to the international trade in 
animals and animal products. The financial setback for the individual animal keepers 
was outweighed by the benefit to the trade position of a country as a whole. 
Furthermore, highly pathogenic avian influenza presented an additional zoonotic 
risk, which means that the virus can cause eye infections in people who had been in 
close contact with infected animals. Some highly pathogenic avian influenza strains 
can even be lethal to people, and indeed people had died from the disease, with one 
casualty in the Netherlands.  
In the Netherlands and the United Kingdom, the stamping-out strategy was the 
cause of trauma and major public resistance (United Kingdom: Anthony 2004 
Murphy-Lawless 2004 Mepham 2001, 2004 Crispin 2002 Laurence 2002 Farm 
Animal Welfare Council 2002; Cumbria Foot and Mouth Disease Inquiry Panel 
2002; Institute for Health Research 200; Cohen et al. 2007 The Netherlands: Huirne 
et al, 2002 Van Haaften and Kersten 2002 Raad voor het Landelijk Gebied and 
Raad voor Dieraangelegenheden 2003 and 2004, Nederlandse Vereniging tot 
Bescherming van Dieren 2004 Van den Berg 2002). This resistance not only came 
from the animal keepers, but also from the general public that had been confronted 
with footage of burning pyres (in the United Kingdom), animal welfare problems, 
and the frustration and anger of those directly involved. The resistance was based 
on a number of issues. The focus of our study is on those issues that touch on 
people’s basic moral convictions about animals, therefore we will only give an 
account of the issues relevant for the study.  
In the process a great number of animals were culled, mostly healthy animals, and 
animals that were kept for non-commercial reasons. The scale and the visibility of 
the culling increased the feelings of unrest, which were based on the notion that the 
lives of these animals should be respected and should not be sacrificed for 
economic purposes. The culling and destruction of production animals was severely 
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criticized because the natural course of life of a production animal, i.e., to produce 
food for the nation, was thwarted (Stafleu et al. 2004). The movement restrictions, 
transport, and the culling were the cause of a range of animal welfare problems 
(Crispin et al. 2002; Laurence 2002; Van den Berg 2002; Nederlandse Vereniging tot 
Bescherming van Dieren 2004 Van Velzen and Dekker 2003 Van den Berg 2002). 
Animal keepers could no longer give adequate care to their animals, animals that 
were not fit for transport (e.g., pregnant animals) were still transported to 
slaughterhouses, and the slaughter-men were not equipped to deal with so many 
animals to be culled within a very short time in conditions that were far from ideal. 
Many livestock farmers were struck hard: not only because their animals were the 
financial basis of their business, but also because they were powerless to care for 
their animals properly and to stop the culling of animals they had sometimes bred 
with for many generations. Non-commercial animal keepers argued that the control 
strategy was not applicable to backyard animals, special or rare breeds, or zoo 
animals. These animals were not kept for commercial reasons and were usually not 
exported or kept for food. Furthermore, the relationship with these animals was to a 
large extent personal and not professional.  
The scale of the public outcry showed that stamping-out for economic reasons was 
no longer compatible with society’s moral convictions about the right treatment of 
animals (Noordhuizen-Stassen et al. 2003). Anthony (2004) concluded that 
competing value frameworks were at work. This meant that economic 
considerations were given undue emphasis over other values of a moral kind, such 
as welfare issues. We found that the debate concentrated on three moral values: the 
intrinsic and relational value of an animal’s life, the duty to treat animals well (to 
care for their health and well-being and to protect them against harm), and the 
autonomy of the animal keepers. It became clear that these values were not the 
priority values of the authorities. First, to the authorities, the value of an animal’s life 
was interpreted as its economic value (to a farmer, the livestock sector, or the 
country). The interests at stake were basically economic, therefore the loss of a 
number of animals compared to the benefits for the sector and the country as a 
whole, was justified in an economic sense (Mepham 2001). To the opponents, the 
value of an animal’s life meant the value of the animal in its own right as a living 
being and the value of the personal and emotional relationship between people and 
their animals. The morally laden terms “right to life” or “respect for life” were used 
to express this opposition.  
Second, an important issue was the “duty to treat animals well” (Crispin et al. 2002), 
which for the animal keepers was the core responsibility to their animals. This was 
in their view a moral duty: people deliberately choose to keep and confine animals, 
and therefore are responsible for their health and well-being. In their view they were 
forced to act against this moral duty, because economic duties to the nation 
prevailed.  
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Third, “autonomy” to the individual keeper or animal practice, meant to be at 
liberty to act according to one’s own convictions to properly care for and protect 
their animals as they see fit. To the authorities this was a value that could be 
outweighed by national interests (Meijboom et al. 2009). This justified the decision 
to take control of the private element of the animal keepers, rendering them 
powerless to stop the slaughter-men entering their premises and harming and culling 
their animals. At a different level, animal keepers had been denied the choice to 
vaccinate their animals to protect them against these diseases.  
This resistance was not about values per se, (that people have a duty to treat animals 
well was not contested as such), but about the choice and relative weight of values 
in this specific context. People felt that these values had been overruled by a 
government that did not acknowledge the fact that other values were at stake. 
Rather, the resistance revealed that the government had left a number of issues out 
of the equation as not relevant. First, it had not taken into account the diversity of 
animal practices with a diversity of human-animal relationships specific to these 
practices. The rural area is no longer dominated by livestock farmers, but now 
includes other animal practices, such as backyard animal keepers, animals in nature 
reserves, recreation with animals (such as horseback riding), and care farms. In these 
practices, the human-animal bond is personal as well as instrumental. Second, the 
policy had failed to do justice to the dynamics of people’s moral convictions about 
animals. The government had based its policy on (economic) values that were no 
longer sufficient justification for the culling of millions of animals (Noordhuizen-
Stassen et al. 2003).  
The opposition had transcended the interests of those directly involved and had 
become a general issue in society as a whole, because it had touched upon very basic 
convictions about animals. In a pluralistic society like the Netherlands, many 
convictions may exist about animals. Despite that, there are convictions that are 
shared by most. What was at stake here? Had a shift in moral convictions taken 
place in different animal practices and was this the cause of the conflict? The 
resistance made clear that the duty to treat animals well is still the core value in our 
shared morality and that it is no longer easily outweighed by financial-economic 
reasons. It also showed that the value of an animal’s life as an intrinsic quality is 
gaining ground over its instrumental (economic) value. However, the source of the 
conflict lay in the interpretation and the strength of these values in this specific context. 
Subsequently, there was a difference in opinion on the “right” action to face the 
epidemics. 
Animal conflicts such as these bring opposing convictions to the fore, which are 
then discussed in the public sphere. In this way, morality and practice keep each 
other in a dynamic equilibrium. When an animal issue jeopardizes this equilibrium, a 
government has an important duty to initiate a public debate on the issue. In this 
debate the moral problem should first be identified. Then a critical discussion is 
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required to find if shared convictions are still capable of dealing with the issue, or if 
new morality needs to be developed. The development of new morality in this sense 
means that changing moral convictions should be reflected in new policy. If a 
government fails to do so, people will start acting according to their own individual 
convictions and will no longer abide by general rules, because the latter no longer 
reflect what they feel to be just. (The Netherlands saw an example of this type of 
civil disobedience during the highly pathogenic avian influenza epidemic, when 
many backyard animal keepers kept their animals hidden from the slaughter-men). 
To understand the driving forces of the debate the government should understand 
more about the stratification of convictions in a pluralistic society.  
Our convictions about animals are deeply rooted in our total belief system, and 
include everything that is important to us: ourselves, other people, animals and the 
natural world. Often our ties with our fellow human beings are stronger than those 
with animals (Posner 2004), which means that we may lend more weight to our 
obligations to other people than to animals. Also, our ties with animals we have a 
personal relationship with and which are visibly present in our community (e.g., in 
contrast with laboratory animals), are likely to be given more weight as individuals, 
animal friends, or co-citizens. This implies that (most of) our attitudes to animals are 
ambiguous, because they do not apply to all animals all the time, and in this friction, 
the values of animal welfare and life are variable. Yet all together this is not new as 
in society we make these decisions all the time. The question is what the influence 
of convictions is on these decisions and how to unify these convictions in the 
“right” policy. Although moral convictions in themselves are deeply felt, as such 
they are not a matured framework of morality. Rather, they are a theoretical point of 
departure. Theoretic convictions develop and become practical when used in a real 
life situation. They are brought to life, shaped, reshaped, re-valued or solidified in a 
public debate on a moral issue in a specific circumstance and context. Then, the 
conviction once again becomes embedded in the moral history of an individual or 
that of a society. What does this mean? It means that a conviction can exists in a 
theoretical form and in a practical form, and is best described by the dynamic 
interaction between the two. The implication is that we should attempt to learn 
more about people's theoretical convictions, because they do exist in some form and 
need to be understood, including their stratification in society. However, for a 
comprehensive understanding of the dynamics of convictions, we also need to learn 
about their role in a practical animal issue.  
We aim to contribute to the public debate by presenting a model to identify 
fundamental moral convictions (FMA) about animals, to find if there is a 
stratification of FMAs and to study their role in judgment on animal issues. The 
model is useful for structuring the debate, and offers a moral vocabulary for 
understanding and communicating the moral issues at stake.  
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In the form of a questionnaire the model was used in a number of surveys 
performed in the Netherlands in 2007 and 2008, among members of the general 
public, veterinarians, and livestock keepers.  
 
Methodology 
 
We use the term “fundamental moral attitude” (FMA) with reference to people’s 
moral convictions about animals. We chose the word fundamental to indicate that it 
concerns the most basic frame of reference. It is moral because it tells us something 
about the right or the wrong way to treat animals, whose welfare and flourishing can 
be promoted or harmed by our actions. The word attitude to animals is already used 
in studies to describe people’s views on animals and their treatment (Knight and 
Barnett 2008 Matthews and Herzog 1999 Serpell 2004) and therefore it makes sense 
to use a term that is already in use. We defined fundamental moral attitude as the 
fundamental convictions of a person, or a group of people, on the hierarchical 
position of animals, their value, doing good (to care for and protect), and their 
rights.  
In preliminary studies we obtained more insight into the key issues of the public 
debate and the values that were at stake, as well as into the more fundamental 
academic discussions on the moral importance of animals. We drew from four 
sources. First, in a survey among stakeholders in 25 member states of the European 
Union (Cohen et al. 2007), we identified the priorities in future prevention and 
control strategies. Second, we analyzed the key issues in the public debate about the 
epidemics in the Netherlands and the UK (for the UK: Anderson 2002; Anthony 
2004; Crispin et al. 2002; Cumbria foot and mouth disease Inquiry Panel Institute 
for Health Research 2002; Farm Animal Welfare Council 2002; Laurence 2002 
Mepham 2001, 2004 Murphy-Lawless 2004, for the Netherlands: Van den Berg 
2002 Van Haaften and Kersten 2002 Huirne et al. 2002 Raad voor het Landelijk 
Gebied and Raad voor Dieraangelegenheden 2003, 2004 Noordhuizen-Stassen 2003 
Van Velzen and Dekker 2003 Cohen et al. 2007). Third, we turned to philosophical 
animal ethics theories concerning the moral importance of animals. This will be 
discussed in more detail further on in this section. Fourth, we performed a pilot 
study in 2006 among 214 non-commercial keepers of backyard animals in the 
Netherlands and interviewed 24 representatives of this practice. This gave us more 
insight into the moral vocabulary used by these animal keepers to express their 
attitudes to animals in general, and the moral dilemmas they had faced during the 
animal disease epidemics. With the data from this preliminary study we developed 
the theoretical framework of the model.  
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The theoretical framework of the model 
We identified four elements as being relevant in people’s attitude to animals in 
general, namely: hierarchy, value, doing good, and rights. These are the four 
“pillars” of FMA. Each element consists of a number of dimensions (=the moral 
conviction), which reflect an opinion on the element. Each dimension is supported 
by a number of arguments (=the why of a conviction, the “building block” of 
convictions). FMA is identified and described by the choice of dimensions and by 
the arguments in support of the dimensions. We will discuss this construction in 
more detail. 
Element one, hierarchy, is about the hierarchical position of humans with respect to 
animals. This element has three dimensions: humans are superior to other animals, 
humans and animals are equal, and animals are superior to humans. In Western 
societies, the hierarchical position of animals seems to be changing. The general 
view has been that humans are superior to animals. This was justified from a 
religious, cultural, or evolutionary point of view. Although Christian-Judean 
religious texts are open to different interpretations, the most common interpretation 
was that humans rule over animals because animals were not considered to have 
immortal souls, and because humans were given stewardship over the natural world. 
The cultural justification is based on the fact that animals have been domesticated 
and dominated for centuries, and in this historical relationship humans were 
superior because we use animals for our purposes, and because we have the power 
to do so (Franklin 2005 Serpell 2004). The evolutionary justification holds that in 
the course of evolution, humans have become more developed than other animals, 
especially in mental capacities, granting them a position on top of the evolutionary 
ladder. (Hyers 2006). The moral justification for a superior position for humans is 
based on criteria that differentiate between species, for instance rationality, 
consciousness, or moral agency. Nowadays, there are more people who consider 
humans and animals to be equal. An equality view is based on criteria that 
emphasize the similarity between humans and animals, such as both being living 
beings, or both being part of a natural order. The latter view is inspired by recent 
scientific studies about the nature of animals and their mental capacities (Bekoff 
2007) that reveal that humans and animals share many characteristics. In a holistic 
view on the natural world, animals are sometimes seen as people’s superior teachers 
to reconnect with nature and our inner selves (De Cock Buning 2009).  
Element two refers to the value of animals. Element two consists of two 
dimensions: animals have value, and animals have no value. For our purposes, value 
is defined as the appreciation for an animal based on its intrinsic value, its 
instrumental value to people, its relational value to people, and its functional value 
for the ecosystem. Over the centuries, animals have already earned appreciation for 
their usefulness to people (e.g., for food) or in a relational sense (e.g., as 
companions). Now animals are increasingly appreciated for their role in the 
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ecosystem, or as intrinsically valuable. The latter means that animals are recognized 
as having value in their own right as beings with a life of their own, and a purpose in 
life that is inherent to their species-specific needs. 
Element three refers to doing good to animals by caring for their health and well-
being, by not harming, and by protecting them against harm. This element consists 
of three dimensions: the obligation to do good to all animals, the obligation to do 
good to some animals, and no obligation to do good to animals. This element 
reflects that people’s actions matter to animals, whose welfare and flourishing can 
be promoted or thwarted by these actions. Animals may have a conscious desire not 
to be harmed when they can feel pain and emotions. This animal welfare issue is and 
has always been the core element in criticism on certain animal use (Bentham 1789 
Singer 1995). However, not all animal species can feel, and are therefore indifferent 
to an action. Yet still certain actions can thwart the natural course of their lives 
(Taylor 1986). Therefore actions, though not necessarily consciously experienced, 
can still be harmful to an animal. 
Element four refers to animal rights, and for our study the focus is on the right to 
life. Element four consists of three dimensions: all animals have a right to life, some 
animals have a right to life, and animals have no right to life. The meaning of having 
rights is that animals are not means to human ends, and should be able to lead their 
own life, undisturbed by people. Furthermore, having rights means that their 
interests to live, to flourish, and to be free from suffering do count and should be 
given due consideration. The issue of animal rights is more debated than animal 
welfare issues because it takes people’s legal and moral responsibility much further 
(Wise 2004). Some argue that animals lack the relevant features to qualify as rights-
bearers, i.e., rational moral agents with a sense of justice and an understanding of, 
and ability to abide by mutual agreements (Carruthers 1992 Scruton 2000). Others 
are concerned about the practical implications of giving animals (legal) rights 
(Posner 2004). Having rights could lead to substantial changes in moral convictions 
and legislation, on what is considered justified in the use of animals. This element 
allows for several aspects of rights. For our purpose we chose the right to life, as 
this is relevant for the debate on the culling of animals in the control of the 
epidemics. With respect to a right to life, there are differing points of view. 
According to some, (Taylor 1986 Schweitzer in Warren 1997) life as such has value; 
therefore killing is a harm done to all living creatures, even if the animal may not be 
aware of this and merely has an unconscious urge to live. To some, only the killing 
of an animal with a higher intelligence and consciousness is morally wrong, because 
these animals may have a concept of life, death and the future. They therefore have 
a conscious desire to live to fulfil future-oriented desires (Regan 1983 McMahan 
2002). 
In general, studies on animal issues give information about people’s opinions (=the 
dimensions), but usually not about the moral basis of these opinions: the moral 
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“why”’ of an opinion (Serpell 2004 Herzog and Dorr 2000 Franklin 2007 
Eurobarometer 2007). Knight et al. (2003), and Knight and Barnett (2008) found 
that the degree of mental abilities of animals were one determinant in people's 
attitude to animals. The more mentally developed and sentient an animal species is, 
the least acceptable is its use for human purposes. Those studies provide a first 
insight into the fundaments of people's convictions, but we aim to get a more 
comprehensive understanding of FMAs and the ‘why’ question. 
FMA is a moral concept, because the objects of our concern are animals that matter 
morally. FMA then rests on morally relevant criteria for whether an animal needs to 
matter morally, which shape our convictions. These criteria should give information 
about the “why” of convictions in a moral sense: they are the moral “building 
blocks” of FMAs. To address this, we turned to philosophical animal ethics, because 
this field is all about criteria for why animals are (or are not) morally important and 
how these guide our ensuing duties to them (Warren 1997). Religion is another 
source of moral convictions. This we discuss briefly in the discussion.  We chose to 
restrict ourselves to animal ethics, because religion is not about animals per se, but 
about the place of humans and animals in creation.  We selected criteria that were 
relevant for our model and divided them into four categories; intrinsic, relational, 
functional/instrumental, and virtue. Some examples may clarify this. Someone may 
think that humans are superior to animals (why?), because animals lack rationality 
(intrinsic). Someone may value animals (why?), because they have an instrumental 
value (functional) or emotional (relational) value to people. We should be kind to 
animals (why?), because this makes us better people (virtue). Animals have rights 
(why?) because they are living beings with their species-specific goal in life 
(intrinsic). The model gives insight into these building blocks of FMA. We will 
briefly discuss these criteria. 
In a number of theories, one intrinsic criterion or more than one, define the moral 
importance of an animal. For some theorists, the fact that an animal is a living being 
is sufficient reason to grant it (certain) moral importance. Albert Schweitzer 
(Schweitzer in Warren 1997) described his thoughts in his Reverence for Life 
theory. He stated that the possession of organic life is sufficient for full and equal 
concern. In his view, all living organisms are capable of experiencing positive or 
negative sensations. Taylor (1986) does not take this capacity to feel as the basis for 
concern. In his theory of Respect for Nature, he states that every living being that is 
goal-oriented and has a good-of-its-own should be subject to our concern. Animals 
are goal-oriented when they are directed to fulfil their life-cycle through growth, 
reproduction, and adaptation to their environment. A being has a good-of-its-own 
when it has needs. Therefore, it is possible to speak of actions that are beneficial to 
the well-being of this being, or are harmful to it. This concept does not require the 
being to realize or to care whether something is beneficial or harmful to its good. It 
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does not need to have a conscious interest in the action. It suffices that the action is 
in the interest of the being. 
All living beings possess life, but only species with a more complex neurological 
system are considered to be sentient. Sentience means the capacity to feel pain and 
emotions. Many theories (e.g., Bentham 1789 Singer 1995) are based on the concept 
of sentience, which dictates that one should refrain from harming a being that is 
capable of suffering. Nowadays, the definition of sentience is extended to include 
the capacity to experience well-being (Appleby and Sandøe 2002). From this 
capacity it follows that a being can experience well-being and unwell-being. Sentient 
beings, therefore, have a conscious interest in not being harmed and in experiencing 
well-being. 
Some animal species possess, besides sentience, higher complex mental, and 
behavioural capacities. Beings with these capacities have mental states such as a will 
to live and a concept of life, death, and the future. Regan (1983) describes these 
animals as subjects-of-a-life. In his view, all subjects-of-a-life should have our full 
consideration. 
In other theories (Scruton 2000 Carruthers 1992 Kant in Warren 1997), rationality 
takes a core position. In this view, only rational beings with self-consciousness and 
the capacity to reason are capable of moral judgment. They therefore can be judged 
morally and held responsible for their actions. These capacities make them “moral 
agents.” In this view, only a moral agent exists as an end in itself and not as a means 
to an end for others. When one does not accept that animals are moral agents, it 
follows that animals themselves have no importance. Harming an animal then is 
wrong only because harming animals is an undesirable character trait, and might 
abhor other people.  
A number of theorists (Warren 1997 and below) reject the idea that one or a 
number of intrinsic criteria alone determine the moral importance of animals. They 
argue that we should not disregard the value of a personal, historical, or 
functional/instrumental bond with people, other animals, and the natural world. 
The moral importance of an animal is then defined by both intrinsic and non-
intrinsic criteria. In our study, we investigate whether both intrinsic and non-
intrinsic criteria are building blocks of FMAs. Therefore, we included all these 
criteria in our model. We will briefly describe the non-intrinsic criteria below.  
Animals in a human community have always been used and valued for their utility, 
such as for food production, for their strength as workers, as guardians, or for 
scientific or recreational purposes. Their appreciation was therefore related to their 
usefulness to people, which was indeed the reason why animals had historically been 
included into a human community in the first place. Some theorists, from a more 
ecological view, value animals as part of a unit: at the level of the species or 
ecosystem. Animals in their natural environment have an important function in the 
survival of their species and in the functioning of the ecosystem. Some theories 
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emphasize this role of species in the ecosystem, and consider this a sufficient basis 
for consideration (Callicot in Warren 1997 Leopold in Warren 1997 Taylor 1986). 
Humans should therefore accept that they have responsibilities towards the natural 
world and its inhabitants. 
Other theories emphasize the strength of the relationship between animals and 
humans in a human social community (Anderson 2004 Noddings in Warren 1997). 
In this social community, humans and animals have lived and worked together for 
centuries, often forming personal, emotional relationships. In this interaction, there 
exists a ‘mutual promise’: that a person will care for and protect the animal when the 
animal is able to fulfil its assigned task in the community. In a personal relationship 
between a human and an animal, the responsibilities to an animal are a function of 
this emotional bonding. Anderson also points out the historical relationship 
between humans and animals. Over the centuries, domestic animals have become 
full members of our human society. In this position, animals have importance based 
on their historical role in a social community. This means that as well as being based 
on its own intrinsic characteristics, an animal’s value is also based on its personal 
and historical value to individuals and the human community. 
According to Hursthouse (1999) virtue ethics as a guide for moral behaviour is 
gaining ground. This was also described by DeGrazia (1999) in his article on current 
developments in animal ethics theory in the 21st century. Virtue ethics focuses on 
the character traits of a person that are seen to be virtuous, such as charity, honesty, 
respect, kindness, and doing good to others. But in what way is virtue guidance for 
moral behaviour, or the “right” action, in a specific situation? Hursthouse suggests 
that a person’s behaviour is the right action if it is what a virtuous person would 
characteristically (characteristic for virtuous character) do in that situation. With 
respect to animals, being kind to animals is then not only in the animal’s interest, 
but is also the morally right action. As a person is not born with a sense of what is 
morally right, one could argue that in the treatment of animals, as in our study, it 
may be virtuous to strive to become a better (virtuous) person, by letting kindness 
and doing good prevail over other non-virtuous motives. 
 
Role of FMAs in judgment 
To learn not only from the theoretical but also from the practical form of 
convictions, our second aim is to learn about the role and valuation of FMA 
convictions in judgment. Furthermore, we want to know whether a person with a 
certain FMA profile judges differently to someone with another FMA profile. If so, 
then we need to know what this difference is based on. To this purpose we 
performed a case-study with four cases, which was included in the model. The cases 
described the culling of healthy animals in an epidemic that differed in one aspect 
only, namely the argument in favour of culling. These were veterinary reasons, 
financial-economic reasons, the protection of human health (eye infections), and the 
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protection of human life. The arguments against culling reflect the practical form of 
the theoretical FMA conviction “animals have a right to life” based on; the value of 
an animal’s life, the relevance of a species’ intrinsic capacities (highly developed) to 
distinguish between mammals and birds, the financial value of an animal, the 
emotional bond between a person and an animal, and virtue (not killing animals is a 
virtuous character trait). The arguments could be valued with a number between 0-
10. For judgment, the arguments in favour and those against can be valued and 
weighed against each other. As such, we can learn about the relative value of 
convictions in a case, between the cases, between FMAs and as compared to their 
value in FMAs. Furthermore, we can determine the turning point in judgment, when 
a human interest outweighs an FMA conviction.  
 
Results 
 
Table 1 shows the schematic representation of FMA, with the elements, the 
dimensions, and the arguments that are relevant for a particular dimension.   For 
instance, for element 1 (hierarchy), an opinion that humans are superior to animals 
(dimension 1) can be supported by the argument ‘because animals are not as rational 
as people’ (argument 3). Another example: for element 3 (to do good) an opinion 
that we should do good to some animals (dimension 2), can be based on animals 
that have a relational bond with people (argument 10). Of course all arguments can 
apply in one way or the other to all the elements, but for clarity we chose to include 
the most relevant ones.  
Element 2 serves a slightly different purpose. It tells us whether a shift has taken 
place from an animal’s instrumental value to another value. Therefore there are no 
arguments in support of the opposite dimension: “animals have no value,” because 
this is not relevant for our purpose.  
FMA is determined by the combination of the dimensions of choice and by the 
numerical valuation of the arguments. With our model, 54 combinations of 
dimensions (3x2x3x3), therefore 54 FMAs are theoretically possible. The arguments 
can be valued by a number between 0 and 10, with 0=not relevant for my opinion 
and 10= very relevant for my opinion.  
Table two gives the schematic representation of the case-study about the culling of 
healthy animals. In each case, arguments against the culling are weighed against 
arguments in favour of culling. For judgment the choice is disagree / partly 
(dis)agree / agree with the culling of healthy animals for this human interest. The 
arguments are numerically valued with a number between 0-10. 
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Table 2 Schematic representation of the four cases 
 
Case: During an animal disease epidemic, healthy cows and chickens are culled in the 
stamping-out strategy to eradicate the disease. Do you agree with the culling of these 
healthy animals, when they are culled:  
- Case 1: to stop the disease from infecting other animals  
- Case 2: to safeguard the export position of a country  
- Case 3: to protect human health (eye infections) 
- Case 4: to protect human life  
I disagree / I partly agree, partly disagree/ I agree with the culling of these healthy animals 
for this purpose, because: 
   
Arguments in favour of culling Rating 0-10 
Culling is necessary to stop infecting other 
animals / to safeguard the export position / to 
protect human health / to protect human life  
  
 
Arguments against the culling 
 
Based on criterion: 
 
An animal’s life is valuable; therefore these cows 
and chickens should not be culled 
Life  
Chickens are highly developed animals; therefore 
these animals should not be culled 
Mental capacity*  
Cows are highly developed animals; therefore 
these animals should not be culled 
Mental capacity  
Cows and chickens that are of a special or rare 
breed should not be culled 
Functional value   
Cows and chickens that have a financial value to 
people should not be culled 
Utility tor people 
 
 
Cows and chickens that have an relational value 
to people should not be culled 
Relational value  
 
 
Culling healthy cows and chickens is a bad 
character trait; therefore these animals should 
not be culled 
Virtue  
Cows and chickens are part of Creation, and 
therefore should not be culled 
Religion   
*Refers to a degree of development of the animal to think, reflect and draw conclusions about oneself or 
others 
 
 
Discussion 
 
Reflection on the theoretical framework of the model  
We have developed a model that is based on four elements (the pillars), each 
consisting of a number of dimensions (conviction on the element) and arguments 
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(the why of a conviction). We defined FMA by the four elements. We described the 
stratification of FMAs by means of the combination of dimensions. We explained the 
why of convictions by arguments, and differentiated between the FMAs by 
comparing the valuation of these arguments. With this method a maximum of 54 
FMAs can be described. We argued that this sufficiently covers the range of FMAs 
in Western societies. This we based on our analysis of the public and philosophical 
debates on the use and position of animals in relation to people and on people’s 
ensuing responsibilities. We described the differences in judgment between FMAs in a 
case-study. 
The arguments were derived from philosophical animal ethics theories. We aimed to 
find if theory can provide the tools to describe (the stratification of) FMAs. The 
preliminary studies gave us a fair insight into the moral dilemmas and the moral 
vocabulary used to describe these dilemmas. This vocabulary was quite similar to 
that used in the philosophical academic debates, as both realms ask the same moral 
questions about the justification for our treatment of animals. If a shared moral 
language indeed exists then theory, FMAs, and public debate have found a way to 
communicate with each other, from which the three realms may benefit. The public 
debate may benefit by using a moral language to facilitate communication between 
people, to understand what differences in opinion are based on. People with 
different FMAs may benefit because it enables them to understand the moral basis 
of each others’ values. Philosophical animal ethics may benefit by reflecting on 
empirical studies, to establish in what way theories can be relevant for the public 
debate and the description of FMAs. Such reflection can also give an impulse to the 
development of new theories to better describe the dynamics of animal issues in 
society. A need for new theory was already recognized by Franklin (2006), who 
expressed the need for a good theoretical argument to help solidify a cultural change 
towards a greater concern for animals.  
In the cases, we focused on the culling and not on the animal welfare problems or 
the infringement of autonomy. We think that the former is a more fundamental 
issue in present day debates: the value of an animal’s life in itself. It is an example of 
shifting convictions about animals. Noordhuizen-Stassen et al. (2003) already found 
that the killing of animals is no longer justified merely because it serves a human 
purpose. 
 
The concept of FMA 
We defend FMA to animals as a dynamic, two-layered concept that rests on four 
pillars: hierarchy, value, doing good, and rights. The first layer constitutes the most 
basic, deeply felt moral convictions about animals. This we defined as the theoretical 
form of convictions. In a society, these convictions have been shaped over time by 
numerous social, religious, cultural, technological, and other influences and by more 
knowledge about the nature of animals (see Marc Bekoff 2007 for his studies about 
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the emotional lives of animals). In an individual, personal experiences and 
upbringing further shape one’s FMA (Fidler 2003 Miura et al. 2002). Derived from 
the first layer for use as arguments in a public debate on an animal issue, convictions 
of the second layer become the practical form of a conviction. For judgment, the 
values of these practical convictions are weighed against other things we value and 
against convictions of other people. Convictions from the second layer have either 
an invariable (the same value as its value for FMA) or a variable (another value than 
its value for FMA) value, depending on the time and place, and on the specific 
animal issue in a specific context. For instance, the value of an animal's life can be 
invariable when weighed against economic interests, but can be variable when 
human life is at risk. The second layer does not hold the same set of convictions all 
the time. It consists of convictions that are chosen from the first layer for their 
relevance in a specific debate. In a different debate other convictions may migrate to 
the second layer. Nor does it mean that the convictions themselves are variable. It 
means that their value (their weight in a weighing process) can be variable.       
Individuals may hold convictions that have an invariable value. For instance, a 
person may think that animals have a right to life in every situation at all times. In a 
society as a whole all values are variable, even the value of human life. It would be 
impossible to function in a society if all convictions had an invariable value. In such 
a situation, no solutions could ever be found in a conflict. However, this does not 
mean that a deeply felt conviction cannot exert a strong influence on judgment. 
Highly valued convictions from the first layer may ultimately be trumped in the 
second layer when (a combination of) other highly valued convictions (moral) or 
interests (not necessarily moral, such as economic benefit) are at stake, but they 
cannot be so easily outweighed by less essential values. In the debate on the 
treatment and culling of animals, people drew from FMA convictions from the first 
layer, i.e., the intrinsic value of life and the right to life (element 2 and 4) and our 
duty to treat animals well (element 3) as arguments in the debate. The debate then 
concerned the valuation of these convictions in this particular context. 
 
The dynamics of animal ethics theory, FMAs, public debates, and societal changes 
By analyzing current debates, we can get a fair idea about the nature of public 
morality. We all know about generally acceptable behaviour in society. For instance, 
cruelty to animals is considered unacceptable in most situations. We propose 
defining the public (or common) morality as the collective FMA of a society as a 
whole. Collective FMA is not the same as the stratification of FMAs in society. The 
latter is the total of FMAs of individuals or groups of people. The former is one 
dynamic pool of convictions and intuitions that most of us agree upon (e.g., to treat 
animals well) and that have a variable value in a public debate. The values of 
collective FMA convictions need to be variable, to bridge differences in FMA 
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convictions of individuals or stakeholders. A public debate can clarify whether a 
collective FMA conviction is out of sync with other FMA convictions,  
In five steps, we will now discuss the dynamics of animal ethics theories, FMAs, the 
public debate and societal change with respect to the culling: 1. circumstance and 
context; 2. case; 3. public debate; 4. outcome; and 5. consequences. We also discuss 
the input of theory and FMAs in this process. Step 1: Until now, risk assessment 
and control policies of animal diseases were made in the context of livestock 
production and trade. The culling of animals was therefore justified on the basis of a 
cost-benefit analysis rooted in the interests of the sector (Meijboom and Cohen et al 
2009). Step 2: Unexpectedly, the issue had ceased to be a problem of the sector 
alone and had become a case in society as a whole. It had stirred something in 
society's collective morality that needed to be discussed in the public domain. It had 
become a case for fundamental criticism on the justification of these policy 
decisions. Step 3: In the ensuing public debate, the stakeholders´ convictions were 
tested against each other and against the collective FMA. During this process 
something happened to these convictions. In a debate, new animal issues confirm 
and solidify a conviction, or revalue or cause a shift in convictions. In this case, the 
issue had solidified the collective conviction that “treating animals well” can no 
longer be so easily outweighed. Furthermore, the intrinsic value of animals had 
increased against a devaluation of their economic value. Thus, as highly valued 
arguments they had gained the strength to give the issue its unique focus. These 
interactions between FMAs give rise to a number of questions. First, were these 
changes in FMA convictions case-bound or have they become part of the collective 
FMA in their new value or shape? Have they therefore transcended an individual or 
group conviction to become a conviction of society? Second, have these convictions 
kept their new status upon returning to the first layer: do processes in the public 
debate change individual FMAs? A third question is: do FMAs change due to 
developments in society or does a particular case of animal use become problematic 
because our morality has changed? From our case it seems that both had occurred. 
The impact of the culling on such a massive scale, and the visibility of the crisis had 
been unprecedented. In that respect it was a new development, which had led to a 
new moral debate. Also, it had become a problematic case, because after the 
adoption of the non-vaccination policy, morality had developed further, rendering 
this policy no longer justifiable. Step 4: The outcome of this debate was a 
government action to find a new approach to future prevention and control 
strategies, along with more communication structures between the parties. As such, 
policy followed and reflected new morality. A government should be aware of these 
dynamics. This is no easy task, considering the plurality in FMAs. To approach this, 
a government should look at the second layer to find for each stakeholder, what 
convictions are valued in the debate and which of these values are variable. 
Furthermore, a government should know whether new values have become part of 
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the collective FMA. Mepham (2000b) recognizes the need for a tool for policy 
makers to understand the dynamics of FMAs. They reflect what is new in our 
convictions. If these have already migrated to the level of the collective FMA that 
manifests itself through public debates, then we need policy to solidify them into 
our legal system. Step 5: The consequence of the debate is that morality has evolved 
to a different level of appreciation of animals. It will become part of the moral 
history of FMA and again will be tested in a future animal issue. As a result it will 
develop further. The variability of the value of convictions allows for these 
developments. 
Some authors (Jonson and Toulmin 1988 Macnaghten 2001, 2004 Mepham, 2000b 
Posner 2004) state that people’s moral convictions are not (only) based on theories 
of duty and rights, but (also) on moral intuitions and personal experience, in this 
case encounters with animals. It is likely that an interaction is at play here. Jonson 
and Toulmin (1988) defend that moral theories manifest themselves at different 
levels: at the purely intellectual academic level on the one extreme to the practical 
level on the other. If the latter is true, then animal ethics theories are one of the 
many inputs that shape theoretical convictions. They may be interpreted to fit the 
theoretical context of a person’s or collective FMA. For example, a theory may 
propose only one criterion for having rights. In an interpretation this criterion may 
be necessary but not sufficient and other criteria are taken into consideration as well 
(the multi-criteria account proposed by Warren 1997). At the second layer, a theory 
becomes a moral argument. This further explains the usefulness of theory to 
describe FMA and its dynamics, because it is actually a part of FMA.  
Animal ethicists who are interested in the practicability and dynamics of theory and 
FMAs need to know how and why a theory becomes a moral argument, and 
whether it has become part of the collective FMA. In this way they can learn about 
the evolution of morality, and develop new theory in line with societal changes. It is 
essential to be aware of these changes. Practical moral theory that does not stay 
tuned to social realities is at risk of isolating itself from the collective morality 
completely and is then no longer practical or relevant.  
 
Applicability of the model  
The validity of the model was tested in a number of empirical surveys. By statistical 
analysis, we were able to describe FMAs, their stratification, and their roles in 
judgment. With the numerical valuation of the arguments we were able to identify 
their importance for a FMA conviction and distinguish between the moral bases of 
different FMAs, Furthermore, we could identify their relative valuation in judgment. 
We found that the value of an animal’s life conviction (in combination with other 
arguments) was indeed a core argument against the culling of animals. This confirms 
Anthony’s (2004) analysis of the strength of this conviction in the debate. 
Therefore, we defend the model’s usefulness for our empirical research purposes. 
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In a next qualitative step the model should be tested in a debate about future animal 
disease control strategies. Representatives of all relevant stakeholders should be 
included to do justice to the diversities in FMAs. The aim is to establish whether the 
model can help structure the boundaries of the debate, stretching from what is 
morally required (the bottom line) to what is morally acceptable (common ground), 
using the three values ‘value of life’, ‘duty to treat animals well’, and ‘autonomy’ 
from the different perspectives of the participants. With these moral tools in hand, a 
number of potential prevention and control strategies can be selected and discussed 
for their implications for those involved, including the animals. To this purpose the 
Ethical Matrix, developed by Ben Mepham, is a useful tool to visualize ethical 
decision-making and the implications of policy for the actors (Mepham 2000a). 
The model can be used to study differences between groups (animal practices, 
gender, cultures, religions, regional differences, etc.). The structure of the model is 
adaptable to accommodate other studies. Changes can be made at all levels: the 
elements, the dimensions, and the arguments, and with respect to the cases. For 
example, for our study we chose the right to life. This can be replaced by another 
right, such as the right to be free from suffering. This gives information about the 
strength of people’s obligation for doing good to animals. Although anti-cruelty 
laws guarantee certain protection against suffering, it does not follow that animal 
use is prohibited per se. A right to be free from suffering, especially when it is a legal 
right, is a stronger claim on people and could entail more fundamental changes in 
our use of animals.  
For our study element 2 was structured to study the shift in the valuation (here: 
appreciation) of animals. In another form, one can learn about the reasons why 
someone does or does not value animals. This would require a change in 
dimensions to: all animals have value, because…., some animals have value, 
namely…., and: animals have no value, because…. Adjustments at the argument 
level are required to support these dimensions.  
At the argument level, alterations are possible, provided that they still reflect the 
moral basis of an opinion. Then alterations can be useful for comparative religion or 
philosophy of life studies, or between religion-based and non-religion based moral 
convictions. For instance, one may find that humans are superior to animals because 
animals are not rational, or because animals lack an immortal soul. 
As there are numerous animal issues and because new animal uses pose new moral 
questions, case studies remain necessary to understand the dynamics of convictions. 
With new case studies, it is possible to study which convictions have migrated to the 
second layer and what their value is in relation to other values in other contexts. 
One practical application is the use of the model for educational purposes. In 
international exchange programs, universities bring together students from a 
diversity of cultures and backgrounds with different attitudes to animals. This 
difference becomes relevant in the field of animal sciences and biomedical research 
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that rest on the use of animals. We successfully applied the model as a discussion 
tool to address the ethical acceptability of animal use for animal experimentation, 
and the possible culturally-based differences in opinion.  
 
Conclusions 
 
Public debates reveal that opposing moral convictions can be the cause of conflict 
over an animal issue. In this paper we present and defend a model to describe the 
stratification of fundamental moral convictions (FMAs) about animals in society. 
The model identifies the moral basis of these convictions about the position, value, 
care and protection, and rights of animals. We used animal ethics theories as a moral 
language to describe FMAs. Furthermore, with the model the role of FMAs in 
judgment on an animal issue can be clarified. We argue that FMAs are dynamic and 
diverse and that they change over time. The model can serve to monitor these 
dynamics of FMAs in the public debate over time. Moreover, it takes the public 
debate a step further because it helps to answer the why of opposing opinions. 
Finally, the model provides a means of communication between the academic field 
of animal ethics, people's FMAs, and public debate. 
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Abstract In this paper the results of a national survey in the Netherlands are 
presented. The aim was to identify and describe the diversity of convictions about 
animals in Dutch society. Furthermore, the aim was to describe the role of these 
convictions in judgement on the culling of healthy animals during an animal disease 
epidemic.  
The survey was performed among 1999 respondents who were representative of the 
Dutch-speaking population. We identified a diversity of convictions, which were 
grouped into profiles. Two profiles included most respondents. These were called 
profile A (50% of the respondents) and profile B (28%). As compared to the B 
profile, the A profile included more men, were older, lived in smaller communities, 
and had less contact with animals. The A profile considered humans to be superior 
to animals, whereas the B profile considered both to be equal. The two profiles 
shared a number of convictions: i.e., animals have value, people have a duty to care 
for and protect all animals and all animals have a right to life. These convictions 
were based on a number of values, such as the possession of life, the ability of 
animals to feel pain and emotions (sentience), and the importance of animals for the 
ecosystem. The A profile rated these values (significantly) lower that the B profile. 
Three smaller profiles C (5%), D (5%) and E (5%) also considered humans to be 
superior, but were of the opinion that people should do good to some animals (C and 
D) and that some animals have a right to life (C and E). The 14 other profiles were 
each chosen by a very small number of respondents. 
The case-study showed that convictions played a role in judgement. Most 
respondents from the A and B profile partly agreed/partly disagreed with culling 
healthy animals in an epidemic outbreak of an animal disease to protect a country’s 
export position (A: 50%, B: 50%) and to prevent eye infections caused by the 
disease in people who had been in direct contact with infected animals (A: 41%, B: 
45%). Most respondents (A: 81%, B: 61%) agreed with culling to protect human 
life. More A respondents (53%) agreed with culling to stop the disease from 
spreading than B respondents (29%). The most important argument against culling 
was the value of animal life. The A respondents rated all arguments against culling 
(significantly) lower than the B respondents. A lower rating meant that the argument 
was less important for one’s judgement on the culling. 
It is argued that people who value their convictions high, therefore value them high in 
judgement, and therefore are less likely to agree with the culling of healthy animals.
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Introduction 
 
In 1997-1998, 2001 and 2003 Europe faced epidemic outbreaks of classical swine 
fever, foot and mouth disease and highly pathogenic avian influenza respectively. 
Especially the United Kingdom and the Netherlands experienced major outbreaks 
of these diseases. The then current European prevention and control policy did not 
allow for vaccination. Instead, the control strategy entailed the culling of infected 
and healthy animals within 1-3 km from the source of the infection. This policy was 
adopted because preventive vaccination was more expensive than culling and at that 
time no marker vaccine was available to determine whether an animal was 
vaccinated or infected. This was important for the export position of a country, 
because trade of animals and animal products was only allowed between countries 
with a disease-free status (Mepham 2004 Berentsen, Dijkhuizen and Oskam 1991 
Koninklijke Nederlandse Academie van Wetenschappen 2002). Furthermore, it was 
essential to stop the highly contagious diseases from spreading and infecting other 
animals. 
The culling included animals kept for commercial purposes, such as for food 
production, and for non-commercial purposes, such as for recreation, breeding of 
rare species, nature management and company. It involved a number of animal 
practices, such as livestock keeping, backyard animal keeping, parks and zoos and 
nature management.  
In these practices, keepers have a moral and legal duty to properly care for the 
health and welfare of their animals and to protect them from harm. However, 
during the epidemics, the stamping-out strategy, the transport restrictions, the 
culling by inexperienced slaughter men, and the speed at which animals had to be 
culled all caused welfare problems. Therefore, the individual keepers’ duty to care 
for their animals was overruled by their duty not to impede legal activity to stop the 
epidemic, as well as by the economic interest of the livestock sector and the nation.  
This decision to cull turned out to be strongly opposed in society. In the ensuing 
public debate, not only animal keepers resisted the culls. It also came from the 
general public, having witnessed footage of the large scale culling, the animal welfare 
problems, and the trauma inflicted on the keepers in the United Kingdom (Mepham 
2001 Crispin et al. 2002 Laurence 2002 Farm Animal Welfare Council 2002 Institute 
for Health Research 2002 Anthony 2004  Murphy-Lawless 2004 Mepham 2004) and 
the Netherlands (Huirne et al. 2002 Van Haaften and Kersten 2002 Rutgers 2003 
Nederlandse Vereniging tot Bescherming van Dieren 2004).  
Anthony (2004) described the debate as value-laden. From an economic perspective 
animals were seen as economically valuable, essential for the functioning of the 
livestock sector and for a solid position on the international trade market. The 
opposition from the animal keepers involved and from society as a whole 
demonstrated that economic motives were no longer considered sufficient reason to 
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cull healthy animals. The economic value of animals was in conflict with other 
values. In the debate, the people who were against culling expressed these other 
values by using terms as ‘respect for life’, ‘right to life’, ‘a duty to care and protect’ 
and ‘senseless killing’ as arguments against culling. This vocabulary showed an 
appreciation of animals as living beings rather than as economic units. It indicated 
that a change in people’s convictions about animals was taking place, which required 
a re-thinking of society’s responsibilities towards them.   
The governments at the national and European level realized that new prevention 
and control policy were required to reflect changes in convictions (Raad voor het 
Landelijk Gebied and Raad voor Dierenaangelegenheden 2003, 2004). For new 
policy, more knowledge about these convictions, about the values they are based on 
and about their role in an animal debate are required. However, people’s convictions 
about animals are shaped by a multitude of social, cultural and religious influences 
(Heleski Mertig and Zanella 2006 Pagani Robustelli and Ascione 2007), personal 
experience (Miura Bradshaw and Tanida 2002) and knowledge about the mental 
capacities of animals (Bekoff 2007 Knight and Barnett 2008). Furthermore, in a 
pluralistic society with people from a variety of backgrounds, one might expect a 
diversity of convictions and their strengths, and these may be the source of 
opposition in animal issues.  
 
Aim of the study 
The aim of the study was twofold. First the aim was to describe the diversity of 
convictions in Dutch society and second to describe the role of these convictions in 
judgement on the culling of healthy animals during an animal disease epidemic. The 
results may contribute to the development of new prevention and control strategies 
for contagious animal diseases. In this paper the results of a national survey are 
presented. 
 
Methodology 
 
For the empirical study a model was developed to be used in an Internet survey. An 
empirical approach was chosen because the focus of this study was to learn more 
about moral convictions in Dutch society, as the stamping-out strategy had led to 
public debates between stakeholders and even in society as a whole.  
The model consisted of two parts. In part one, moral convictions were identified 
and described. In part two, in the form of a case-study, the role of these moral 
convictions in the justification of culling healthy animals was studied. 
First a definition of moral conviction was required. The definition used in this study 
was based on Warren’s (1997) discussion of the moral importance of animals, which 
is based on certain values. For the current study, moral convictions were defined as 
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people’s beliefs about the moral importance of animals and people’s ensuing 
responsibilities towards them.  
In a next step the aim was to find what moral convictions are about. To this 
purpose, an analysis was performed on public debates about animal issues at the 
European and at the Dutch level on the culling during an animal disease epidemic 
(see references in the introduction) and on animal issues in general. Four domains 
were identified that lie at the heart of these debates. These domains are: the 
hierarchical position of animals with respect to people, an animal’s value (as in 
appreciation), people’s moral responsibility to care for and protect animals (to do 
good) and animal rights. Therefore, the framework of the model is centred round 
these domains.  
For each domain a number of statements refer to this domain reflecting what the 
opinion is with respect to the domain. 
Domain one is about the hierarchical position of humans with respect to animals. 
For this domain three statements each refer to this domain: humans are superior to 
other animals, humans and animals are equal, and animals are superior to humans.  
Considering humans to be superior to animals may originate from a religious, 
cultural, evolutionary or biological point of view. 
Although Christian-Judean religious texts are open to different interpretations, the 
most common interpretation is that humans rule over animals because animals were 
not considered to have immortal souls, and because humans were given stewardship 
over the natural world (Armstrong and Boltzer 2003).  
The cultural justification may be based on the fact that animals have been 
domesticated for centuries and kept for human purposes, and because humans have 
the power to do so (Serpell 2004).  
The evolutionary justification holds that in the course of evolution humans have 
become more developed than other animals, especially in mental capacities, granting 
them a position at the top of the evolutionary ladder (Hyers 2006).  
The justification for a superior position is based on values which differentiate 
between species, for instance rationality or moral agency. An equality opinion is 
based on values that emphasize the similarity between humans and animals, such as 
both being living beings, or both being part of a natural order. This opinion is 
inspired by recent scientific studies about the nature of animals and their mental 
capacities (Bekoff 2007), which reveal that humans and animals share many 
characteristics. An opinion that animals are superior to people may be based on a 
holistic view on the natural world, in which animals are seen as people’s superior 
teachers to reconnect with nature and our inner selves (Kupper 2009).  
Domain two refers to the value of animals. For this domain two statements each 
refer to the domain: animals have value, and animals have no value. In this case 
value is defined as the appreciation for an animal based on its intrinsic value as a 
living being, its instrumental value to people, its relational value to people, its 
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functional value for the ecosystem, and its value as part of Creation. Over the 
centuries, animals had already earned appreciation for their usefulness to people 
(e.g., for food) or in a relational sense (e.g., as companions). Now animals are 
increasingly appreciated for their role in the ecosystem (Taylor 1986 Leopold in 
Warren 1977), and have become intrinsically valuable. The latter means that animals 
are recognized as having value in their own right as beings with a life of their own, 
and a purpose in life that is inherent to their species-specific needs. This domain is 
somewhat different in that a statement: some animals have value, is not included, 
because the purpose of this domain was to discover how the intrinsic value is 
appreciated with respect to the other values. 
Domain three refers to doing good to animals by caring for their health and well-
being, by not harming them, and by protecting them against harm. For this domain 
three statements each refer to the domain: a duty to do good to all animals, a duty to 
do good to some animals and no duty to do good to animals. This domain reflects 
that people’s actions matter to animals, whose welfare and flourishing can be 
promoted or thwarted by these actions. This animal welfare issue is and has always 
been the core domain in criticism on certain animal use (Bentham 1789 Singer 
1995).  
Domain four refers to animal rights. For this domain three statements each refer to 
the domain: all animals have a right to life, some animals have a right to life, and 
animals have no right to life. This domain allows for several aspects of rights, such 
as a right to freedom, or to autonomy. For this study the right to life was chosen 
because of its relevance for the debate on the culling of animals. With respect to a 
right to life, there are differing points of view. According to some (Taylor 1986 
Schweitzer in Warren 1997), life as such has value; therefore killing is a harm done 
to all living creatures, even if the animal may not be aware of this and merely has an 
unconscious urge to live. To some, only the killing of an animal with a higher 
intelligence and consciousness is morally wrong, because these animals may have a 
concept of life, death and the future. They therefore have a conscious desire to live 
to fulfil future-oriented desires (Regan 1983 McMahan 2002). 
The issue of animal rights is more debated than animal welfare, because it takes 
people’s legal and moral responsibilities much further (Wise 2004). Some argue that 
animals lack the relevant features to qualify as rights-bearers, i.e., rational moral 
agents with a sense of justice and an understanding of, and ability to abide by 
mutual agreements (Carruthers 1992 Scruton 2000). Others are concerned about the 
practical implications of giving animals (legal) rights (Posden 2004). 
To learn more about moral convictions, a description in terms of domains and 
statements is not sufficient. Insight is also required into what these convictions are 
based on: the why of convictions. To answer this question the academic animal 
ethics debate about the moral importance of animals was useful. Animal ethics in 
the academic realm and animal issues in the public debate are both concerned with 
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the question: Are animals morally important and if so, why? In the academic debate, 
values are proposed which an animal is required to fulfil for moral importance. For 
instance, some authors argue that being a living being (Taylor 1986 Schweitzer in 
Warren 1997) is sufficient to be morally important. Other authors argue that being 
able to feel pain and emotions (sentience) (Bentham 1789 Singer 1995), or being 
conscious (Regan 1983), or being able to think and to distinguish between right and 
wrong (Scruton 2000 Carruthers 1992 Kant in Warren 1997), or having a notion of 
the future and of life and death (McMahan 2002) are required as well. Some authors 
refer to the importance of the emotional, functional or historical relationship 
between animals and people (Anderson 2004 Noddings in Warren 1997). Other 
authors emphasize their role as a species within an ecosystem (Callicot in Warren 
1997 Leopold in Warren 1997 Taylor 1986). Another value refers to virtuous 
character. A virtuous person would not harm an animal, because that would be a 
sign of bad character (Hursthouse 1999). Warren (1997) proposes a multi-values 
account for moral importance (she calls this moral status). She argues that in the 
public morality not one value, but a number of values (called values in the current 
study)are important for moral importance, depending on the situation.  
The above-mentioned values were included in the model to describe the why of 
moral convictions. Moreover, a religion or philosophy of life value was included, to 
study whether religion or a philosophy of life contributed to the respondents’ 
convictions, and to examine the relative importance of this value with respect to the 
other values.   
Part one of the model was constructed by domains, statements and values. In this 
way, moral convictions were described by the combination of a statement and a 
supporting value. For instance, a person might have the conviction that one has a 
duty to do good (domain three) to all animals (statement), because they are living 
beings (value). Another person might have the conviction that one has the duty to 
do good to some animals, namely those that are sentient. Each value stands for a 
value, such as the value of life. 
The second part of the model was a case-study and consisted of four cases. Each 
case described an argument in favour of culling and arguments against culling. It 
described the culling of healthy cows and chickens in an animal disease epidemic. 
These two species were presented because people may distinguish between 
mammals and birds (Eurobarometer 2007). This can be based on an animals’ mental 
capacities (in the cases the term ‘highly developed’ was used), or because humans 
are mammals, and other mammals such as cows may be more appealing.  
The arguments in favour were: to stop a disease from spreading (case one), to 
safeguard the export position of a country (case two), to protect people against eye 
infections (case three) and to protect human life (case four).  
The arguments against culling were: healthy cows and chickens should not be culled 
because: animal life is valuable / cows are highly developed (mental capacity to 
 Chapter 5 
84 
 
think, feel, and be conscious) / chickens are highly developed (idem) / special and 
rare breeds are valuable (important for a species, a region, or the ecosystem) / 
animals have a financial value to people (for instance production animals as a source 
of income for the farmer) / people have a personal bond with these animals 
(relational bond) / killing animals is a bad character trait (virtue) / animals are part 
of Creation (religion). These eight arguments were the same in all four cases. This 
was done to study whether an argument was valued differently in the different cases.  
Each of these arguments against culling was a ‘translation’ of a value. In this way it 
became an argument against culling. For instance, an example of a moral conviction 
is: animals have a right to life because they are living beings. In the cases it became an 
argument against culling, namely: these healthy cows and chickens should not be culled because 
animal life is valuable. As such the role of moral convictions in judgement was 
determined.  
In the form of a questionnaire, the model was sent to an Internet panel which was 
approached through CentERdata (www.centerdata.nl). CentERdata performs on-
line survey research by means of a CentERdata panel. It consists of 2000 
households, that once a week fill in an Internet survey. This Internet panel is an 
appropriate representation of the Dutch-speaking population. Information about 
gender and age was available. In the current survey further information was 
obtained to find whether the respondents had contact with animals privately or 
professionally. The questionnaire consisted of both closed and open questions.  
In part one the respondents were asked to choose one statement per domain. For 
instance, a respondent chooses the statement that humans are superior to animals.. 
Then the respondent rates all the values that support this statement with a number 
between 0-10, 0 means not at all important for the respondent’s opinion and 10 
means most important for the respondent’s opinion. The higher the rating, the 
more important he/she considers the value for his/her statement. In an open 
question the respondents could add another value or a comment. 
In part two, the case-study, the respondents gave their judgement on the culling per 
case. They could choose between: I agree, I partly (dis)agree or I disagree with the 
culling. They motivated their judgement by rating the argument in favour of or 
against culling by a number between 0 and 10. The number 0 indicated that the 
argument was not important at all for their judgement, and the number 10 indicated 
that the argument was most important. The questionnaire is included in appendix 
one. 
The diversity of convictions showed in the combination of chosen statements of the 
four domains. This combination was called profiles. Each profile is described by the 
combination of four numbers. The first number refers to a statement (1, 2, 3) of 
domain one: the position of the animal. The second number refers to a statement of 
domain two (1, 2): the value of animals. The third number refers to a statement (1, 
2, 3) of domain three: to do good, and the fourth number refers to a statement (1, 2, 
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3) of domain four: the right to life. In this way 54 combinations of statements 
(3x2x3x3), are theoretically possible. 
Of the profiles that included most respondents, statistical analysis of the ratings was 
performed. The average rating of the values per statement was analyzed to find out 
for each statement which values rated relatively high in relation to each other, and 
whether there were significant differences in rating between the profiles. 
In the case-study, it was first determined how the respondents had judged per case, 
to find out if there were differences between convictions. Then with the average 
rating of the arguments in favour of and against culling, it was determined, which 
arguments were rated high in relation to each other what their relative rating was per 
judgement category and per case and whether there were significant differences in 
rating between respondents with different profiles.  
 
Data analysis 
The demographic data obtained were gender, age and contact with animals in 
private life or work. The values were grouped into: ‘rated low’ (rate between 0 and 
4.9), ‘rated average’ (between 5 and 6.9) and ‘rated high’ (between 7 and 10). The 
ratings were not categorized into equal groups, but were categorized on the basis of 
their subjective meaning. This was done because moral convictions in themselves 
are subjective and the result of the personal interpretation of a respondent. 
Therefore conclusions were drawn on the basis of the relative differences between 
the ratings.  
Statistical analysis was performed with SPSS 1.5 for Windows. By means of the 
Kolmogorov-Smirnova test it was established that the ratings of the values were not 
normally distributed. Therefore, the Mann-Whitney test (p<0.05) was used to 
identify possible significant differences in rating of the same argument between 
different moral convictions (rows in tables).  
A principal component analysis (PCA) using SPSS version 15 was performed for 
three reasons. Firstly, a PCA analysis assisted in grouping the values into values 
important for a statement and those not (or less) important. Secondly, the values 
may not be independent from each other but may be inter-correlated. A conviction 
may be based on more than one value. For instance, the fact that an animal is a 
living being may be necessary to a respondent for some moral importance, but 
he/she may find that this should be combined with an ability to feel pain and 
emotions for full importance. Thirdly, it needed to be established whether the 
domains themselves were independent from each other. In the model the domains 
are presented as separate from each other, but this cannot be merely assumed.  
Prior to the analysis it was assessed whether the data were suitable for this analysis. 
The correlation coefficient between the statements needed to exceed >.3. The 
Kaiser-Meyer-Olkin value needed a recommended value of .6 or more. The 
Bartlett’s Test of Sphericity needed to be significant (p<0.05).  
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The following questions were addressed. Can the values be grouped into important 
or not (or less) important for a statement? With the PCA the values were grouped 
into components. Components with an eigenvalue of 1.0 or higher were considered 
important. Then the next question was: which values are relatively the most 
important for a component (load with a coefficient >.5). The third question was: are 
values per component inter-correlated (i.e., not independent)? The latter two 
questions were approached by the direct oblimin rotation method.  
 
Results 
 
Demography  
In group A, 54% were male, 66% were between 45-64 years of age, and 49% had 
contact with animals. 59% of group B were female, and compared to group A was 
younger with 46% aged between 15-45 years, and had more contact with animals 
(66%). The Central Bureau of Statistics in the Netherlands (CBS, www.cbs.nl, 
retrieved 25 June 2008) provides demographic data of the Dutch population. 
According to these data, the ratio male to female is 1:1, and the highest percentage 
of the Dutch population is found in the 40-65 age range.  
 
Diversity of convictions 
The survey was sent to 2,545 people. Of these, 2,051 respondents (81%) returned 
the questionnaire, and 1,999 respondents had filled out the questionnaire 
completely. This high response rate was due to the fact that the respondents were 
part of an existing CentERdata Internet panel, and were therefore more motivated  
 
Table 1 Choice of statement* per domain by the total group (n) and A and B profile (%)  
Domain Statements Total 
n=1999 
 
A  
n=993 
50% 
B  
n=559 
28% 
Humans are superior to animals 67 100  
Humans and animals are equal 32  100 
Position 
Animals are superior to humans 1   
Animals have value 100 100 100 Value 
Animals have no value    
People should do good to animals 85 100 100 
People should do good to some animals 12   
Do good 
People don’t have to do good to animals 3   
All animals have a right to life 87 100 100 
Some animals have a right to life 12   
Rights 
Animals have no right to life 1   
*The respondents could only choose one statement per domain 
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to participate. Table one gives the percentage of respondents per statement: for 
domain one 67% stated that people are superior to animals and 32% stated that they 
are equal. These two statements referred to one domain and were therefore mutually 
exclusive. For the other domains 100% stated that animals have value, 85% stated 
that people should do good to all animals and 87% stated that all animals have a 
right to life. These statements were not mutually exclusive, because they referred to 
different domains.  
In total 19 profiles were identified (table two). Two profiles were dominant and 
were called A and B. Profile A included 50% of the respondents (n=993). This 
group had chosen the combination of statements 1111. This is: humans are superior 
to animals, and animals have value, and people have a moral duty to be good to all 
animals, and all animals have a right to life. Profile B included 28% of the 
respondents (n=559). These respondents had chosen the combination 2111. This 
 
Table 2 Profiles: combination of statements of the four domains 
Profile  Number of respondents Percentage respondents 
1111 =A 993 49.7 
1112 88 4.4 
1113 13 0.7 
1121 92 4.6 
1122 98 4.9 
1123 4 0.2 
1131 37 1.9 
1132 11 0.6 
1133 7 0.4 
Subtotal 1343 67.4 
2111 =B 559 28.0 
2112 25 1.3 
2113 1 0.1 
2121 31 1.6 
2122 14 0.7 
2131 11 0.6 
Subtotal 641 32.3 
3111 12 0.6 
3112 1 0.1 
3121 1 0.1 
3132 1 0.1 
Subtotal 15 0.9 
Total 1999 100.0 
A profile is determined by the combination of statements. Each combination consists of four numbers. The 
first number refers to a statement (1, 2, 3) of hierarchy, the second number to a statement (1, 2) of value, 
the third number to a statement (1 ,2, 3) of to do good, the fourth number to a statement (1 ,2, 3) of right 
to life 
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profile differed with A in that these respondents considered humans and animals to 
be equal.  
Three smaller profiles: C (5%), D (5%) and E (5%) also considered humans to be 
superior, but were of the opinion that people should do good to some animals (C and 
D) and that some animals have a right to life (C and E). The 14 other profiles were 
each chosen by a very small number of respondents and were therefore too limited 
for further analysis. Further analysis was performed with A and B.  
 
Domains and values 
After the respondents had chosen one statement for each domain, they were asked 
to rate the values in support of this statement with a number between 0 and 10. The 
rating of the values by the A and B respondents is presented in table three. Most 
values were rated average or high, except for the ratings for the statement humans are 
superior to animals and the religion or philosophy of life value in domains one, three 
and four. 
In domain one (position of animal with respect to humans), the A group 
respondents based their choice of the statement humans are superior to animals, mainly 
on the values animals cannot think (rate 6.7) and animals cannot distinguish between right 
and wrong (6.1). The other values were rated low (2.1-3.5). The B respondents based 
their choice of the statement humans and animals are equal mainly on the values: both 
humans and animals are living beings (9.1), both humans and animals are sentient (8.7) and 
both humans and animals are important in the ecosystem (8.7).  
For domain two (value as in appreciation), for the A and b respondents the 
statement animals have value was based on the values: animals are living beings (A: 7.9 
and  B: 8.4), animals have a functional use to people (7.9 and 8.3), People have a relationship 
with animals,(7.9 and 8.5),animal species are important for the ecosystem (8.3 and 8.8) and my 
religion or philosophy of life tells me so (7.3 and 7.0) Only in this domain was the religion 
or philosophy of life argument rated high (7.3 and 7.0). 
For domain three (to do good by caring for and protection), the statement people 
should do good to all animals was mostly based on the values animals are living beings (8.7 
and 9.2), animals are sentient (7.6 and 8.5) and animals are important in the ecosystem (8.1 
and 8.8).  
Domain four (the right to life) showed some dissimilarities between the A and B 
respondents. For the former group the choice of the statement that all animals have a 
right to life was based mainly on the values animals are living beings (7.7 and 8.6), animals 
have an urge to live (7.1 and 8.0), and animals are important for the ecosystem (8.1 and 8.8). 
The B respondents rated animals are sentient high (7.4) and animals should be able to fulfil 
their life-cycle high as well (8.1). The A group rated most values significantly lower 
than the B group. 
A PCA was performed on the statements. It did not include the domain animals have 
value, because all respondents had chosen statement one (animals are valuable). The 
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Table 3 Average rating of values in support of a statement per domain by the A and B profile 
Domains     Position Value  Do good   Rights 
Profiles   A 
 
 B 
 
A B 
 
A 
 
B 
 
A B 
Row: Statement 
Column: values 
People 
are 
superior 
to 
animals, 
because: 
People 
and 
animals 
are 
equal, 
because:
Animals have 
value, because: 
People should 
do good to all 
animals, 
because: 
All animals 
have a right 
to life, 
because: 
Animals are living 
beings  
 9.1 7.9s 8.4s 8.7s 9.2s 7.7s 8.6s 
Animals are not/are 
sentient 
3.5 8.7   7.6s 8.5s 5.93 7.4s 
Animals cannot/can 
think 
6.7 6.4   4.7s 6.2s 4.5s 6.1s 
Animals cannot/can 
distinguish between 
right and wrong 
6.1 5.3 
      
Animals should be able 
to fulfil their lifecycle 
      6.7s 8.1s 
Animals have an urge to 
live 
      7.1s 8.0s 
Animal species are 
not/are important in the 
ecosystem  
3.5 8.7 8.3s 8.8s 8.1s 8.8s 8.1s 8.8s 
Animals are useful to 
people 
  7.9s 8.3s     
People have a 
relationship with animals 
  7.9s 8.5s     
People become a better 
person by being good to 
animals 
  
  
5.5 6.3   
My religion or 
philosophy of life tells 
me so 
2.1 2.8 7.3 7.0 2.8 2.9 2.6 2.9 
Empty cells=values not relevant for the statement. s=significant differences in rating of a value 
between A and B p<0.05. For domain one A and B had chosen different statements, therefore no 
significant differences were computed.   
 
correlation matrix showed a low coefficient of .328 between to do good and right to life. 
The Kaiser-Meyer-Olkin value (.543) was lower than the recommended value of .6, 
but the Bartlett’s Test of Sphericity was significant (p<0.05).  
Hierarchy was negatively correlated with to do good and right to life. To do good (.827) and 
right to life (.802) loaded strongly on component one with an eigenvalue of 1.4, which 
explained 47% of the total variability. Hierarchy loaded strongly (.999) on component 
two with an eigenvalue of .992, which explained 31% of the total variability.  
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Table four gives the PCA loadings of the values per statement for the profiles A and 
B. The analysis showed that for each statement the values loaded on two or three 
components named C1, C2 and C3. In the survey the respondents had valued the 
statements according to the importance for each for their opinion. Therefore the 
components represented the degree of importance, with C1=the most important, 
and C2 and C3=less important.  
For the statement humans are superior to animals (A group domain one) the values 
animals cannot think and animals cannot distinguish between right and wrong loaded the 
strongest on C1 and were highly inter-correlated.  
For the statement humans and animals are equal (B group domain one) the values both 
humans and animals are living beings, and both humans and animals are sentient were highly 
inter-correlated and together with the value both humans and animals are important in the 
ecosystem loaded the strongest on C1. A third component C3 included the highly 
inter-correlated values animals cannot think and animals cannot distinguish between right and 
wrong. This indicated that they were seen as inter-correlated, but not important for 
the statement. These two values were not correlated with the religion statement.  
For the statement animals have value (domain two) the values animals are important for 
the ecosystem, animals are useful to people, and animals have a relational bond with people were 
highly inter-correlated and loaded the strongest on C1 for both the A and B profiles.  
For the statement  people should do good to all animals (domain three), the values animals 
are living beings and animals can feel pain and emotions loaded the strongest on C1 for 
both profiles. For B the importance in the ecosystem also loaded strongly. All these 
values were highly inter-correlated. 
For the statement all animals have a right to life (domain four), for the A and B profile 
the highly inter-correlated values animals are living beings, animals need to fulfil their 
natural life-cycle, and animals have an urge to live and animals are important for the ecosystem 
loaded the strongest on C1.  
For all statements the religion statement loaded (strongly) on C2 or C3, rendering it 
the least important statement. 
The results of the PCA analysis showed that the values could be grouped into 
important and not (or less) important. When comparing this with the ratings this 
meant that values valued between 0-5.9 were not important and those between 6-10 
were important. Thus the ratings and the PCA support each others findings, with 
the exception of the value animals are living beings in domain two. This value does not 
load strongly on C1. This could indicate that the respondents had interpreted value 
as merit (for humans or the ecosystem) rather than appreciation (for life itself). 
 
Case-study: judgement 
The respondents were asked to give their judgement on the culling of healthy cows 
and chickens in four cases (table five). Most respondents partly (dis)agreed with the 
culling to safeguard a country’s export position and to prevent eye infections. Most 
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Table 5 Judgement on the culling of healthy cows and chickens for each case and judgement by A 
and B profile in percentages 
Judgement Respondents who 
disagree with the 
culling  
Respondents who 
partly (dis)agree 
with the culling  
Respondents 
who agree with 
the culling  
 
Profiles 
 
 
A 
 
B 
 
A 
 
B 
 
A 
 
B 
 
Case 1 
Healthy cows and chickens are 
culled to stop the disease from 
spreading 
 
7 
 
15 
 
41 
 
57 
 
53 
 
29 
 
Case 2 
Healthy cows and chickens are 
culled to safeguard the export 
position of a country 
 
25 
 
37 
 
50 
 
50 
 
25 
 
14 
 
Case 3 
Healthy cows and chickens are 
culled to protect human health 
(eye infections) 
 
24 
 
32 
 
41 
 
45 
 
35 
 
 
23 
 
Case 4 
Healthy cows and chickens are 
culled to protect human life 
 
 
4 
 
9 
 
15 
 
31 
 
81 
 
61 
 
Percentages rounded off 
The A respondents agreed with the culling to stop a disease from spreading and 
most A and B respondents agreed with the culling to protect human life. A greater 
proportion of A respondents than B respondents agreed with the culling and a 
greater proportion of B respondents disagreed or partly (dis)agreed. 
Next, the respondents were asked to rate the argument in favour of and all 
arguments against culling with a number between 0 and 10. Table six gives the 
rating of the argument in favour of culling per case per judgement category. The 
respondents who disagreed with the culling rated the arguments in favour low, 
respondents who partly (dis)agreed rated these arguments average, and respondents 
who agreed rated these arguments high. 
Table seven shows the average rating of the argument against culling animal life is 
valuable, therefore healthy cows and chickens should not be culled per case per judgement 
category. Compared to the other arguments against culling, this argument was rated 
the highest. The respondents who disagreed with the culling rated this argument 
average to high, respondents who partly (dis)agreed rated this argument average and 
respondents  who  agreed  rated  this  argument low.  The A  respondents rated  this 
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Table 6 Rating of the argument in favour of culling for each case and judgement by the A and B 
profile 
Judgement Respondents who 
disagreed with the 
culling  
Respondents who 
partly (dis)agreed 
with the culling  
Respondents who 
agreed with the 
culling  
 
Profiles 
 
 
A 
 
B 
 
A 
 
B 
 
A 
 
B 
 
Case 1 
Healthy cows and chickens should 
be culled to stop the disease from 
spreading 
3.2 3.2 6.0 5.9 8.4 
 
 
8.1 
 
Case 2 
Healthy cows and chickens should 
be culled to safeguard the export 
position of a country 
3.2 3.1 5.4 5.4 7.2 7.1 
 
Case 3 
Healthy cows and chickens should 
be culled to protect human health 
(eye infections) 
3.3 3.0 5.5 5.4 7.6 6.8 
 
Case 4 
Healthy cows and chickens should  
be culled to protect human life 
 
5.5 4.7 6.8 6.2 8.7 7.7 
 
 
argument significantly lower than the B respondents. The rating of this argument 
was lower than its rating as a value (compare with table three). 
The other arguments against culling were all rated average or low. Therefore, only 
the average rating of these arguments together is presented per case per judgement 
category in one table (table eight). 
The respondents who disagreed with the culling rated these arguments low to 
average, respondents who partly (dis)agreed rated these arguments low and 
respondents who agreed rated this argument even lower.  
The A respondents rated these arguments somewhat lower than the B respondents. 
The rating of these arguments was lower than their rating as a value (compare with 
table three). 
In general it showed that the A respondents rated the arguments in favour of culling 
higher than the B respondents, and against culling (significantly) lower. 
Furthermore, when comparing the rating of the arguments in favour of and against 
culling, it showed that the higher the rating of the argument in favour of culling, the 
lower the rating of the arguments against culling (compare tables six to eight).  
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Table 7 Mean rating of the argument animal life is valuable, therefore these healthy cows and chickens should 
not be culled for each case and judgement by the A and B profile 
Judgement Rating by the 
respondents who 
disagreed with the 
culling  
Rating by the 
respondents who 
partly (dis)agreed 
with the culling 
Rating by the 
respondents who 
agreed with the 
culling  
Profile A B A B A B 
 
Case 1 
Animal life is valuable, therefore 
these healthy cows and chickens 
should not be culled to stop the 
disease from spreading 
 
7.1s 
 
7.9s 
 
5.4s 
 
6.0s 
 
2.6s 
 
 
 
3.5s 
 
Case 2 
Animal life is valuable, therefore 
these healthy cows and chickens 
should not be culled to safeguard 
the export position of a country 
6.1s 7.0s 4.7s 5.7s 3.0 3.5 
 
Case 3 
Animal life is valuable, therefore 
these healthy cows and chickens 
should not be culled to protect 
human health (eye infections) 
6.1s 7.4s 5.0s 6.2s 3.4s 4.2s 
 
Case 4 
Animal life is valuable, therefore 
these healthy cows and chickens 
should not be culled to protect 
human life 
s5.6 s8.0 s5.1 s6.1 s3.0 s4.2 
 
S=p<0.05 
 
Table 8 Average rating of the other arguments against culling together for each case and judgement 
by the A and B profile 
Judgement  Respondents who 
disagreed with the 
culling  
Respondents who 
partly (dis)agreed 
with the culling  
Respondents who 
agreed with the 
culling  
Profiles 
 
 A B A B A B 
Case 1 5.2 6.2 4.4 4.8 2.3 2.8 
 
Case 2 
 
4.5 
 
5.5 
 
3.6 
 
4.4 
 
2.5 
 
2.7 
 
Case 3 
 
4.2 
 
5.3 
 
3.9 
 
4.9 
 
2.7 
 
3.4 
 
Case 4 
 
4.5 
 
6.4 
 
4.3 
 
5.0 
 
2.6 
 
3.5 
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Discussion 
 
In this section it is discussed how the results of the study may contribute to a better 
understanding of convictions and their role in judgement on the culling of healthy 
animals. In addition, an explanation of the opposition between some parties 
involved in the public debate about culling is presented. 
With the model it was possible to identify diversity in convictions, by the choice of 
statements, the rating of the values, the arguments and judgements in the cases. 
However some issues need to be discussed.  
The convictions were described by means of domains, statements and values. It is 
argued that the domains were the core issues of animal debates, but other domains 
may also be important. The theoretical framework of the model allows for other 
domains, statements and values, or cases and arguments to be included, dependent 
on the issue of study. For instance, in the current study the value of religion or a 
philosophy of life was included, but this value was rated the lowest. This is 
unexpected as about 50% of the respondents was religious (CentERdata had not 
provided information about a philosophy of life). This could have been due to the 
phrasing of this value, combining religion and philosophy of life. Therefore, a 
comparative religion or philosophy of life study may clarify the importance of 
animals by means of other domains, such as a domain based on the relation between 
humans and (other) animals with respect to God and Creation, or by a spiritual 
holistic domain based on the interdependence of spirits of all living creatures as 
equal partners in the natural and spiritual world. For instance, the possession of 
rationality or other mental capacities may not be important from a religious or 
spiritual point of view, but instead the possession of a soul may be more important. 
 
Diversity of convictions 
As the respondents were representative of Dutch society, the results indicate that in 
Dutch society most people consider humans to be superior to animals, but still feel 
that people should be good to all animals and that all animals have a right to life. It 
indicates that a superior position does not relieve people from their responsibility to 
properly care for animals and to respect their lives. This also follows from the PCA 
of the statements, which showed that a hierarchy or equality view on animals is not 
correlated with doing good to animals and with a right to life. This is reflected in the 
rating of the value animals can/cannot think, which was important for domain one, but 
not for the domains to do good and right to life. However, not all conditions for a PCA 
were met. Therefore a certain connection between a superiority view and one’s 
ensuing responsibilities cannot be excluded.  
It is argued that a number of values (as moral values) are shared in Dutch society. 
This was based on their consistent high rating for convictions and as arguments in 
the case-study. Furthermore, it supports Warren’s multi-values account for moral 
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importance. In this study most values were rated average or high, meaning that 
more than one value was important for one’s convictions. This was supported by 
the PCA analysis. A number of values were shown to be inter-correlated for the 
statements of the four domains.  However, they were inter-correlated for one 
specific statement. The values animals are living beings and animals are sentient are highly 
inter-correlated for the statement people should do good to all animals, but for the 
statement all animals have a right to life only the value animals are living beings loaded high 
on component one. This seems to indicate that the possession of life itself is not 
only necessary but also sufficient for this right, and that non-sentient animals have a 
right to life as well. This seems to support the theory by Schweitzer (in Warren 
1997) in which the possession of life of an individual animal is sufficient for moral 
importance and the theory of Taylor (1986) in which being a species in the 
ecosystem is sufficient for moral importance. However in practice, in most 
situations people feel a stronger duty towards sentient animals than towards non- 
(or less) sentient animals. Sentience renders an animal aware of external stimuli, and 
of the present and perhaps the future, showing a clear urge or will to live. An urge 
to live may also be present in non-sentient animals, but this is not so easily 
recognized by people. Moreover, with sentient animals it is easier to build up a 
reciprocal personal relationship. Therefore, one’s conviction that all animals have a 
right to life should be seen as a starting point from which one judges a particular 
situation, but it may not be an absolute right.  
The virtue and religion or philosophy of life values were not rated high. Virtue enjoys a 
renewed interest in the academic debate (Hursthouse, 1999, Degrazia, 1999), but 
this was not reflected in the results. Virtue is not only concerned with one particular 
action towards animals for the animal’s sake, but also with the action as a reflection 
of virtuous character. A striving for virtuous character requires an understanding of 
the concept of virtuous behaviour as well as doing the right thing in one particular 
situation. Therefore, the respondents either may not have recognized this concept in 
the argument presented or may not have been motivated by a wish to better 
themselves.  
Religion or philosophies of life are important sources of morality in our society, and 
Christianity is the predominant religion in the Netherlands. People often interpret 
Christian religious texts as humans having stewardship over the natural world and, 
in contrast to animals, having an immortal soul. This view is likely to have an 
influence on the moral importance of animals. In some studies (Driscoll 1992; 
Heleski, Mertig and Zanella 2006) religiosity was related to attitudes to animals. The 
current results do not support this. Religion was only important in the appreciation 
of animals as part of Creation (domain 2 value). This could indicate that this source 
of morality is more important in our relationship with Creation as a whole than with 
animals alone. In our relationship with animals, personal experience and upbringing, 
knowledge about their ability to feel, their mental capacities (Bekoff 2007; Knight 
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and Barnett 2008), their social behaviour, and their importance for the natural world 
may be more decisive for their moral importance.  
The respondents were not limited to the closed questions and could give an 
additional answer in an open-ended question. However this did not yield important 
additional information.  
 
The influence of convictions on judgement 
More insight was obtained into the role of convictions in judgement. It was 
remarkable that most respondents were of the opinion that all animals have a right 
to life, given the fact that rights exert a strong claim on people to reconsider the use 
of animals. In the case-study, this value was reflected in the argument animal life is 
valuable, which was the core argument against culling. However, arguments against 
culling could be out-rated by arguments in favour of culling. This implies that 
convictions reflect beliefs about a right to life, but that in a public debate these 
convictions may have a different rate depending on the issue. 
The respondents did not distinguish between cows and chickens. Other studies 
found that people do distinguish between animal species (Driscoll 1992; Knight and 
Barnett 2008). Knight and Barnett found that belief in animal mind, which refers to 
a degree of consciousness, sentience, intelligence and self-awareness is an important 
factor influencing people’s views on animal use. Driscoll refers to popular (e.g., dogs 
and cats) and unpopular species (e.g., insects) and found that it was considered less 
acceptable to use popular species for human purposes than unpopular species. 
However, this was not confirmed in our case-study, as no distinction was made 
between cows and chickens. Furthermore, for animals to be of a special breed or 
having a relational or functional bond with people was not important for judgement 
either.  
The arguments that were rated low were not necessarily unimportant. They may as a 
collective still have been important for judgement. The PCA supported this by 
showing that together they loaded on one component and were inter-correlated, and 
that the argument animal life is valuable and the arguments in favour of culling each 
loaded on a different component.  
 
Social influences 
The demographic data showed that social differences exert an influence on 
convictions. As compared to the B profile, the A profile consisted of older people 
and more men; they had less contact with animals in private life or work, and lived 
in smaller towns. Living in smaller communities meant that they may have been 
raised with farm animals kept for their utility. More B respondents were younger, 
were female, had more contact with animals in private life or work, and lived in 
larger towns or cities. 
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Younger people were born and raised in a period when more became known about 
animals, their mental capacities, their importance in the ecosystem, and people’s 
influence on their welfare and habitat. Furthermore, from the sixties onwards, the 
public debate focused on the use of animals in testing and on the development of 
intensive farming systems. Environmental organizations increasingly draw attention 
to the fragile balance between animal species in their natural habitat and the 
consequences of people’s actions on this habitat. These developments have surely 
influenced the outlook of younger people in relation to animals. 
Several studies describe gender differences in the attitude towards animals (Herzog 
1991; Driscoll 1992; Hills 1993; Fidler 2003; Robertson, Gallivan and MacIntyre 
2004; Heleski, Mertig and Zanella 2006; Herzog 2007; Eurobarometer 2005). These 
authors describe the attitude of women as being based on identification with the 
animal and concern for their treatment, while the attitude of men seems to be more 
based on their utility.  
Overall the B respondents rated their convictions significantly higher than the A 
respondents, their convictions exerted more weight in judgement, and a greater 
proportion of B respondents were against the culling. 
Possible significant demographic differences such as for gender or age were not 
calculated as the aim was to study differences in convictions. However, it could 
prove useful for further research, because significant differences were found in 
rating between the A and the B respondents. 
 
Opposing views in animal issues 
It is concluded that in Dutch society a number of convictions are shared by a 
majority. How does this explain opposing views in animal issues when 78% of the 
respondents shared most convictions? This can be explained in different ways. 
Some respondents were of the opinion that animals are superior to people. People 
with these convictions do not represent a majority view in society, but may still have 
a strong voice in animal debates. Animal use is historically an accepted practice, and 
the moral justification of animal use as such is not questioned: is it morally 
justifiable to keep, benefit from and kill animals for human purposes? People who 
are of the conviction that animals are superior and who value this conviction highly, 
are likely to disagree with most keeping and treatment of animals. 
However, one does not have to support a superior position of animals to be heard 
in an animal issue. Some people may rate their convictions high and equally high as 
arguments in the issue. Therefore, their convictions are not so easily overruled by 
human interests. Others may be of the opinion that people have no duty to do good 
to animals (0.7%) and therefore may see no reason to support better treatment of 
animals.  
How does this explain the opposing views on the culls? Two things were important 
for an understanding of this opposition. First, a number of values (values refer to 
Diversity of moral convictions 
99 
 
values) had been challenged, such as the value of life (culling), of sentience (the 
animal welfare problems) and of the importance of animals in the ecosystem (in the 
epidemics special or rare animal species and semi-wild animals in nature areas had 
been culled as well) and the personal relation between people and the animals. 
Second, these values did not have the same importance for all stakeholders in this 
particular situation. Anthony described the culling debate as based on values. The 
current study showed that it is based on the differences in valuation of these values 
in this particular context. 
In general, it is argued that people who value their convictions high, therefore value 
these convictions high in judgement, and therefore these convictions can only be 
outweighed by highly valued human interests, for instance to protect human life.  
 
Future policy 
New prevention and control policy should be aware of the nature, diversity and 
dynamics of moral convictions about animals, which are based on a number of 
values, and play a role in the culling debate. These values should be given a place in 
the realization of new policy. However, it is a challenge to develop policy that is 
acceptable by a majority in society. In this dilemma three things are relevant.  
People who partly (dis)agree with the culling may require more information about 
the veterinary, economic, human health and animal welfare risks involved to reach 
judgement. Furthermore, it should be made clear which alternative measures are 
considered (such as vaccinating). It requires a risk assessment which also includes 
moral values and their importance, when a value is at risk to be jeopardized.  
New policy should acknowledge that new ways of animal keeping have emerged in 
the Dutch rural area, such as the keeping of backyard animals. These keepers have a 
different and more personal relationship with their animals. In this diversity of 
animal keeping, policy should address the moral duties to care for and not to harm 
for each stakeholder not only to their own animals, but also to the animals of 
others. 
Some people with strong convictions may never agree with the culling of healthy 
animals, because they do not consider animal keeping acceptable in the first place. 
To conclude, policy should acknowledge that policy-making for the prevention and 
control of animal diseases has a moral dimension reflecting society’s views on how 
one ought to behave towards animals and their keepers.  
 
Recommendations for future research 
During the animal disease epidemics a number of animal welfare problems occurred 
as a result of transport restrictions and handling of the animals. These animal 
welfare issues were cause for concern. It is recommended for future research to 
study the role of convictions on the acceptability of animal welfare problems related 
to this issue.  
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The Eurobarometer (2007) in a study of attitudes towards the welfare of farmed 
animals in the European member states concluded that there are ‘very distinct realities 
with regard to the welfare and protection of farm animals within the Union’ (p. 72) and that this 
may be caused by different levels of awareness and attitudes in the member states. 
The model may be useful to study in what respect these animal welfare issues are 
perceived differently in the various European member states and if this can be 
explained by differences in moral convictions about animals.  
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Abstract In this paper the results of an empirical survey among veterinarians and 
farmers are presented. The aim was to describe the diversity of their moral 
convictions about animals, and to study the role of these convictions in judgement 
on the culling of healthy animals during an animal disease epidemic.  
The results showed a diversity of convictions, which were based on a number of 
values. The convictions of the veterinarians and the farmers were based on the same 
values. 
Most veterinarians and farmers considered humans to be superior to animals, 
mostly because they were of the opinion that animals cannot think as well as 
humans and cannot distinguish between right and wrong. They were of the opinion 
that all animals have value, because animals are living beings, are important in the 
ecosystem, have a functional use for people and because there is a personal 
relationship between humans and animals. They were of the opinion that people 
have a moral responsibility to do good to all animals, which is having a duty to care 
for and protect animals, mostly because animals are living beings, are sentient and 
are important in the ecosystem. They were of the opinion that all animals have a 
right to life, mostly because animals are living beings and are important in the 
ecosystem. 
It is argued that for veterinarians and farmers a number of values constitute the 
fundament of their moral convictions about animals, upon which animals’ moral 
importance and people’s moral responsibilities to animals are based.   
The majority of the veterinarians and the farmers either disagreed or partly 
(dis)agreed with culling healthy animals to stop an animal disease from spreading 
and thus infecting other animals, to safeguard a country’s export position, or to 
prevent eye infections in people. This judgement was based on a high valuation of 
animal life. Culling to protect human life was agreed on by most.  
It is argued that a person who values animal life highly, will value animal life highly 
as an argument against culling. Therefore, arguments in favour of culling must be 
valued higher than the value of animal life for a person to agree with culling.  
It is suggested that new animal disease policy should not only acknowledge the 
ethical aspects of culling healthy animals, but should also aim to minimise the 
animal welfare problems in the control of an epidemic.
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Introduction  
 
From 1997 to 2003 three major animal disease epidemics: classical swine fever, foot 
and mouth disease and highly pathogenic avian influenza broke out in Europe. To 
prevent or control these diseases animals were not vaccinated but culled. In this 
stamping-out of the diseases, an estimated 50 million infected and healthy animals 
were culled (www.OIE.nl).  This policy was in line with the then current European 
non-vaccination policy to control these highly contagious diseases. Stamping-out a 
disease, which means culling both infected and healthy animals within a radius of 1-
3 kilometres from the source of the infection, was from a financial-economic 
perspective, preferable to vaccination (Mepham 2004 Woods 2004 Koninklijke 
Nederlandse Akademie van Wetenschappen 2002). Furthermore, no marker vaccine 
was available to distinguish between infected and vaccinated animals (Berentsen et al 
1991). The strategy to stop the disease from infecting other animals enabled the 
member states to quickly regain their ‘disease free’ status. The latter was imperative 
to resume international trade in animals and animal products. The financial setback 
for the individual animal keepers was outweighed by the benefit to the trade 
position of a country as a whole.  
In the United Kingdom (Anthony 2004 Murphy-Lawless 2004;Mepham 2001, 2004 
Crispin 2002 Laurence 2002 Farm Animal Welfare Council 2002 Cumbria Foot and 
Mouth Disease Inquiry Panel 2002 Institute for Health Research 2002 Cohen et al. 
2007) and The Netherlands (Huirne and Mourits 2002 Van Haaften and Kersten 
2002 Raad voor het Landelijk Gebied and Raad voor Dieraangelegenheden 2003 
and 2004 Nederlandse Vereniging tot Bescherming van Dieren 2004 Van den Berg 
2002) the stamping-out strategy gave rise to public resistance. Not only animal 
keepers resisted this strategy, but the general public as well,  expressing their 
indignation about the culling of healthy animals after having been confronted with 
footage of burning pyres (in the United Kingdom), animal welfare problems and the 
grief of the animal keepers directly involved.   
It was assumed that farmers would support the decision to cull the animals seeing as 
good trade position was beneficial to their business. In reality the farmers were 
seriously divided, with those who saw sense in this strategy and others who seriously 
opposed it (Anthony 2004 Murphy-Lawless 2004 Mepham 2001, 2004 Crispin et al 
2002 Institute for Health Research 2002 Huirne et al 2002 Van Haaften and Kersten 
2002 Rutgers 2003).  
Veterinarians involved with the culling were torn between on the one hand, their 
duty to animals and their keepers to heal and protect animal life and on the other 
hand, the decision to cull healthy animals to stop the disease from spreading. They 
were unable to provide proper care even though numerous animal welfare problems 
had occurred. These were caused by transport restrictions, by slaughter men who 
were inexperienced and often had to cull on the farm and not in a slaughterhouse, 
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by overcrowding in the stables leading to aggression and cannibalism, and by having 
no access to sick or pregnant animals for treatment (Laurence 2002 Farm Animal 
Welfare Council 2002). 
 
A contract with animals 
Veterinarians and farmers are committed to working with or for animals. To a large 
extent, the human-animal bond is defined by the function fulfilled by the animal; a 
bond based on an understanding that when one takes good care of the animal’s 
health and welfare the animal will provide you with food, company or other valuable 
goods or services. This give and take between people and animals has existed since 
animals became part of the human community and can be described in terms of a 
‘contract’ (Palmer 1997).  
Veterinarians are committed by a direct duty to care for an animal’s health and 
welfare by practising preventive measures or treatment. This is done for the animal’s 
sake as a living sentient being as well as for the keeper. However, with respect to 
food safety and public health a veterinarian also has a duty towards society. This 
implies that animals may be killed for public health reasons.  
Farmers keep production animals primarily for food production. This determines 
the human-animal relationship as basically functional (Velde et al 2002). Meat-eating 
is accepted by a majority in Dutch society, so in the livestock sector it is legitimate 
to kill animals for this reason (Rutgers et al 2003). Farmers will have fulfilled the 
terms of the ‘contract’ when taking good care of the heath and welfare of the 
animals. Under the terms of this contract, production animals are required to 
provide animal products of sufficient quality. In society it is acceptable, for instance, 
to kill a cow, which produces no or an insufficient quantity of milk for a longer 
period of time (Rutgers et al 2003). 
Though it may be true that production animals primarily serve a functional purpose, 
a number of authors (Anthony 2003 Wilkie 2005 Holloway 2000, 2001) recognised 
the personal bond that exists between the animals and the farmer, and describe the 
conflict that arises when the animals are killed. During the epidemics, the farmers 
were torn between their ‘contract’ not to harm their animals and broader political 
and economic considerations. They were traumatised by their inability to fulfil their 
side of the contract: to care for the welfare of their animals and to protect them 
against (in their view) senseless slaughter. Anthony (2003) described the culling 
being felt as an injustice towards the animals.  
 
Moral convictions 
Animals are kept for numerous reasons. These reasons can be commercial, such as 
for the production of food or non-commercial, such as for company or recreation. 
Up to a point, the nature of animal keeping determines the human-animal 
relationship (e.g. functional or relational) and the understanding between the animal 
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and the person (contract). However, it is also shaped by more fundamental moral 
convictions about animals. These moral convictions guide our interactions with 
animals and the natural world. They are shaped over time by diversity of social, 
cultural, religious, personal and regional inputs and by knowledge about animals. In 
the public debate about the culling, terms as ‘respect for life’ right to life’ and 
‘senseless killing’ were used to express these convictions. 
 
New policy 
At present new prevention and control strategies for contagious animal diseases are 
being developed which aim to better reflect the views in society about justifiable 
culling of animals during an epidemic. This is necessary to avoid further conflict 
between the animal keepers, the government and society as a whole in the case of 
future outbreaks of diseases. To this purpose, policy-makers should be 
knowledgeable of the moral convictions of animal keepers and their possible 
diversity between different kinds of animal keeping. Each kind of animal keeping 
could have its own convictions specific to the goal of the keeping, which is likely to 
influence judgement on the acceptability of culling healthy animals.  
 
Studies into moral convictions  
This study is part of a larger research project about moral issues at stake in the 
public debate about the culling. It is focused on moral convictions about animals in 
general and on the role of convictions in judgement about culling. As the culling 
had been opposed by the general public, there was reason to believe that public 
morality - convictions shared by a majority in society – had changed since the 
adoption of the European non-vaccination policy. It was no longer considered 
justified to cull healthy animals for economic reasons to resume export to other 
countries. In this discussion there were opposing opinions as to what was a 
justifiable reason to cull healthy animals.  
In this paper, the results of the survey among veterinarians and farmers are 
presented. The focus was on these two groups, because both groups had been 
directly involved in the epidemics, and because both groups work with animals on a 
daily basis and are likely to have views on justifiable treatment and culling of 
animals.  
 
Aim of the study 
The aim of the study was twofold. First, it aimed to identify and describe moral 
convictions about animals among farmers and veterinarians, and to study possible 
differences between the two groups. Second, the study aimed to demonstrate how 
these convictions affect judgement regarding the culling of healthy animals in an 
animal disease epidemic, and whether there are differences between veterinarians 
and farmers in this respect. The results may contribute to a better understanding of 
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convictions, which is important knowledge in the development of new prevention 
and control strategies for contagious animal diseases. In this paper the results of an 
empirical survey are presented. 
 
Methodology 
 
For the empirical study a model was developed (Cohen et al. 2009) to be used as a 
questionnaire in an Internet survey among veterinarians and farmers. An empirical 
approach was chosen, because the focus of this study was to learn more about 
moral convictions not of individuals, but of groups of people in Dutch society, as 
the stamping-out strategy had led to public debates between stakeholders and even 
in society as a whole.  
The theoretical framework of the model was based on two surveys and on two 
literature studies. The first survey was performed in the European member states to 
identify the priority issues for future animal disease policy (Cohen et al. 2007). 
Furthermore, a survey was performed among backyard animal keepers, to find 
which moral values were at stake in the culling of their animals. Furthermore, a 
literature study was performed to learn more about the social and moral issues of 
epidemics (see the references in the Introduction). A second literature study was 
performed of the academic animal ethics debate about the moral importance of 
animals.  
Prior to the survey among veterinarians and farmers, a national survey had been 
performed based on this theoretical model which proved to be a good tool to 
describe moral convictions and their role in judgement.  
The model consisted of two parts. In part one, moral convictions were identified 
and described. In part two, in the form of a case-study, the role of these moral 
convictions in the justification of culling healthy animals was studied. 
First a definition of moral conviction was required. The definition used in this study 
was based on Warren’s (1997) discussion of the moral status of animals, which is 
based on certain values, and people’s ensuing moral responsibilities. For this study, 
moral convictions were defined as people’s beliefs about the moral importance of 
animals and people’s ensuing responsibilities towards them. It is moral because it 
tells us something about the right or the wrong way to treat animals, whose welfare 
and flourishing can be promoted or harmed by our actions.  
In a next step the aim was to find what moral convictions are about.  To this 
purpose the survey in the European member states and among backyard animal 
keepers and the literature study were used.  
Four domains were identified that lie at the heart of debates about animal issues. 
These domains are: the hierarchical position of animals with respect to people, an 
animals’ value (as in appreciation), people’s moral responsibility to care for and 
protect animals (to do good) and animal rights. Therefore, the theoretical 
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framework of the model was centred round these domains. For each domain a 
number of statements were added, reflecting what the opinion is with respect to the 
domain. 
Domain one is about the hierarchical position of humans with respect to animals. 
For this domain three statements each reflect a different opinion: humans are 
superior to animals, humans and animals are equal, and animals are superior to 
humans.  
Considering humans to be superior to animals may originate from a religious, 
cultural, evolutionary or biological point of view. Although Christian-Judean 
religious texts are open to different interpretations, the most common interpretation 
is that humans rule over animals because animals were not considered to have 
immortal souls, and because humans were given stewardship over the natural world 
(Armstrong and Boltzer 2003). 
The cultural justification is based on the fact that animals have been domesticated 
for centuries and kept for human purposes, and because humans have the power to 
do so (Serpell 2004). The evolutionary justification holds that in the course of 
evolution, humans have become more developed than other animals, especially in 
mental capacities, granting them a position at the top of the evolutionary ladder 
(Hyers 2006).  
The justification for a superior position is based on values which differentiate 
between species, for instance rationality or moral agency. An equality opinion is 
based on values that emphasise the similarity between humans and animals, such as 
both being living beings, or both being part of a natural order. The latter opinion is 
inspired by recent scientific studies about the nature of animals and their mental 
capacities (Bekoff 2007), which reveal that humans and animals share many 
characteristics. An opinion that animals are superior to people can be based on a 
holistic view on the natural world, in which animals can be seen as people’s superior 
teachers to reconnect with nature and our inner selves (Kupper 2009).  
Domain two refers to the value of animals. For this domain two statements each 
reflect an opinion: animals have value, and animals have no value. In this case value 
is defined as the appreciation for an animal based on its intrinsic value as a living 
being, its instrumental value to people, its relational value to people, its functional 
value for the ecosystem, and its value for Creation. Over the centuries, animals had 
already earned appreciation for their usefulness to people (e.g., for food) or in a 
relational sense (e.g., as companions). Now animals are increasingly appreciated for 
their role in the ecosystem (Taylor 1986, Leopold in Warren 1977), and have 
become intrinsically valuable. The latter means that animals are recognised as having 
value in their own right as beings with a life of their own, and a purpose in life that 
is inherent to their species-specific needs. This domain is somewhat different in that 
a statement: some animals have value, is not included. The purpose of this domain 
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was not to find which animals have value, but to find how the intrinsic value is 
appreciated with respect to other values. 
Domain three refers to doing good to animals by caring for their health and well-
being, by not harming them, and by protecting them against harm. For this domain 
three statements each reflect an opinion: doing good to all animals, doing good to 
some animals and no duty to do good to animals. This domain reflects that people’s 
actions matter to animals, whose welfare and flourishing can be promoted or 
thwarted by these actions. This animal welfare issue is and has always been the core 
domain in criticism on certain animal use (Bentham 1789 Singer 1995).  
Domain four refers to the right to life.  For this domain three statements each 
reflected an opinion: all animals have a right to life, some animals have a right to 
life, and animals have no right to life. This domain allows for several aspects of 
rights, such as a right to freedom, or to autonomy. For this study the right to life 
was chosen, as this is relevant for the debate on the culling of animals. With respect 
to a right to life, there are differing points of view. According to some, (Taylor 1986 
Schweitzer in Warren 1997) life as such has value; therefore killing is a harm done to 
all living creatures, even if the animal may not be aware of this and merely has an 
unconscious urge to live. To some, only the killing of an animal with a higher 
intelligence and consciousness is morally wrong, because these animals may have a 
concept of life, death and the future. They therefore have a conscious desire to live 
to fulfil future-oriented desires (Regan 1983 McMahan 2002). 
The issue of animal rights is more debated than animal welfare, because it takes 
people’s legal and moral responsibility much further (Wise 2004). Some argue that 
animals lack the relevant features to qualify as rights-bearers, i.e., rational moral 
agents with a sense of justice and an understanding of, and ability to abide by 
mutual agreements (Carruthers 1992 Scruton 2000). Others are concerned about the 
practical implications of giving animals (legal) rights (Posden 2004). 
To learn more about moral convictions, a description by domains and statements is 
not sufficient. Insight is also required into what these convictions are based on: the 
why of convictions. To answer this question the academic animal ethics debate about 
animals was useful. Animal ethics in the academic realm and animal issues in the 
public debate are both concerned with the question: Are animals morally important and 
if so, why? In the academic debate, values are proposed which an animal is required to 
fulfil for moral importance. For instance, some authors argue that being a living 
being (Taylor 1986 Schweitzer in Warren 1997) is sufficient to be morally important. 
Other authors argue that being able to feel pain and emotions (sentience) (Bentham 
1789 Singer 1995), or being conscious (Regan 1983), or being able to think and to 
distinguish between right and wrong (Scruton 2000 Carruthers 1992 Kant in Warren 
1997) or having a notion of the future and life and death (MacMahan 2002) are 
required as well. Some authors refer to the importance of the emotional, functional 
or historical relationship between animals and people (Anderson 2004 Noddings in 
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Warren 1997). Other authors emphasize their role as a species in an ecosystem 
(Callicot in Warren 1997 Leopold in Warren 1997 Taylor 1986). Warren (1997) 
proposes a multi-values account for moral status. She argues that in the public 
morality not one value but a number of values (called values in the current study) 
are important for moral importance, depending on the situation. 
In our study a value was included which refers to virtuous character. A virtuous 
person aims to act according to virtuous character (Husthouse 1999). In this study, 
to do good to animals reflects virtuous character. Furthermore, a religion or 
philosophy of life argument was included, to study whether religion or a philosophy 
of life contributed to the respondents’ convictions, and to study their relative 
importance with respect to the other values. These values were included into the 
model to describe the basis of moral convictions.  
Part one of the model was constructed by domains, statements and values. In this 
way, moral convictions were defined by the combination of a statement and a 
supporting value. An example may clarify this: someone may have the conviction 
that people have a duty to do good to all animals (statement), because animals are 
living beings (value). Another person has the opinion that one has the duty to do 
good to some animals, namely those that are sentient.  
The second part of the model, the case-study, was constructed by four cases, 
judgement categories and arguments in favour and against culling. The cases 
described the culling of healthy cows and chickens in an animal disease epidemic. 
These animal species were chosen because in the epidemics mammals as well as 
poultry were culled. Furthermore, its aim was to learn whether the respondents 
made a distinction between mammals and birds based on the animals’ mental 
capacities (in the cases the term ‘highly developed’ was used, which includes a 
number of mental capacities).  
Each case presented an argument in favour of culling and arguments against culling. 
The arguments in favour were: to stop a disease from spreading (case one), to 
safeguard the export position of a country (case two), to protect people against eye 
infections (case three) and to protect human life (case four).  
The arguments against culling were: healthy cows and chickens should not be culled, 
because: animal life is valuable / cows are highly developed (mental capacity to 
think, feel, and be conscious) / chickens are highly developed (idem) / special and 
rare breeds are valuable (important for a species, a region, or the ecosystem) / 
animals have a financial value to people (for instance production animals as a source 
of income for the farmer) / people have a personal bond with these animals 
(relational bond) / killing animals is a bad character trait (virtue)/ animals are part of 
Creation (religion). These eight arguments were the same in all four cases. This was 
done to study whether an argument was rated differently in the different cases.  
Each of these arguments against culling was a ‘translation’ of a value. In this way the 
value became an argument against culling. For instance, an example of a moral 
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conviction is: animals have a right to life because they are living beings. In the cases it 
became an argument against culling, namely: these healthy cows and chickens should not be 
culled because animal life is valuable. As such the role of moral convictions in judgement 
was determined.  
The model in the form of a questionnaire in an Internet survey was sent to 
veterinarians and farmers in the Netherlands. The veterinarians were approached 
through their interest organisation, the Royal Veterinary Association of the 
Netherlands (www.knmvd.nl). The farmers were approached through the following 
interest organisations: the Dutch Organisation for Agriculture and Horticulture 
(www.lto.nl), the Dutch Poultry Farmers Organisation (www.nop.nl) and 
Responsible Farming (www.verantwoordeveehouderij.nl).  
The questionnaire consisted of closed questions and open-ended questions. In part 
one, the respondents were asked to choose one statement per domain. For instance, 
a respondent is of the opinion that humans are superior to animals, therefore 
he/she chooses statement one of domain one. Then the respondent rates all the 
values that support this statement with a number between 0-10, 0 means not at all 
important for the respondent’s opinion and 10 means most important for the 
respondent’s opinion. The higher the rating, the more important he/she considers 
the value for his/her statement. In an open-ended question the respondents could 
add another value or a comment. 
In the case-study, the respondents gave their judgement on the culling per case. 
They could choose between: I agree, I partly (dis)agree or I disagree with the culling. 
They motivated their judgement by rating the argument in favour of and against 
culling by a number between 0 and 10. The number 0 indicated that the argument 
was not important at all for their judgement, and the number 10 indicated that the 
argument was most important.  
Due to technical differences in the programming of the Internet questionnaire, it 
was not possible to compare the ratings of the veterinarians and the farmers as the 
methodology of both groups was different. The farmers had rated all the values and 
arguments, whereas the veterinarians had only rated the values and arguments they 
considered important. This means that not all veterinarians had rated all values and 
arguments. The ratings (as shown in the tables) reflect the average rating by the 
number of veterinarians who had rated this argument.  
Still, a comparison between the two groups of respondents was possible by their 
choice of values and arguments. It showed whether just one or a number of values or 
arguments were important, which were most important, and whether these were the 
same values and arguments for both groups. The questionnaire is included in 
appendix one. 
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Data analysis 
Demographic data were obtained for gender, age, and type of animal keeping. The 
age groups were 21-40, 41-60, and 61 and older. The veterinarians were subdivided 
into veterinarians specialised in companion animals, production animals, horses or 
mixed practice. For the farmers the groups were: regular or organic keeping of 
poultry, cattle, pigs, sheep or goats.  
First the percentage of respondents per statement was determined, to establish 
whether there were statements that were shared by most. The choice of statements 
by the veterinarians and the farmers were compared. Per statement the average 
rating of the values was analysed to find out which values were rated high, average 
or low, and what their relative rating was with respect to each other. The higher the 
rating the more important the value was in support of their choice of statement. 
In the case-study, it was first determined how the respondents had judged per case, 
to find out whether there were differences between the veterinarians and the 
farmers. There were three judgement categories: I disagree, I partly (dis)agree, and I 
agree with the culling. The arguments were rated with a number between 0-10. The 
higher the rating the more important the argument was for their judgement. Then 
with the average rating of the arguments in favour and against culling, it was 
determined per judgement category and per case which arguments were rated high, 
average or low, b) what their relative rating was with respect to each other 
The ratings were not normally distributed, which was an indication that the rating 
was subjective. This was expected in a study which describes opinions. The rates 
were not categorized into equal groups, but were categorized on the basis of their 
subjective meaning: that is their importance. This was done because moral 
convictions in themselves are subjective, therefore the rating of the arguments was 
subjective, and the result of the personal interpretation of the respondents. 
Therefore they were categorised into rated low (0-4.9) average (5-6.9) and high (7-
10). As such their relative importance could be established with respect to other 
values and arguments.  
Statistical analysis of the ratings was performed with SPSS 15 for Windows. By 
means of the Kolmogorov-Smirnova test it was established that the rating was not 
normally distributed. Therefore, the Mann-Whitney test (P<0.05) was used to 
identify possible significant differences in rating..  
 
Results 
 
A total of 863 veterinarians and 762 farmers filled in the Internet questionnaire they 
had accessed via the website of their organisation. It was not possible to determine 
the response rate, because it was not possible to determine how many people had 
visited the website. 
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Demography 
Most veterinarians were male (66%), 49 % were found in the age group 31-50, 22% 
specialised in production animals and 33% in companion animals, 61% had been 
involved in an epidemic, and 14% were no longer practising.  
Most farmers were male (78%), 62% were found in the age group 41-60, and 71% 
had been involved in an epidemic. Most farmers were regular (as opposed to 
organic) cattle farmers (42%), followed by regular pig farmers (22%), and 3% were 
organic farmers. 
The Central Bureau of Statistics in the Netherlands (CBS, www.cbs.nl, retrieved 25 
June 2008) provides demographic data of the Dutch population. According to these 
data, the ratio male to female is 1:1, and the highest percentage of the Dutch 
population is found in the 40-65 age range. 
 
Moral convictions 
Most veterinarians had chosen the statements: humans are superior to animals 
(80%), animals have value (100%), people should do good to all animals (79%), and 
all animals have a right to life (82%). Most farmers had chosen the statements: 
humans are superior to animals (85%), animals have value (100%), people should do 
good to all animals (78%), and all animals have a right to life (65%). See table one. 
 
Table 1 The percentage of respondents per statement for each of the four domains  
Domain Statements Total group 
Veterinarians 
 
Total group 
Farmers 
 
Humans are superior to animals 80 85 
Humans and animals are equal 20 15 
Position 
Animals are superior to humans 0 1 
Animals have value 100 100 Value 
Animals have no value 0 0 
People should do good to all animals 79 77 
People should do good to some animals 20 22 
Do good 
People don’t have to do good to animals 1 1 
All animals have a right to life 82 65 
Some animals have a right to life 15 31 
Right to life 
Animals have no right to life 3 4 
Percentages rounded off  
 
Two large groups were identified consisting of most respondents: a group with 
respondents who considered humans to be superior, the S group (80% of the 
veterinarians and 84% of the farmers) and a group with respondents who 
considered both to be equal: the E group (20% of the veterinarians and 14% of the 
farmers). Therefore, only the results for these two groups were analysed further. 
As compared to the total group of veterinarians, the S group veterinarians included 
more men (72%), were older (48% in the 41-60 age group), 24% worked as a 
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production animal veterinarian, 65% had been involved in an animal disease 
epidemic, and 15% were no longer practising as a veterinarian.   
As compared to the total group of veterinarians and the S group, the E group 
included more women (59%) and were younger (49% in the 21-40 age group), 29% 
had a companion animal practice, 54% had been involved in an animal disease 
epidemic, and 8% were no longer practising as a veterinarian.   
As compared to the total group of farmers, the S group farmers consisted of more 
men (84%), were older (65% in the age group 41-60), and 89% were regular farmers 
and 3% organic farmers. 
As compared to the total group of farmers and the S group, the E group consisted 
of more women (42%), and were younger (37% was in the age group 20-40 and 
57% in the age group 41-60), 81% were regular farmers and 4% organic farmers.  
 
Ratings of values by the S and E veterinarians 
In table two the ratings by the group S and E veterinarians are presented. The 
highest ratings are shown in this section. 
For domain one (hierarchical position), the S group veterinarians rated all values 
between 4.7–6.7. Animals cannot think as well as humans was rated relatively the highest 
with a rating of 6.7. The E group rated animals are living beings 9.0, rated animals are 
sentient 8.9 and rated animals are important in the ecosystem 8.2,  
For domain two (value of animals), the S and E group both rated all values, except 
the religion or philosophy of life value between 7.0–8.6. The E group rated some values 
significantly higher than the S group. 
For domain three (to do good), the S and E group both rated  the values animals are 
living beings, are sentient, and are important in the ecosystem between 7.3 and 9.1  The E 
group rated the first two values significantly higher than the S group.  
For domain four (right to life), the S group rated animals are living beings 7.8, and rated 
animals are important in the ecosystem 7.3. The E group rated these two values 
significantly higher (8.3 and 8.0 respectively) than the S group and rated animals have 
an urge to live 7.0.  
For all four domains and for both groups the religion or philosophy argument was 
rated average (5.8 – 6.5). 
 
The ratings of values by the livestock farmers 
In table three the ratings of the values by the S and E farmers are presented. For 
domain one the S group farmers rated all values relatively low, between 1.6 – 5.3. 
The argument animals cannot think was rated relatively the highest with a rating of 5.3. 
The E group rated animals are living beings 8.4, rated animals are sentient 8.0 and rated 
animals are important in the ecosystem 7.3.  
For domain two the S and E group both rated all values, except the religion or 
philosophy of life argument high, between 7.6–8.6. The S group rated the argument 
 Chapter 6 
118 
 
Table 2 Average ratings of the values by the S and E group of the veterinarians 
Domain Position Value Do good Right to l.ife 
Statements Humans 
are 
superior, 
because: 
Humans 
and 
animal 
are equal, 
because: 
Animals have 
value, because: 
People should 
do good to all 
animals, 
because: 
All animals 
have a right to 
life, because: 
Values S E S E S E S E 
Animals are living 
beings  
 9.0 7.4 7.7 8.7 s 9.1 s 7.8 s 8.3 s 
Animals are 
not/are sentient 
4.7 8.9   8.2 s 8.8 s 5.8 s 6.9 s 
Animals cannot 
/can think 
6.7 6.2   4.8 s 5.7 s 4.3 s 5.5 s 
Animals 
cannot/can 
distinguish 
between right and 
wrong 
5.9 4.7       
Animals should 
be able to fulfil 
their life-cycle 
      5.8 6.2 
Animals have an 
urge to live 
      6.6 7.0 
Animal species 
are important in 
the ecosystem  
4.8 8.2 8.1 s 8.6 s 7.3 8.1 7.3 s 8.0 s 
Animals are 
useful to people 
  7.8 s 7.5 s     
People have a 
relationship with 
animals 
  8.3 s 8.6 s     
People become a 
better person by 
being good to 
animals 
    6.1 6.1   
My religion or 
philosophy of life 
tells me so 
 
6.2 6.0 6.5 6.1 6.2 6.0 5.8 6.0 
s=significant differences between group S and E. Not computed for domain 1, because the S and E 
group had chosen different statements. 
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Table 3 Average ratings of the values by the S and E group of the farmers 
Domain Position Value Do good Right to l.ife 
Statements Humans 
are 
superior, 
because: 
Humans 
and 
animal 
are equal, 
because: 
Animals have 
value, because: 
People should 
do good to all 
animals, 
because: 
All animals 
have a right to 
life, because: 
Values S E S E S E S E 
Animals are living 
beings  
 8.4 8.3 8.4 8.5 8.6 7.0 7.2 
Animals are 
not/are sentient 
3.9 8.3   7.9s 8.4s 6.4s 7.7s 
Animals cannot/ 
can think 
5.3 5.7   4.5s 6.0s 4.2s 5.6s 
Animals cannot/ 
can distinguish 
between right and 
wrong 
4.7 5.5       
Animals should 
be able to fulfil 
their life-cycle 
      5.2s 7.2s 
Animals have an 
urge to live 
      6.2s 7.2s 
Animal species 
are not/are 
important in the 
ecosystem  
4.9 7.3 7.6 7.6 7.0s 7.6s 6.8 7.4 
Animals are 
useful to people 
  8.6s 7.8s     
People have a 
relationship with 
animals 
  7.9 8.0     
People become a 
better person by 
being good to 
animals 
    4.2 4.3   
My religion or 
philosophy of life 
tells me so 
 
1.6 2.2 5.4 4.7 2.0 2.3 1.9 2.3 
s=significant differences between group S and E (p<0.05). Not computed for domain 1, because 
the S and E group had chosen different statements. 
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animals are functionally useful to people significantly lower than the E group. 
For domain three, the S group rated the values animals are living being 8.5, rated 
animals are sentient 7.9, and rated animals are important in the ecosystem 7.0. The E group 
rated animals are living being 8.6, rated, animals are sentient 8.4, and rated animals are 
important in the ecosystem 7.6. The latter two values were rated significantly higher than 
by the S group.  
For domain four, the S group rated the argument animals are living beings 7.0. The E 
group rated animals are living beings 7.2, rated animals are sentient 7.7, rated animals should 
be able to fulfil their lifecycle 7.2, rated animals have an urge to live 7.2 and rated animals are 
part of the ecosystem 7.4. 
For all four domains and for both groups the religion or philosophy of life 
argument was rated relatively low (1.6 – 5.4), and rated the highest in domain two.  
The veterinarians and the farmers could be compared by the choice of values they 
considered important for their convictions. For both groups the same values were 
important. Furthermore, the relative differences between the S and E group were 
similar. Religion or philosophy of life and virtue were important for neither, but 
were more important for the veterinarians than for the farmers.  
 
Case-study 
The respondents were asked to give their judgement on the culling of healthy 
animals in four different cases (table four). Most veterinarians and farmers disagreed 
or partly (dis)agreed with the culling to stop the disease from spreading, to safeguard 
the export position of a country, or to protect human health (eye infections). Culling 
to protect human life was agreed on by most. More veterinarians than farmers partly 
(dis)agreed. Often more farmers than veterinarians disagreed.  
More respondents from the S group agreed with the culling and more respondents 
from the E group disagreed in all cases. In case 1 to 3 the number of respondents of 
the E group who agreed with the culling was low. 
Table five gives the rating of the argument in favour of culling per case. It showed 
that the higher the rating of the argument in favour of culling, the lower the rating 
of the arguments against culling (compare table five and six). The argument healthy 
cows and chickens should be culled to protect human life was rated the highest even among 
the respondents who disagreed. It was rated 9.4 by the S group veterinarians and 9.3 
by the E group veterinarians. It was rated 9.4 by the S and 9.0 by the E group 
farmers. The respondents from the E group of the veterinarians and the farmers 
often rated the arguments in favour lower than the group.  
Table six gives the rating of the argument ‘animal life is valuable, therefore these healthy 
cows and chickens should not be culled’. This was the argument against culling that had 
been rated the highest. In all four cases the S and E veterinarians rated this 
argument high.  The S and E farmers were more diverse in their rating, 
 
                                                    Survey veterinarians and farmers 
121 
 
Table 4 Judgement by the S and E groups of the veterinarians and farmers in the four cases 
in percentages   
Judgement Respondents 
who disagreed 
with the culling 
 
Respondents 
who partly 
(dis)agreed 
with the 
culling  
Respondents 
who agreed 
with the 
culling  
Row: groups 
Column: cases 
S E S E S E 
Veterinarians 
Case one 
Healthy cows and chickens are 
culled to stop the disease from 
spreading 
15 28 65 66 20 7 
Case two 
Healthy cows and chickens are 
culled to safeguard the export 
position of a country 
29 45 56 51 14 5 
Case three 
Healthy cows and chickens are 
culled to protect human health 
(eye infections) 
35 51 51 45 14 4 
Case four 
Healthy cows and chickens are 
culled to protect human life 
5 12 28 49 67 39 
Farmers 
Case one 
Healthy cows and chickens are 
culled to stop the disease from 
spreading 
23 46 55 51 22 3 
Case two 
Healthy cows and chickens are 
culled to safeguard the export 
position of a country 
23 56 53 42 22 3 
Case three 
Healthy cows and chickens are 
culled to protect human health 
(eye infections) 
34 56 47 35 19 10 
Case four 
Healthy cows and chickens are 
culled to protect human life 
7 28 24 34 70 38 
  Percentages rounded off    
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Table 5 Rating of the arguments in favour of culling by the S and E respondents in the 
four cases 
Row: judgement Respondents 
who disagreed 
with the culling 
Respondents 
who partly 
(dis)agreed 
with the 
culling  
Respondents 
who agreed 
with the culling 
Row: groups 
Column: cases 
S E S E S E 
Veterinarians 
Case one 
Healthy cows and chickens should be 
culled to stop the disease from 
spreading 
5.9 5.1 8.1 7.9 9.1 8.7 
Case two 
Healthy cows and chickens should be 
culled to safeguard the export 
position of a country  
6.1 5.8 7.0 6.7 7.6 7.7 
Case three 
Healthy cows and chickens should be 
culled to protect human health (eye 
infections) 
6.0 5.5 7.2 6.8 7.8 8.6 
Case four 
Healthy cows and chickens should be 
culled to protect human life 
8.2 8.5 9.1 9.0 9.4 9.3 
Farmers 
Case one 
Healthy cows and chickens should be 
culled to stop the disease from 
spreading 
5.8 4.1 8.0 7.2 8.7 9.5 
Case two 
Healthy cows and chickens should be 
culled to safeguard the export 
position of a country 
6.5 4.7 7.5 7.3 8.2 7.0 
Case three 
Healthy cows and chickens should be 
culled to protect human health (eye 
infections) 
6.0 5.3 7.7 8.3 8.7s 7.6s 
Case four 
Healthy cows and chickens should be 
culled to protect human life 
7.8 7.1 8.6 8.6 9.4s 9.0s 
s=significant differences between S and E per case p<0.05 
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Table 6 Rating of the argument against culling ‘animal life is valuable,  
therefore these healthy animals should not be culled’ by the S and E group  
Judgement 
 
Respondents 
who disagreed 
with the culling  
Respondents 
who partly 
(dis)agreed 
with the culling
Respondents 
who agreed 
with the 
culling  
Row: groups 
Column: 
cases 
S E S E S E 
Veterinarians 
Case one 
 8.1 s 8.9s 7.7 s 8.2 s 7.3 8.6 
Case two 
 8.2 s 9.0 s 7.6 s 8.2 s 6.9 8.5 
Case three 
 8.2 s 8.9 s 7.7 s 8.3 s 7.1 s 9.1 s 
Case four 
 8.1 9.0 8.2 s 8.8 s 7.5 s 8.3 s 
Farmers 
Case one 
 7.5 7.6 6.8 7.6 5.9 4.0 
Case two 
 7.6 7.4 6.6 7.2 6.0 8.5 
Case thee 
 7.4 7.4 6.6 s 7.6 s 5.4 s 7.7 s 
Case four 
 
6.6 6.6 6.7 s 8.1 s 6.0  7.5 s 
s=significant differences between S and E per case p<0.05 
 
For both the veterinarians and the farmers the S group respondents rated this 
argument (significantly) lower than the E group. The rate of this argument was 
lower that the rating of its corresponding conviction and decreased in rating when 
the rating of the argument in favour increased.  
The other arguments against culling were rated low between 3.8 – 4.8 or average, 
between 5.2 and 6.6 by the veterinarians. The E group rated them lower than the S 
group. The farmers rated these arguments low, between 3.2 – 4.9. The higher the 
rating of the argument in favour of culling was, the lower the rating of the 
arguments against culling.  
In general, the respondents who partly (dis)agreed with the culling had already rated 
the arguments in favour of culling higher than the arguments against but did not 
fully agree with the culling.  
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Discussion 
 
In this paper the results of a survey among veterinarians and farmers are presented. 
The aim of the study was to describe their moral convictions about animals, the role 
of these convictions in judgement on the culling of healthy animals in an animal 
disease epidemic, and the possible differences between the two groups  
 
A model for moral convictions and judgement 
For the survey a model was constructed based on values that were proposed by 
animal ethicists for an animal’s moral importance (Warren 1997). These values were 
chosen because it was important to describe morality with a moral vocabulary: a 
terminology specific for moral issues to express the underlying moral basis of one’s 
convictions. Furthermore, discussions about animals in the academic realm and in 
public debates are both concerned with the question:  what is morally right and wrong in 
the treatment of animals and why.  
In the academic animal ethics debate these values serve to distinguish between 
species, e.g. rationality (Kant in Warren 1997 Scruton 2007), or include all species, 
e.g. life (Schweitzer in Warren 1997). If rationality is the decisive value, then killing a 
rational animal is considered morally wrong because a rational animal has more 
moral importance that an animal that is not considered rational. However, in reality 
the justification of animal use and treatment is not only dependent on certain 
properties of the animal but also on the context. For instance killing an insect does 
not require the same justification as killing a cow. However, killing cows for food is 
acceptable but culling cows in an epidemic is problematic.  
For comprehensive insight into the dynamics of convictions in judgement, 
knowledge about the underlying values is not sufficient and needs further 
clarification in the context of a specific situation (Cohen et al. 2009). In this respect, 
animal ethics values are useful to clarify the nature of convictions, but in order to be 
useful for policy-makers in the drawing up of new preventive and control policy, it 
is required to know how these values are weighed against a diversity of interests in a 
certain context. Moral convictions then are the starting-point for judgement, but for 
individuals or groups, this starting-point may be different in their interpretation in a 
specific situation.  
 
Diversity in moral convictions 
The respondents had chosen a diversity of statements, but included the highest 
percentage of respondents: the S group and the E group, which were identified 
among the veterinarians as well as the farmers. The results show that there were 
more similarities than differences between the veterinarians and the farmers and 
their S and E group. These similarities were seen in the choice of statements and in 
the priority order of the values. The majority of all the respondents were of the 
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opinion that animals have value, that one should do good to all animals and that all 
animals have a right to life. Furthermore, these statements were supported by the 
same values. The differences between the S and E groups were found in the rating 
of the values and the arguments, and in judgement were gradual. 
Comparison of the veterinarians and the farmers was not possible with respect to 
the rating of the values and arguments, due to differences in the programming. 
However the two groups could be compared on the basis of their choice of 
statements, and by the priority order of the values. The differences were gradual. In 
the case-study comparison was possible on the basis of judgement, and the priority 
order of the arguments. In all cases the differences were gradual. 
The moral convictions of the veterinarians and the farmers were based on a number 
and the same values. This supports the multi-criteria account for moral importance 
of animals as proposed by Warren (Warren uses the term moral status) and does not 
support animal ethicists who argue that one value only is necessary and sufficient 
for moral importance (life: Schweitzer in Warren and Taylor 1986, sentience: Singer 
1995, subject-of-a-life: Regan 1993, rationality: Kant in Warren and Scruton 2000).  
In the case-study the argument healthy cows and chickens should not be culled because animal 
life is valuable was rated high, and other arguments were rated lower. This suggests 
that for judgement only this value was the most important, which stands to reason, 
since the cases were about culling. However it is argued that for judgement, this 
value was necessary but not sufficient. In the public debate other issues were 
important as well, such as the relational bond between the animals and their 
keepers, and the value of special breeds. Therefore, the value of life is the starting-
point of judgement, but other values are necessary for a balanced weighing of 
arguments in favour and against culling.   
Warren’s multi-criteria account acknowledges that people and animals have a long-
standing and complex bonding that is often determined by the nature of the 
relationship. Furthermore, people have other moral responsibilities towards 
domesticated animals in a human society than towards wild animals in their natural 
habitat. Finally, as the result of changes in the rural area, such as the emergence of 
other forms of animal keeping, and further knowledge of animals and their mental 
capacities, set in a culturally diversified pluralistic society, people’s convictions over 
time have changed. Therefore in the complex and dynamic interactions with 
animals, and the complexity of weighing human interests and animal interest, it is 
likely that more than one value lies at the base of convictions and moral 
responsibilities in different situations and in different times. 
 
Domain one: hierarchical position of animals  
Most respondents were of the opinion that humans are superior to animals. The S 
group of the veterinarians and farmers based their statement on the same value: 
insufficient ability to think. 
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The questionnaire consisted mostly of closed questions. However, per statement the 
respondents could give an additional answer in an open-ended question.  As such it 
was possible to learn about other important values than those given. The value of 
this extra information was to verify whether the closed questions were all-inclusive.  
With respect to this domain, the values were not all-inclusive. For this statement 
other values were added by the respondents, which they rated equally high or higher 
than those given. The respondents based this statement not only on an animal’s 
presumed incapability to think, which was not rated high. They also based it on 
other values, which were presented in the open-ended question. Some respondents 
referred to the natural food chain on which humans are on top. Other referred to 
the course of the evolution, and the historical interdependence of humans and 
animals in which humans dominate and eat animals. However, the reasoning in 
support of a superior position was more often reversed: humans are superior, because 
they dominate.  
The veterinarians and the farmers who considered humans and animals to be equal 
based their statement on the same values: both humans and animals are living 
beings, both are sentient beings, and both are important in the ecosystem. 
 
Domain two: value of animals  
The veterinarians and farmers valued animals highly for their intrinsic value as living 
beings as well as for their functional and relational value for people and for their 
value in the ecosystem. This means that the ‘old’ value of animals as having a 
functional importance to people, e.g., as providers of food still holds, but that ‘new’ 
values have come to the fore which are rated equally high and are likely to exert 
substantial weight in the weighing of human interests against animal interests. This 
was already demonstrated in the public debate about the culling: the old financial-
economic value of animals was weighed against their intrinsic and relational value. 
 
Domain three: to do good 
Most respondents were of the opinion that people should do good to all animals. In 
the open-ended question, respondents pointed out that a superior position of 
humans does not mean that people have no moral responsibilities to animals. On 
the contrary: because people dominate animals, depriving them of their natural 
environment and behaviour they have a responsibility to properly care for and 
protect them. This showed clearly in domain three, with most respondents being of 
the opinion that all animals should be treated well and should be protected. 
 
Domain four: right to life 
More veterinarians than farmers were of the opinion that all animals have a right to 
life. This could be explained by the nature of the practice. Veterinarians in the first 
place aim to heal animals, and farmers keep and kill animals for food production. 
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Even though in both practices animals are killed, this does not contradict the view 
that animals have a right to life. It may indicate that animals should not be killed 
wantonly. A right to life therefore should be seen in context. Killing for food, killing 
animals that are considered a pest or killing a very sick animal were considered 
justified, which was supported by previous research findings (Rutgers et al. 2003). 
Our study showed that culling healthy animals for economic or human health 
reasons, when alternatives are at hand, was not supported by most.  
 
Judgement and the influence of moral convictions  
In the cases, values became arguments against culling. For the farmers as well as the 
veterinarians, the value of animal life was the core argument against culling. Its 
rating was high but not absolute, that is the rating decreased when the argument in 
favour increased. This was seen in the other arguments against culling as well. 
Though the latter arguments were not rated high, they may have been important for 
judgement as a collective group against culling.  
Most veterinarians and farmers partly (dis)agreed with the culling to stop a disease 
from spreading, to safeguard the export position and to avoid eye infections. They 
did not fully agree or disagree. This could be due to the collective strength of the 
arguments against culling or to a lack of information about the risks involved. Many 
respondents remarked on the need to first assess these risks. For their judgement 
they needed more information about the spreading of the disease, the animal 
welfare problems, the impact on the economy, the risk and severity of the eye 
infection, or the risk that people might die from the disease. The respondents also 
expressed the need to first consider alternative measures before deciding to cull. 
Vaccination was mentioned the most often, followed by reducing livestock 
movements and producing on a more regional scale, swifter action after an 
outbreak, and the protection of slaughter men against infection.  
These options had not been included in the questionnaire because the aim was to 
clarify the dynamics of moral arguments only. In reality of course, many other 
arguments are considered for judgement. 
 
The dynamics of moral convictions in the public debate 
Based on the results it is argued that moral convictions do play a role in judgement. 
Their strength in a public debate on an animal issue is determined by the issue as 
well as their rating. A certain moral conviction can be rated high by an individual or 
in a certain type of animal keeping. In the public debate, its rating as an argument is 
under the influence of the case with its specific interests and values, or it can have a 
constant rate. The veterinarians and the farmers, who considered humans and 
animals to be equal, rated the values higher and the arguments against culling higher, 
and more were against the culling. Therefore, it is argued that a person who values 
his or her convictions highly, will value these convictions highly as an argument 
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against culling. Therefore, arguments in favour of culling must be valued higher 
than the arguments against for this person to agree with culling.  
For example, in Dutch society it is generally recognised that animals are sentient 
beings with an intrinsic value. This recognition is already laid down in the Dutch 
Animal Experimentation Act (www.minvws.nl) and the Animal Act 
(www.minlnv.nl). This requires that people should treat animals with respect, and 
killing animals needs thorough justification. However, the public debate about the 
culling of healthy animals in the epidemics showed that respect for the intrinsic 
value of animal life did not lead to consensus about the acceptable reasons to cull 
healthy animals. This means that though people may hold the same conviction, they 
do not necessarily have the same opinion as to the justification of culling. For 
example, one person may value animal life highly, which can only be overruled by 
essential human needs, for example when human life is at stake. For another person, 
animal life is valuable, but not as valuable as for the first person, and can be 
overruled by economic reasons (in this example it is assumed that human life is 
considered more essential than economic reasons). Therefore it is argued that even 
though two persons may value animal welfare and animal life similarly, the one 
person may value them higher in a specific case than the other person, which may 
explain the opposition during the epidemics. 
Convictions and judgements are also shaped by social influences. The S group 
included more men and older people and the E group included more women and 
younger people. Compared to the veterinarians, the farmers’ S group was larger and 
the E group smaller. This could be explained by the social structure of the groups. 
The Dutch livestock sector is a rural and commercial, male-dominated type of 
animal keeping with a largely functional bond with the animals. The nature of the 
animal keeping may also explain the size of the S and E group. In a male-dominated, 
commercial practice like the livestock sector, one is likely to find more S 
respondents. As compared to the farmers, the veterinary practice in The 
Netherlands includes more women and the majority of veterinarian students are 
female (www.knmvd.nl retrieved June 2010).   
 
Animal welfare implications 
One of the core responsibilities of people towards all animals is our duty to care for 
their health and welfare and to protect them from harm. This was clearly expressed 
in domain three.  
Therefore, new policy for the prevention and control of animal diseases should not 
only acknowledge the ethical aspects of the culling of animals, but should also focus 
on measures to avoid animal welfare problems as much as possible. New policy, in 
which animal welfare is one of the core concerns that is not easily outweighed by 
economic interests, will likely be supported in society.  
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Animal welfare issues could be addressed by for instance applying emergency 
vaccination-to-live, by a selective lifting of the transport ban to avoid overcrowding 
and allowing access to animals, and by training the slaughter men. Ultimately, 
preventive vaccination, if possible, would be the best way to reduce the risk of an 
outbreak and its inevitable animal welfare problems.   
 
Conclusions 
 
In this paper the results of an empirical survey to identify and describe the moral 
convictions of a group of livestock farmers and veterinarians is described. 
Furthermore, the role of these convictions in judgement on the culling of healthy 
animals in an animal disease epidemic is described.  
The veterinarians and the farmers shared the same moral convictions about animals. 
The majority were of the opinion that humans are superior to animals, that animals 
have value, that people should care for and protect all animals and that all animals 
have a right to life. More veterinarians considered animals to have a right to life than 
farmers. Their moral convictions were based on a number of values, such as the 
possession of life, sentience, and the importance of an animal species in the 
ecosystem. It is argued that these values constitute the fundament of their moral 
convictions about animals, upon which people’s moral responsibilities towards 
animals are largely based.  
In a case-study, the two groups judged similarly. Most veterinarians and farmers 
either disagreed or partly (dis)agreed when healthy animals were culled for to stop 
the disease from spreading, to safeguard a country’s export position, or to prevent 
eye infections in people. Most respondents agreed or partly agreed with culling to 
protect human life. The most important argument against the culling was that 
animal life is valuable. 
In both the veterinary and the farmers group, two dominant groups were identified: 
called S and E. The S group considered humans to be superior to animals. The E 
group considered both to be equal. The S group included most respondents and was 
larger among the farmers. As compared to the E group, it consisted of more men 
and older people. The S respondents rated their moral convictions and arguments 
lower, and a higher percentage agreed with the culling of healthy animals. 
It is argued that a person who values animal life highly, will value animal life highly 
as an argument against culling. Therefore, arguments in favour of culling must be 
valued higher than the value of animal life for a person to agree with culling.  
It is concluded that knowledge about the dynamics of convictions and judgement, in 
a specific context, contribute to a better understanding of opposing views on the 
culling of healthy animals in an animal disease epidemic.  
With this knowledge new prevention and control policy can be developed which 
aims for more support in Dutch society. 
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Abstract European animal disease policy seems to find its justification in a “harm to 
other” principle. Limiting the freedom of animal keepers—e.g., by culling their 
animals—is justified by the aim to prevent harm, i.e., the spreading of the disease. 
The picture, however, is more complicated. Both during the control of outbreaks 
and in the prevention of notifiable animal diseases the government is confronted 
with conflicting claims of stakeholders who anticipate running a risk to be harmed 
by each other, and who ask for government intervention. In this paper, we first 
argue that in a policy that aims to prevent animal diseases, the focus shifts from 
limiting “harm” to weighing conflicting claims with respect to “risks of harm.” 
Therefore, we claim that the harm principle is no longer a sufficient justification for 
governmental intervention in animal disease prevention. A policy that has to deal 
with and distribute conflicting risks of harm needs additional value assumptions that 
guide this process of assessment and distribution. We show that currently, policies 
are based on assumptions that are mainly economic considerations. In order to 
show the limitations of these considerations, we use the interests and position of 
keepers of backyard animals as an example. Based on the problems they faced 
during and after the recent outbreaks, we defend the thesis that in order to develop 
a sustainable animal disease policy other than economic assumptions need to be 
taken into account. 
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Introduction 
 
As in many parts of Europe, The Netherlands have been confronted with several 
outbreaks of notifiable animal diseases: classical swine fever in 1997–1998, foot and 
mouth disease in 2001, and highly pathogenic avian influenza (bird flu) in 2003. The 
disease control policy of The Netherlands was in line with the stringent EU 
regulations for the control of notifiable animal diseases at that time: a non-
vaccination policy,2 and in case of an outbreak, a stamping-out strategy. Animals 
that are either infected, possibly infected or are a potential carrier of the disease, are 
culled in order to prevent further spread of the disease. This strategy has raised a lot 
of public concerns with a clear moral statement. Questions as whether the control 
of notifiable animal diseases justifies the killing of large numbers of animals, and 
whether there are alternatives available for mass culling has been on the public 
agenda ever since (cf. Cohen et al. 2007).  
These questions can be addressed from different perspectives, such as the animal, 
the perspective of food safety and public health, or the animal keeper. In this article, 
we focus on one specific stakeholder: the keeper of backyard animals. Keepers of 
backyard animals are a diverse, but substantial group in The Netherlands. An 
estimated 400,000 citizens keep a few million animals and spend at least a few 
billion euro’s on their hobby each year (Van Velzen and Dekker 2003 Treep et al. 
2004 den Boer et al. 2004 Sijtsema et al. 2005). Their position is between the 
professional animal keeper and the keeper of pets. On the one hand, backyard 
animals are commonly not kept for commercial purposes. On the other hand and in 
contrast to pet animals, these animals are not kept in the house. In a quantitative 
study, performed as part of our research project, the main reasons for keeping 
backyard animals are human-animal contact and breeding of fancy or rare breeds 
rather than commercial purposes. They consider keeping animals as a way of living. 
It is a hobby that is an intrinsic part of their life. This group of animal keepers 
appears to be extremely critical in their assessment of the policy during the last 
outbreaks. They argue that their interests and values are not taken seriously (cf. 
Beekman et al. 2007).  
In this article, we analyze the background and the implications of this criticism on 
the animal disease policy.3 After having presented the harm principle as the obvious 
justification that underlies recent policy measures, the shortcomings of this principle 
in the context of animal disease prevention is discussed (see “The Harm Principle as 
a Problematic Justification of Animal Disease Policy”). Rather than the prevention 
of harm, the problematic aspect in animal disease prevention is the question how we 
should weigh the conflicting “risks of harm” claims. With respect to conflicting 
“risks of harm,” the harm principle is silent on how to weigh competing claims of 
“risks of harm.” Therefore, governmental policy needs additional arguments in 
order to weigh and prioritize different “risks of harm” (see “Risks, Conflicts, and 
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the Silence of the Harm Principle”). The fact that governments all over Europe are 
able to deal with diverging and sometimes conflicting “risks of harm” claims shows 
that, next to the harm principle, additional assumptions are included in the policy 
and legislation. Currently, these assumptions are veterinary and economic in nature. 
Consequently, problems of animal disease prevention are addressed as mainly 
veterinary and economic problems. The criticism of the keepers of backyard animals 
is a clear indication of the shortcomings of this scope (Section The Criticism of 
Keepers of Backyard Animals). Keepers of backyard animals do not feel wronged in 
economic terms, but feel wronged in moral terms. They believe the infringement of 
their lifestyle is justified on grounds with which they do not agree. Thus, what is 
presented as a veterinary and economic problem turns out to be a question with a 
clear moral statement. Ignoring this moral statement can only be at the cost of 
leaving the values and interests of some groups out of consideration without 
sufficient justification (Section The Central Role of Value Assumptions and the 
Problem of an “Economy Only”).  
 
The harm principle as a problematic justification of animal disease policy 
The current animal disease policy often has a serious impact on both animals and 
animal keepers, such as the culling of animals and the restrictions of transportation. 
This directly intervenes in the freedom of the individual animal keeper. Nonetheless, 
these measures are considered to be justified in that they aim to prevent society 
from further harm, i.e., the spreading of the disease and the subsequent 
consequences for food production, transport, and trade.  
This justification seems to be based on the “harm to others” principle. The most 
basic interpretation of the harm principle, as was introduced by Mill (1859/1979) 
and further developed by many other authors (cf. Hart 1961 Feinberg 1984, 1994), 
roughly states that governmental intervention is justified when it is aimed to prevent 
harm to others. The principle starts from the ideal that every individual enjoys 
maximum freedom that is still consistent with equal liberties of his fellow citizens. 
Therefore, it is only justified to restrict the liberty of person A in order to prevent 
that person from causing harm to person B, who can be a specific person, but also a 
member of the public in general. Harming is in this context defined as a wrongful 
setback of interests (Feinberg 1994, p. 4, 34). However, harm as such is not a 
sufficient condition for evaluating the situation as morally impermissible. If it were a 
sufficient condition, the moral claim that we ought not to impose harm on others 
would have serious implications. In a very strict version the claim would imply that 
broadly accepted practices, such as driving your car is problematic, because it 
certainly is related to harm for many others. At this point, two additional domains 
are relevant: intentionality, and care. The harm principle is about harm that is 
deliberately and intentionally imposed on others or that is the result of obvious 
carelessness or negligence. The harm principle can justify strong interventions in the 
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freedom of, for instance, an animal keeper, who deliberately tries to harm others by 
contributing to the spread of a disease. Furthermore, the harm principle can be 
applied, if one is confronted with negligence. For example, it is assumed that the 
outbreak of classical swine fever in The Netherlands in 1997 has been caused by a 
lorry-driver that used to transport pigs in a region of Germany in which the virus 
for classical swine fever was detected. His truck was not properly disinfected and as 
a result millions of pigs had to be killed as part of the attempt to bring the disease 
under control (Stegeman et al. 2000 p. 186). Although, the outbreak was not the 
result of a deliberate choice to harm others, the involved person obviously has made 
serious mistakes for which he can be accused.  
However, in practice, only but very few agents in the animal sector really intend to 
harm others. Furthermore, outbreaks also occur even if there is not a situation of 
negligence. Out of perfectly decent, prima facie plausible motives some acts can 
impose a serious risk of an outbreak. For instance, feeding cows with commercial 
feed that contains bones and brains from animals was not done out of cruelty 
towards the animals or with the intention to endanger animal health. Nonetheless, it 
has been directly related to the outbreak of mad cow disease in the UK in the 1990s. 
This illustrates that, in the practice of animal disease policy, a justification of the 
government intervention by reference to the harm principle only is less 
straightforward. Only part of all current government interventions can be 
sufficiently justified by this principle.  
In answer to this, it can be argued that the harm principle can also be interpreted in 
a less restricted way. Brink (2007), for instance, shows that the harm principle also 
can be interpreted as: “A can restrict B’s liberty in order to prevent harm to others” 
He distinguishes this, so-called HP2-version from the more restricted HP1-version 
that states that: “A can restrict B’s liberty to prevent B from harming others.” It is clear 
that HP1 only justifies intervention if “the target herself would be the cause of harm 
to others.” HP2 also allows intervention in order to prevent harm to others, 
“whether that harm would be caused by the target or in some other way.” In this 
case B need not intend to harm or even to be fully aware of the harm that may 
result from his actions. This last version seems to be more in line with what is at 
stake in animal disease policy. Reasons for intervention are not restricted to the fact 
that animal keepers directly harm others, but government intervenes because their 
actions may impose harm on others. It is a risk of harm. The BSE feed restrictions, 
which were designed to reduce the spread of BSE, are a good example. The so-
called ruminant-to-ruminant feed ban implies the prohibition of the feeding of 
ruminant animals, e.g., cattle, sheep, and goats, with animal proteins of mammalian 
origin. The introduction of this prohibition entails an intervention in the freedom of 
several actors in the animal food sector. Nevertheless, it is considered to be an issue 
that has to be subject of governmental law and policy not because these actors 
directly harm others if they feed their animals with animal proteins of mammalian 
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origin, but because it involves a risk of harm if animals that are herbivores by nature 
are fed with feed from animal origin. Therefore, from the less restrictive 
interpretation of the harm principle, the government is allowed to introduce such 
compulsory measures.  
However, even this less restrictive interpretation of the harm principle is not 
sufficient to justify all measures that are part of animal disease policy. Governments 
often are confronted with a web of different, overlapping, but also conflicting 
claims of harm, rather than with a clear distinction between the harmers and those 
who are harmed. The tension between commercial actors in the livestock sector and 
keepers of backyard animals can highlight this point. Both groups do not aim to 
harm each other and they sincerely aim to prevent an outbreak of an animal disease. 
Nonetheless, they differ with respect to the view on what risks of harm are 
acceptable. For instance, commercial keepers may consider the presence of actors 
who keep animals for reasons of hobby as a risk factor, because they are less 
organized and operate in a less standardized way and thus the traceability of possibly 
infected animals is low. Consequently, this way of animal keeping may jeopardize 
the business security of the commercial animal keeper. On the other hand, keepers 
of backyard animals do not consider this assumed risk of harm for the commercial 
sector a sufficient justification for a restriction in their freedom of lifestyle. They are 
convinced that their animals are not the cause of disease outbreaks, and do not 
contribute to a further spread of the disease. A recent study on the highly 
pathogenic avian influenza virus in The Netherlands in 2003 substantiates their 
conviction (Bavinck et al. 2009). They even may claim that these commercial 
keepers and their focus on trade and export are a risk to their idea of the good life 
and their way of caring for their animals.  
In such cases, the problem is not that one partner will be harmed by another if the 
government does not intervene, but that both partners anticipate running a risk to 
be harmed by each other, and ask for government intervention. In order to deal 
with such problems, the government needs tools to weigh and assess conflicting 
claims of harm and to cope with the risk domain of harm. These are tools that the 
harm principle cannot provide.  
 
Risks, conflicts, and the silence of the harm principle 
Given the fact that European governments are confronted with conflicting claims 
of stakeholders who anticipate running a risk to be harmed by each other, and who 
ask for government intervention, a justification of government intervention based 
on the harm principle only becomes complicated. The conflicting claims and the 
aspect of risk complicate the government’s decision to choose the option that 
preserves the most freedom.  
First, the conflicting claims of stakeholders illustrate that governments have to deal 
with various kinds and amounts of harm. Confronted with conflicts of legitimate 
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claims, the government has a serious priority problem. They have to compare and 
evaluate the different claims in order to be able to intervene and prevent. This 
implies a process of assessing “the types of harm, the amounts of harm, and our 
willingness, as a society, to bear the harms.” (Harcourt 1999 p. 182) In this process 
the harm principle does not provide much guidance. Even stronger, “the harm 
principle is silent on those questions.” (Harcourt 1999 p. 182) The principle only 
shows that doing harm is morally not permissible and that an infringement of 
personal liberty is allowed in order to prevent harm. The principle, however, does 
not provide a tool to compare and value conflicting risks of harm nor does it 
indicate which of the conflicting risks of harm should prevail. To make such a 
comparison and to decide how to address the conflict, one needs additional 
arguments.  
Second, the aspect of risk illustrates that policies have to deal with the probability 
that a specific action or type of action results in a harm. The policy is not only about 
limiting harm, but also about reducing the risk that harm will occur. This is 
especially relevant, because the policies are not merely focused on the control during 
an outbreak. Governments also formulate strategies for the prevention of notifiable 
animal diseases. In those cases, the domain of probability plays an even more central 
role than during an outbreak. This implies that governments do not only have to 
assess the various types of risk, but also have to assess the risk that harm will occur 
because of a specific action or practice. In these situations, reference to the harm 
principle only is not enough to justify government intervention. On the one hand, 
weighing “risks of harm” confronts policy makers with the aspect of uncertainty. 
More then once, there is no clear risk, but only a certain probability on certain harm 
related to a particular action. Simply ignoring or silencing the uncertainty is often no 
option as the case of the control of BSE or “Mad cow disease” in the UK illustrates. 
Since 1986, BSE is known as a fatal neurodegenerative disease that affects cattle, but 
it was only in 1996 that the UK government announced that BSE was linked to a 
novel human disease that is fatal for humans: the variant Creutzfeldt-Jakob disease 
(vCJD). Moreover, this disease appeared to be almost certainly caused by 
consuming BSE-contaminated food. The governmental authorities, however, first 
were silent about the uncertainty and assured the public that no safety issues were 
involved in the consumption of beef and that all BSE-related health issues were fully 
under control. However, at some point the government had to announce that beef 
consumption could have serious adverse health effects and that they had already 
known this for some time but had not conveyed the uncertainty they faced. It 
appeared that the authorities had been erroneously taken the “absence of evidence” 
as “evidence of absence.” (Mepham 2004 p. 331) As a consequence, the UK-
government has been severely criticized (House of Lords 2000). This criticism is not 
so much based upon the knowledge that becomes available after the crisis, but on 
the way the government ignored dealing with and communicate on the uncertainty 
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they were faced with. Confronted with uncertainty, it is possible to determine what 
action is preferable, given the available evidence. In these situations extra moral 
tools, such as the precautionary principle can guide one’s decisions.  
On the other hand, dealing with the aspect of risk in the claims of stakeholders is 
more than mere risk calculation. Risk (R) can be defined as the probability (P) of the 
occurrence of a hazard (h): R = P × h. Therefore, a probability of 0.0001 on the 
occurrence of a hazard that has a seriousness of 100 leads to the same result as if we 
are confronted with a hazard with a seriousness of 0.1 and a probability of 0.1. 
However, if the 100-unit hazard implies the death of a whole city and the 0.1-unit 
hazard some extra noise for all citizens of that city, because of a train passing by 
every 30 min, then the risks are differently valued and the risk of the death of a 
whole city needs stronger justification than the risk of more noise. Although the 
calculation results in the same figures, the example illustrates that identifying 
hazards as risks and the assessment of those risks are not the result of pure and 
value-free calculation (Jensen and Sandøe 2002 Rasmussen and Jensen 2005). Every 
identification of a hazard as a risk is based upon value-laden assumptions, and moral 
decisions always (implicitly) play a role in the weighing of risks. This is no different 
with respect to the control of animal diseases (cf. Anthony 2004 Jensen 2004). In 
this process the harm principle can be action guiding, because it says to choose that 
option that preserve most freedom. However, it cannot be the only tool, because of 
the above-mentioned silence on how to evaluate and weigh different types and 
amounts of harm. For instance, in their study on the highly pathogenic avian 
influenza virus in The Netherlands in 2003, Bavinck et al. (2009) conclude that “the 
probability of infection is much smaller for hobby flocks than for commercial 
farms,” but at the same time that “as birds are kept outdoors, backyard flocks may 
be more at risk for introductions of AI strains (…).” They argue that this can be 
explained, because “the probability of infection is most likely determined by a 
complex combination of determinants as the number of animals, the type of species 
or breeds present, the number and type of contacts between flocks, and the sanitary 
measures that are put in place.” (pp. 252–253).  
To decide in such a context, a government needs in addition to the harm principle, 
value-laden assumptions to deal with both the conflicts and with the risk domain of 
the claims of harm. Only these value assumptions can help to determine what risk 
of harm should be addressed, even if it is at the cost of leaving another risk 
unaddressed. For example, if public health is highly valued, one can argue that 
addressing risks of harm with respect to human health should always prevail over 
risks of other kinds of harm. Only based on such additional value-laden 
assumptions it is possible to evaluate the risk aspect of harm and to make choices 
between conflicting claims of harm. Given this claim, it appears that governments 
all over Europe make such evaluations and have specific value assumptions. In spite 
of the shortcomings of the harm principle, they are able to deal with the conflicting 
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risks of harm related to animal disease prevention. This leads us to the conclusion 
that a focus on these basic assumptions is necessary to understand the criticism of 
the keepers of backyard animals on the animal disease policy. Before going into the 
details of the currently used value assumptions, we shortly focus on the criticism 
from the keepers of backyard animals on the animal disease policy.  
 
The criticism of keepers of backyard animals 
 
Keepers of backyard animals are no strict opponents of animal disease policy. 
However, most of them were very critical of the policy and interventions during the 
last outbreaks, especially of the lack of differentiation between the different groups 
of animal keepers (cf. Beekman et al. 2007 Treep et al. 2004). A short analysis of 
their problems with the methods of prevention and control at the time of the 
outbreaks is helpful in illustrating the shortcomings of the harm principle and in 
explicating the additional value-lade assumptions used in the current policies.  
First, keepers of backyard animals believe they have been wronged by the current 
policy measures. They consider their hobby as a predominantly private affair 
(Sijtsema et al. 2005), with its own internal values. The reason to keep animals is 
part of their idea of the good life. It is not just a hobby; it is part of their lifestyle 
and an essential domain of who they are and what they consider worthwhile in life. 
In other words, keeping animals is important to their identity. Therefore, policy 
measures that entail the risk of the culling of animals do not only jeopardize the 
lives of the animals themselves, or the interests of a certain animal practice, but are 
considered a serious infringement of one’s way of life. They believe that animal 
disease policy directly interferes with one of their most important freedoms, i.e., to 
choose one’s own life plan that fits one’s identity. Apparently, the government 
evaluated this infringement of freedom as less important than the harm to the 
public at stake, but this evaluation does not directly follow from the harm principle.  
Second, keepers of backyard animals also believe they have been wronged, because 
they believe that the current policy underestimates the public goods related to their 
way of keeping animals. They consider the policy measures to signal disrespect with 
regard to public interests that are promoted by keeping animals for reasons of 
hobby. It is emphasized that the keeping of animals for recreational purposes results 
in goods of which its value goes beyond the private level. For instance, the breeding 
of rare or endangered species is considered as such a good. Also those forms of 
amateur livestock keeping that represents a type of rural life that has almost 
disappeared as a result of processes such as the systematic increase of scale in 
agriculture, urbanization, and industrialization, contribute to goods that are highly 
valued by the public. Nonetheless, these public goods were, up until recently, not 
enough reason to provide the keepers of backyard animals a more protected 
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position in the policy. Again, this illustrates the use of additional assumptions next 
to the harm principle.  
Third, these animal keepers claim that the current regulation is far too stringent or 
even disproportionate, because they believe that they play no role in the outbreak.  
Fourth, keepers of backyard animals argue that they are forced to take measures that 
they do not only consider as too stringent, but also morally unacceptable. For 
instance, they experience the obligation to keep the animals inside under very harsh 
restriction as too stringent, but also as morally problematic given the animal welfare 
consequences.  
On top of this, the culling of healthy animals is considered as morally unacceptable. 
The moral concerns did not only cover moral unease with the killing of animals as 
such. They believe that perfectly healthy animals are killed purposelessly4 and that 
they were forced to act in a morally objectionable way that leaves them with the idea 
that they betrayed their animals.5 At the last two points, the additional moral 
assumptions become most explicit. The problem is not a discussion on the rightful 
interpretation of the harm principle, but on arguments and values that are used to 
assess the harms at stake and to evaluate “our willingness, as a society, to bear the 
harms.”  
In summary, keepers of backyard animals consider themselves to have been 
wronged not because they do not agree with the importance of the harm principle, 
but because they do not agree with the way the possible harms are valued, how the 
risk domain of harm is assessed, and how the conflicts of harms are addressed. It is 
clear that the criticism of keepers of backyard animals on governmental intervention 
is not on the harm principle as such. It is much more the result of people’s feeling 
of being wronged by the intervention, because they do not share the underlying 
moral assumptions and evaluations that result in addressing some risk of harm, 
while leaving others unaddressed. More in general, keepers of backyard animals do 
not feel to be taken seriously as stakeholders with interests that are worthwhile 
protecting and with animals with which they have a special relationship. To 
understand this criticism, we have to focus on the value assumptions that underlie 
the current policy.  
 
The central role of value assumptions and the problem of an “economy only” view 
The justification of the government intervention as part of animal disease policy 
often implicitly includes a trade off of freedom against other values. In practice, 
especially economic and veterinary considerations play a crucial role. This bias can 
easily be understood by the history of animal husbandry in Europe, which has been 
developed to ensure “food security,” i.e., to secure the production of safe food for 
all, policy, market structures, and technologies aim to increase food production and 
facilitate free trade. Consequently, this focus can be recognized in the animal disease 
policies too. There is a clear tendency to assess animal diseases and its consequences 
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in economic terms only. For instance, the decision of the European Union to adopt 
the former non-vaccination policy was informed by veterinarian arguments, but 
mainly justified on economic grounds. It was calculated that the economic costs of 
preventive vaccination were higher than the costs involved with controlling an 
epidemic. Furthermore, it was argued that a non-vaccination policy stimulates free 
market trade of animal products between countries, who have adopted this policy 
(cf. KNAW/Royal Academy of Sciences 2002). This illustrates that the animal 
disease policy has been mainly focused on economic trade and has evaluated the 
value of goods merely in terms of its economic benefits.  
The current economy-based policies (Dijkhuizen and Morris 1997), however, have 
become subject to serious criticism. On economic arguments, it has been stressed 
that it is highly questionable whether this policy strategy is the most cost efficient. 
For instance, the outbreak of classical swine fever in 1997 was extremely costly for 
all involved partners. The Dutch government had to compensate farmers, but in 
spite of the compensation the farmers were financially harmed, and the national and 
international reputation of the Dutch pig farmers was negatively affected. This 
illustrates that in the long run, it is not so certain whether this policy is sound in 
economic terms. Another example is the criticism of the calculations that underlie 
the stamping-out strategy during the 2001-foot and mouth disease. This has been 
criticized, because the policy turned out to have a serious impact on the tourist 
industry too. This was not part of the original risk-benefit calculation. A similar 
claim can be made with respect to the socio-psychological damages to the involved 
stakeholders entailed by the stamping-out policy that have been ignored in the 
calculation. On top of this, the recent outbreaks provided a lot of relevant epidemic 
knowledge that shows some risk calculation to be flawed and some measures to be 
less relevant than they were expected to be.  
Nonetheless, the most profound problems are with the economy-based approach 
itself. The criticism of keepers of backyard animals signals three broader problems 
with this approach. First, it illustrates a too limited view of whose interests have to 
be taken into consideration and who should be seen as a stakeholder who may run a 
risk of harm as a result of policy intervention. The emphasis on trade and export 
entails that stakeholder interests are only valued and taken into account as far as 
they can be assessed within an economic framework. The interests of stakeholders 
that do not easily fit within this framework are often left out of consideration or 
only play a marginal role. As a result, the role that non-commercial animal keepers 
play is very modest. From the perspective of trade, their interests and claims are 
often subservient to those of the livestock sector that trade and export animals and 
animal products.  
A second point of criticism concerns the overall aim that underlies the evaluation of 
harm as a legitimate reason for state intervention. Although all agents are considered 
to be entitled to be protected by the government against harm, what counts as harm 
 Chapter 7 
144 
 
is evaluated from the aim to stimulate free market trade of animal products between 
countries. As a result, the issues that do not easily fit within an economic framework 
tend to be left out of consideration in the translation of risks of harm into an 
economical risk-benefit analysis. For instance, the fact that keeping animals is 
important to the identity of keepers of backyard animals is difficult to translate into 
economic sound language or in terms of a contribution to free trade. Consequently, 
an economy-based approach hardly can deal with the importance of this lifestyle 
aspect. This is problematic, because the infringement of a person’s way of life needs 
a justification other than the argument that it does not fit in an economic 
framework. Meaningful actions and views on the good life of citizens who keep 
animals for reasons of hobby are regulated in a way that is unacceptable for them, 
because the decisions are based upon economical considerations that they do not 
share and that do not reckon adequately with the lifestyle domain that is violated. 
This problem also holds for the above-mentioned public interests that are related to 
keeping backyard animals for reasons of the breeding of rare breeds or endangered 
species. Not all of these goods may contribute to food production or to export, but 
they have public value.  
Third, the economy-based approach can deal with only a limited number of views of 
the animal and the human-animal relationship. The animal is mainly conceived as a 
commodity. Consequently, the relationship between human and animal are primarily 
defined in terms of commodity and owner. From this perspective, the animal has a 
value as far as it is, or can become part of export and trade. Consequently, policy 
measures that entail the risk of the culling of animals are acceptable if it guarantees 
future trade. This view is problematic. On the one hand, because empirical research 
has shown that the public no longer considers arguments based on economic 
benefit and export only sufficient to justify the culling of healthy animals or to cause 
very severe animal welfare problems (Treep et al. 2004 p. 55ff Noordhuizen-Stassen 
et al. 2003 pp. 43–44). Animals are now commonly conceived as subjects whose 
value cannot be reduced to their economical worth. On the other hand, the idea of 
the human-animal relationship as an owner-commodity relationship does not fit 
with the relationship keepers of backyard animals have with their animals. They 
value their animals and the relation with them fundamentally differently. They are 
owners of the animal, but do not value the animals for financial reasons only. 
Consequently, the government justifies the culling of animals and other preventive 
measures on grounds they do not share.  
These three problems of a strong emphasis on economic considerations in dealing 
with conflicting risks of harm show that this strategy may be effective, in the sense 
that it results in priority rules that one needs to apply the harm principle. However, 
it disregards the plurality of values and norms in society. It is effective only because 
it forces us to discuss issues of animal disease control and prevention as merely 
economic and veterinary problems, while the main problem of those who criticize 
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the policy starts in a moral disagreement about how non-economic considerations 
should be valued. 
  
Conclusions 
 
In this article, we first have shown that the current problem of animal disease policy 
cannot be reduced to a problem of the rightful interpretation of the harm principle. 
The control of animal disease is a matter of dealing with conflicting claims of “risks 
of harm” that requires an assessment of the types of harm and the probability that a 
harm may occur. In this process the harm principle is of less guidance. Additional 
assumptions are needed in order to justify government interventions.  
Second, we have argued that these additional assumptions cannot be reduced to 
economic terms. It requires an interdisciplinary interaction of science, ethics, and 
society. This is the lesson that can be learned from the criticism of the keepers of 
backyard animals. Apparently, the disapproval may seem as the opinion of just a 
minority group. The above analysis, however, shows that their criticism is linked to 
a discussion with strong connections to non-economic beliefs and values. The 
problem is a moral one. The basic assumptions that underlie the preventive 
measures are not shared by the keepers of backyard animals. If one aims to develop 
a sustainable animal disease policy, this implies that conflicting claims with respect 
to risks of harm cannot be settled by translating all claims into economic or even 
monetary terms. As long as not all stakeholders agree on the moral importance and 
value of the economy, forcing us to discuss the problems in financial terms does not 
settle the real problem. Only if the moral assumptions of the current policy are 
explicated and the scope of what counts as relevant for animal disease control is 
broadened can a more robust animal disease policy be developed.  
Therefore, the moral values and principles of all involved have to be taken seriously. 
Ignoring this moral statement can only be at the cost of leaving the values and 
interests of some groups out of consideration without sufficient justification.  
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Footnotes 
1 A notifiable animal disease is one that must be immediately reported to the authorities and 
includes all animal diseases subject to national and/or international regulations. 
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2 In the subsequent years after the epidemics the Dutch government initiated a debate at the 
European level to re-evaluate the non-vaccination policy. As a result vaccination-to-live is since 
2006 allowed for foot and mouth disease and highly pathogenic avian influenza based on the EC 
directive 2006/14/EC. 
3 The articles in the Special Issue of the Journal of Agricultural and Environmental Ethics on 
animal diseases (vol 17 nr. 4–5, 2004) provide an interesting and helpful context for our discussion. 
4 Note that the evaluation of the killing as purposeless is the result of a different evaluation of the 
risks involved with the other options for action. 
5 This is based upon the results of 24 in-depth interviews that have been held with representatives 
of organizations for keepers of backyard animals by Cohen as part of the research project “New 
foundations for prevention and control of notifiable animal diseases.” 
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The aim of this study was to contribute to new prevention and control policy for 
notifiable animal diseases, by giving more insight into the diversity and dynamics of 
moral convictions and judgement concerning animals in Dutch society. 
In the first part of this chapter, the methodology used in the surveys and the results 
are discussed. The second part is a theoretical discussion about the dynamics of 
moral convictions, judgement, and normative policy-making. 
 
Methodology and results 
 
Identifying moral issues 
Between European member states, and in pluralistic societies like the Netherlands, 
one is likely to find social-cultural differences in moral convictions concerning 
animals. At the European level, this means that in the design and harmonisation of 
policy concerning animals, careful consideration is required regarding what is 
considered morally acceptable in each member state.. A number of animal issues 
need to be approached at the EU level, because there is extensive trade of animals 
and their products between the member states. Some animal issues, such as animal 
disease policy, are the subject of concern, and reveal the difficult balance between 
international economic interests and views on the morally acceptable use and 
treatment of animals (Eurobarometer 2007).  
The EU non-vaccination policy only allows free trade between member states in 
which the animals are not vaccinated and yet remaining disease-free of certain 
notifiable diseases. In case of a disease outbreak, the disease-free status had to be 
regained by a method that proved to be morally problematic: stamping-out the 
disease by culling infected and healthy animals within a certain area. However, the 
resistance against this method required a rethinking of this policy. Drawing-up new 
policy for member states that are connected through liberal trade and EU 
regulations, but that may not share the same views on what is acceptable treatment 
of animals, is a challenge 
The current research was not a study of differing views on animals in the member 
states, although this is recommended for future research in chapter two. Animal 
disease policy is still drawn up at the European level, and revisions should be 
approached at this level first. Our European survey (chapter two) was an inventory 
among stakeholders in the member states about issues concerning animal disease 
policy and priorities for future policy. It was expected that countries that had 
suffered one or more epidemic disease outbreaks would have other priorities than 
those member states that had not had such an experience. This was not 
substantiated. This could have been due to the low response rate, and with 
responses mainly from Chief Veterinary Officers and veterinary organisations. 
Therefore, the importance of veterinary issues was emphasised, as spreading of the 
disease to other member states infecting more animals was a major risk. Regional 
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differences were found though, with the north-western and the southern member 
states, irrespective of outbreak-experience, choosing preventive measures as their 
first priority, which from a veterinary point of view is the best action. From a moral 
point of view this was the preferred action as well, and will be discussed later in this 
chapter. 
Eastern European member states chose social, psychological and financial 
consequences. Stakeholders from the Netherlands, a member state that had 
experienced major epidemic outbreaks of classical swine fever, foot and mouth 
disease and highly pathogenic avian influenza, valued animal welfare and related 
moral issues high. In the other member states, these issues only came at the third or 
fourth place.  
In the Netherlands, animal welfare and the intrinsic value of animal life have a 
dominant place in the public morality, policy-making and legislation 
(www.minlnv.nl). This justifies a new perspective on animal disease policy at the 
national level that has such a strong impact on animals and people. It is a challenge 
to follow new EU policy, while at the same time doing justice to Dutch public 
morality concerning animals. However, not that much is known about the public 
morality. One recent survey performed by Rutgers et al (2003), clarified morally 
justified reasons for killing animals for different reasons: culling for economic 
reasons was only supported by 16% of the respondents. These results were relevant 
for our study to a point, but it did not fully reveal the underlying moral reasons why 
people were in favour or against culling. Therefore, to learn more about the Dutch 
public morality about culling, three surveys were performed: among backyard animal 
keepers, and at the national and at the stakeholder level.  
Backyard animal keepers were the first stakeholder group that was studied (chapter 
three). Many backyard animals had been culled, especially during the highly 
pathogenic avian influenza epidemic. The disease control policy did not allow for a 
distinction between commercial and non-commercial animal practices, even though 
these practices differed with respect to the nature of the practice and their specific 
human-animal bond. Some studies (Ziel 2003 Treep et al. 2004  Sijtsema et al. 2005 
Raad voor Dieraangelegenheden 2003) had been performed regarding the nature of 
this practice. However, more information was needed about their priorities for 
future animal disease policy, and about their views on animals, as this group had 
manifested itself in the public debate as strong opponents of the stamping-out 
policy. This opposition needed to be clarified from a moral perspective, to reveal 
what moral values were at stake. Furthermore, their moral vocabulary used to 
express their opposition, needed to be clarified to find what values it was based on. 
Preceding the survey, a number of interviews were performed with backyard animal 
keepers. They were representatives and spokesmen of this group and were therefore 
more knowledgeable on the subject than the average backyard animal keeper. These 
interviews were important to understand the results of the backyard animal survey 
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and they pointed out what the driving force was behind their resisting the culling of 
their animals. Terms such as respect for life, right to life, a duty to care for and protect, loss of 
autonomy, and senseless killing were used. The term ‘senseless killing’ showed that this 
particular situation did not justify the culling.  
To analyse the interviews, a method was used of labelling and clustering in value-
clusters of our own design. As these moral values were expressed implicitly rather 
than explicitly, the limitation of this approach was our interpretation of the 
terminology. However, a useful structure was found in the philosophical animal 
ethics literature, which lent us guidance how to interpret the expressions for their 
underlying moral values.  
Most respondents in the backyard animal survey did not find it justified to cull 
healthy animals (89%) provided that sufficient preventive measures are taken. They 
were in favour of a separate status from commercially kept animals, and supported 
preventive vaccination to protect their animals. It can be argued that for the 
backyard animal keepers disagreeing with the culling was the starting-point, which 
could be modified by external situations. This could be due to the fact that a 
majority of the respondents (66%) had been involved in an epidemic.  
 
Reflections on the model 
The EU survey and the study of the backyard animal practice preceded the national 
and stakeholder surveys. They yielded relevant results for the design of a model for 
moral convictions and judgement for empirical studies  (chapter four). The model 
also needed a ‘language’ that was unequivocal in its meaning, and useful to describe 
convictions and their basis. Some authors emphasise the importance of external 
influences for people’s conviction about animals, such as culture (Pagani 2007), 
gender (Herzog 1991 Driscoll 1992 Hills 1993 Fidler 2003 Robertson, Gallivan and 
MacIntyre 2004 Heleski, Mertig and Zanella 2006 Herzog 2007, our study chapter 
five and six), age (our study chapter five and six) political view and religion (Driscoll 
1992 Heleski, Mertig and Zanella 2006), experience with animals (Pagani 2007 
Endenburg 1994, 1995 Miura et al. 2002 Fidler, 2003), physical appearance (Knight 
and Barnett 2008), and knowledge about animals and their mental capacities (Bekoff 
2007). Knight and Barnett found that purpose and knowledge of animal use were 
important for one’s convictions. They furthermore proposed that belief in animals’ 
mental capacities, such as sentience or conscience, defines people’s convictions and 
the acceptability of their use. This they called belief in animal mind and explains why 
people agree with one kind of animal use and disagree with another. Taylor and 
Signal (2005) performed a study in which attitudes were tested against animals as 
‘pet’ ‘pest’ and ‘profit’ (the utility of an animal to humans). This means that in 
different situations animals may belong in different categories, which in turn is of 
influence on one’s attitude. In the theoretical discussion of this chapter, this 
discrepancy is discussed in more detail. 
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The theoretical framework of the model was not based on external influences as 
mentioned above, but on well-defined moral values that refer to the animal itself 
and which define why animals have moral importance, and therefore why people have 
moral convictions concerning them. In the academic animal ethics literature, values 
are proposed, which are useful for this purpose. Even though philosophical and 
empirical ethics usually do not interact, they are concerned with the same question: 
‘Why are animals morally important?’  
In general, studies usually give information about people’s convictions, but usually 
not about their moral basis: the moral “why”’ of a conviction (Serpell 2004 Herzog 
and Dorr 2000 Franklin 2007 Eurobarometer 2007). In our model, moral 
convictions were defined by a combination of the what of a conviction, which is 
one’s view with respect to the position, value, doing good and right to life of 
animals, and the why of these views. In other words, on what moral values are these 
convictions based? This approach was adopted for two reasons. First, the why 
question of convictions gives insight into underlying values that are the basis of 
views on the right and wrong way to treat animals. Only in this way can one obtain a 
complete picture of convictions and gain more insight into the source of opposition 
in an animal debate. Second, the why question reflects what our responsibilities 
towards animals ought to be following from these values. It is a self-reflection of 
society on the moral acceptability of animal use from a vision of a society people 
would prefer to live in. This is reflected in terms such as respect, kindness, 
compassion, and doing good. In this interpretation, convictions concerning animals 
are normative. This means that policy should not only concentrate on people’s 
responsibilities and actions; it should reflect intention to do good, based on values 
and on views on an ideal society. This will be discussed further in the theoretical 
discussion in this chapter. 
The model consists of domains, statements and values. These are the ‘building 
blocks’ of moral convictions. The domains reflect the subject of a conviction 
(position of animals, value of animals, to do good to animals and right to life), the 
statements reflect the opinion on the subject (e.g humans are superior to animals) and 
the opinions are supported by values (e.g. humans are superior to animals because animals 
cannot think). The statements are the what and the values are the why of a conviction. 
This why refers to a variety of values: intrinsic referring to characteristics of the 
animal itself; relational; to the bond between animals and people; usefulness: to their 
usefulness to people, or to their role in the ecosystem; virtue: to how a virtuous 
person should behave towards animals; and to religion. The limitations of the model 
are found in the choice of domains, statements, moral values and cases, which were 
a given, thus restricting the respondents in their choice.  
The choice of the four domains was based on our literature search about issues in 
animal debates. It is possible that another domain should have been included. For 
instance, respect for animal life is a term which was heard quite often in the culling 
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debate. It describes a certain attitude to animals. Intuitively most people have a good 
idea about the meaning of respect. However, this term was not included, because it 
does not tell one exactly what a respectful attitude is and how one should behave in 
a respectful manner in a certain situation. It may refer to the right outcome, the 
right action or to the right character. In the latter case, respect is an expression of 
virtuous character (Hursthouse 1999). Does respect imply that people should refrain 
from harming animals, or is one allowed to kill animals in a respectful manner or is 
killing not acceptable at all? Due to the uncertainty how to interpret respect, the 
domains to do good (domain three) and a right to life (domain four) were chosen. 
Animal welfare has always been and still is the main concern in animal issues. 
However, from the 1960s onwards a shift was taking place from a welfare 
discussion to a rights discussion in animal debates (Armstrong and Boltzer 2003, 
Franklin 2007 Regan 1983 Singer 1995). With these domains it was studied if and 
how animal welfare and right to life have become part of public morality. 
To counteract these limitations, the model allows for adaptations, because domains, 
moral values and cases can be added or left out, depending on the focus of the 
study. 
On the whole the model is built on subjective terms which may be interpreted 
differently by different people, because our relationship with animals is subjective. 
This means that these terms do not have one unequivocal meaning or value. 
Perhaps the strength of our empirical research may in fact lie in its restrictions. It 
does not give the personal interpretation of moral values. It gives their average value 
over a large number of respondents, which is the best way to describe public 
morality as it is the majority and shared view in society.  
In a case-study it was studied if and how convictions were important in judgement 
on the culling of healthy animals in animal disease epidemics. Four cases each 
presented a different reason in favour of culling: to stop the disease from spreading, 
to safeguard the export position of a country, to protect people against eye 
infections, and to protect people from a disease that can be lethal in humans. These 
cases reflected the issues about the moral justification of culling. Eye infections only 
occur when in contact with the highly-pathogenic H7 type of avian influenza. In the 
case-study this case aimed to clarify whether this infection was considered sufficient 
reasons to cull, or only when human life is at stake.  
The limitation of this approach was that the cases were a simplification of reality 
with each case giving only one argument in favour of culling. In reality, a number of 
values and interests are weighed against the value of animal life. Furthermore, the 
cases did not provided supplementary information with which the respondents 
could make a risk assessment, (e.g. information about the severity of the eye 
infection. Is it a mere inflammation or is it a more serious condition?). However, for 
more insight into a complex issue it was necessary to study one aspect at a time. 
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Comparison with other methods  
In the ethics debate, the term principle is often used (Verweij 1998 Mepham 2000). 
Verweij defines principles as moral norms. In this interpretation, principles are the 
basis of certain attitudes or actions. Therefore, one can argue that principles are 
comparable to the statements, the what of moral convictions in our model.. 
However, principles don’t seem to focus on the why level: the values, upon which a 
principle rests.  
Verweij argues that cases serve to specify principles. However in this way cases do 
not specify which underlying value of a principle is important. Therefore, principles 
are too vague in their implications. For instance, in the culling debate the term respect 
for life was often heard. What does this mean in terms of the action that should be 
taken, and on what values is this based? Are people allowed to cull animals, as long 
as pain and distress are kept to a minimum, or does it mean that one should not cull 
animals at all, or that one should cull in a respectful manner. The latter reason needs 
a clarification of what a respectful manner is?  
A number of tools have been developed on the basis of principles in the context of 
cases. The Ethical Matrix, developed by Ben Mepham (2000), takes three principles 
as its basis: justice, fairness and wellbeing. The matrix is used to find how in a 
particular case or policy scenario, these principles are valued for what they imply to 
the stakeholders involved. In this concept, the principles themselves are not under 
discussion. The variables are the stakeholders and the valuing. With this method, 
cases are compared on the basis of their valuing of principles. However, the matrix 
does not clarify what these principles in fact mean to the stakeholders, and what 
they are based on. In other words to be of any use, it requires more reflection on the 
nature of these principles and their interpretation. Furthermore in different cases, 
other principles may be relevant, as in the current study.  
The concept of Reflective Equilibrium (RE) (Verweij 1998 Van Thiel 2009), is based 
on the dynamics of principles, intuitions and facts in a case. In a case with its case-
specific facts, a first judgement is given based on moral intuitions relevant to this 
case. The aim is to find the underlying general principle from which these intuitions 
arose. In this process, facts, moral intuitions and principles are reflected upon to 
reach a new equilibrium. The process is: a case with its facts ? first moral 
judgement based on intuitions ? general principle. It is a qualitative tool to be 
performed by one person, who Van Thiel calls a thinker. 
The model of the current study operates the other way around. First the conviction 
is established which then is weighed and redefined in a case to reach judgement. The 
process is: conviction ? arguments in a case ? judgement. Therefore an 
intermediate step of moral intuitions to find the underlying conviction was not 
included. Moreover, the model is a quantitative empirical tool for use in stakeholder 
groups and in society as a whole.  
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The model is more comparable to the empirical model developed by Van Thiel, 
who used the RE as a starting-point for normative-empirical research in health care 
institutions. She argues that in health care, moral intuitions have developed as a 
result of the nature of the practice and the experience of health care givers and 
patients. These intuitions she calls moral wisdom. In her study the respondents were 
asked to formulate their intuitions about, for instance, respect for autonomy of the 
patient.  
In the surveys the respondents were not asked to choose between convictions. 
Instead they were presented with the building blocks, which were the domains, 
statements and moral values, to compile their own convictions. Furthermore, a 
system of numerical rating was used, required for large scale surveys, to statistically 
describe and differentiate between convictions, and between stakeholders, sexes, 
age, and other relevant criteria.  
 
Reflection on the surveys 
In the national survey 1999 respondents (81%) and in the stakeholder survey 863 
veterinarians and 762 livestock farmers participated (of the latter two no 
information was available about the response rate). This showed that the subject 
was considered important and enabled us to draw some conclusions. The results 
showed that the model was indeed useful for this kind of empirical research, 
because it was possible to distinguish between respondents on the basis of their 
convictions, values, and judgement.  
The results of the national survey and the stakeholder survey among  veterinarians 
and livestock farmers first of all revealed that people indeed have convictions 
concerning animals. This is likely as animals have long since been part of our human 
community, in which norms and values guide our behaviour towards others. As 
people have extensive interactions with animals, certain convictions have been 
developed. The question is whether these convictions form a coherent and 
structured whole representing public morality about animals in Dutch society, or 
merely represent the convictions of a limited group of individuals. For this study, 
public morality is defined as the entirety of convictions and their supporting values 
shared by a substantial group, and by different groups of people in society.  
The results showed diversity in moral convictions, but not as anticipated. By means 
of the combination of statements, 54 profiles can be distinguished: 3x2x3x3 
statements for four domains (for a discussion f profiles see chapter five). However, 
one profile included most respondents, called the A profile. A second important 
profile could be distinguished, called the B profile. The A and B respondents 
differed with respect to their view on the position of animals with respect to 
humans (domain one), and with respect to the valuing of their convictions. The A 
respondents emphasised the differences between humans and animals by stating 
that humans are superior because humans possess rationality, and because humans 
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can distinguish between right and wrong. The B respondents who considered 
humans and animals to be equal emphasised the similarities between the two: the 
fact that both are living beings, are sentient and are both equally important in the 
ecosystem. In an open question the respondents could give additional information. 
This revealed that other values than those given were important. For instance, many 
A respondents emphasised that the fact that people can and do dominate animals is 
proof of people’s superiority. This is interesting since this opinion follows from 
what the human-animal relationship is in our society and not on what this 
relationship should be. However, the respondents made it clear that from this 
conviction it does not follow that people have no moral responsibilities towards 
animals. On the contrary, because people are stewards of animals and nature and 
dominate animals, people have a duty to care.  
All respondents from both surveys were of the opinion that animals have value 
(domain two). The purpose of this domain was to find if in Dutch society, a shift 
had taken place from an instrumental value towards other values. This showed that 
animals were still valued for their usefulness to people, but were equally highly 
valued for the fact that they are living beings, are part of the ecosystem, have a 
personal relationship with people and are part of Creation. This means that the ‘old’ 
values still hold, but ‘new’ values have been included.  
Most respondents were of the opinion that people have a duty to care for and 
protect all animals (domain three). Three values supported this view: the fact that 
animals are living beings, are sentient and are important in the ecosystem. The fact 
that this duty includes all animals means that values with which one can distinguish 
between animals, did not seem to be relevant. However, sentience is a distinguishing 
criterion, as some species are likely to be more sentient than others. Therefore, the 
fact that this value was relevant means that a duty to care is not dependent on a 
certain degree of sentience.  
With the fourth domain (right to life) it was examined whether animals are 
considered to have a right to life, and to find out if this right is dependent on their 
importance to people, or follows from certain intrinsic values. Most respondents 
found that all animals have this right, based on the fact that they are living beings 
and are important in the ecosystem, which are values of the individual animal and an 
animal species. For most B respondents, sentience, lifecycle, and urge to live were 
equally important. This indicates that all animals are recognised as having an interest 
to live and fulfil the goal of their life independently of the interests of people. 
However, even if this interest is recognised, a right to life is case-dependent, which 
will be discussed later. 
Most moral values were shared by both groups, but the A respondents valued these 
values (significantly) lower than the B respondents.  
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A multi-criteria account for moral convictions 
The model served as a bridge between moral convictions and philosophical ethics 
theory, because it provided a moral language by means of which both can 
understand each other. It has the potential to make both realms more dynamic and 
reactive to societal issues. It showed which values were important for an animal’s 
moral importance, and people’s moral convictions. While most ethicists link an 
animal’s moral importance to one criterion, for instance rationality (Scruton 2000) 
or sentience (Regan 1983, Singer 1995), Warren (1997) proposes a multi-criteria 
account. She argues that in the public morality not only one, but a number of 
criteria (in the current study these are called moral values) are relevant for moral 
importance. The results confirm Warren’s theory, but caution is needed in their 
interpretation. The respondents were required to value all the values and therefore 
had to consider their importance with respect to other values. However, had they 
been asked to give values of their own in an open question, perhaps fewer values or 
even only one would have been given. However, in the stakeholder survey, the 
veterinarians gave reason to believe that Warren’s theory is correct. In this survey, 
due to technical differences they only valued values they considered important for 
their convictions. It showed that not one but a number of averagely or highly valued 
values supported their convictions.  
It is argued that a diversity of moral values form the foundation of moral 
convictions and constitute the basis of Dutch public morality, as these values were 
valued high by most respondents in both surveys. One can argue that the choice of 
values given in the model is not comprehensive and other values should have been 
included to give a complete picture of important values in Dutch society. However, 
based on the analysis of the literature and the high valuation of these values in the 
surveys, the results give an impression of what is considered important in Dutch 
society.  
Differences in the valuation of moral values and arguments and in judgement were 
found between males and females, and between older and younger people. More A 
respondents were male and older and more B respondents were female and 
younger. The B respondents had a more favourable attitude towards animals: they 
valued their convictions higher and more were opposed to the culling. This could 
mean that women and a younger generation have other views on acceptable use and 
treatment of animals. The question is whether a favourable attitude of younger 
people is proof of change in the public morality? It is argued that this is likely, 
because established moral views that are not sufficiently flexible to meet new 
developments in society, may be overruled by views of younger people who do have 
the capacity to critically react to these developments.  
This study and many others (Herzog 1991) found gender related differences in 
attitude towards animals. Women place more emphasis on the personal relationship 
and show more empathy about animal suffering (Hills 1993, our study chapter 
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three). A recent development in animal ethics is called care ethics (DeGrazia 1999), 
which focuses on the importance of a caring and relational bond with animals 
instead of a functional relationship. Domain two showed that a functional value was 
still highly valued, but that other values were equally important. Domain three 
showed that caring should include all animals, independent of their functional use. 
This caring may be interpreted differently in different situations and between 
domestic and wild animals, with a stronger duty towards animals under our care.  
Furthermore, in society a diverging development into ‘visible’ and ‘invisible’ animals 
is taking place. On the one hand there is an empathic and personal relationship with 
animals one can see and interact with. On the other hand invisible animals in the 
livestock sector, laboratories and fur farms are increasingly depersonalised and 
instrumentalised. However, in our society, the emphasis on care, and the fact that 
increasingly women are increasingly found in key positions in society and in 
traditionally male-dominated professions, such as the veterinary practice, will exert 
their influence. It would be interesting to study in what way women and younger 
people employed in these ‘invisible’ animal practices may influence the way in which 
the practices are managed based on a different notion of the acceptable treatment of 
these animals. 
 
Judgement  
In the case-study it was studied whether moral convictions exert an influence in 
judgement on the culling of healthy animals. The results demonstrated that 
convictions only predict judgement to a certain extent, because in the case-study, 
respondents with the same convictions were found in all three judgement categories: 
disagree, partly disagree/agree, and agree.  
As compared to the national survey, more veterinarians and livestock farmers were 
against culling. This may be due to the fact that these groups are knowledgeable 
about animals and therefore are more critical about the stamping-out strategy. 
In the national survey, more A respondents were in favour of culling and more B 
respondents were against culling. Arguments against culling each reflected a moral 
value from one’s convictions, relevant to the case. More A respondents valued the 
arguments in favour of culling higher, and the arguments against culling lower than 
B. For both groups the arguments were flexible: they were valued lower when the 
arguments in favour were valued higher. Nonetheless, more B respondents were 
against culling and had valued the arguments against culling higher and in favour 
lower. It is argued that people or groups who value their moral convictions relatively 
high, therefore value them as an argument in a case high, and therefore are more likely 
support an animal interest over a human interest. The opposite is also true. 
The argument healthy animals should not be culled because life is valuable was the most 
highly valued argument. This in itself was not surprising, since this was the issue in 
the first place. It was more surprising to find that the other arguments, for instance 
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the importance of a relational or functional bond between people and animals, the 
value of rare breeds and the mental capacities of animals, were less relevant. It is 
argued that these values exerted a collective weight giving further support against 
culling. With the method used it was not possible to prove this. It would require a 
new set-up with the value of life as the only argument against culling to examine 
whether judgement was the same as in the surveys or not. However, these values 
were identified as important in the epidemics. 
How can one explain opposition in the culling debate when convictions and their 
supporting values are shared? The results showed that differences were gradual and 
were found in the valuing (rating) of one’s convictions, and/or differences in their 
valuing as arguments against culling, and/or differences in the valuing of the human 
interest in the cases. Based on the results it is argued that people who value their 
moral values low/high, therefore value these values as arguments in a case 
low/high, and therefore are more likely to be in favour/against the culling. This may 
explain the opposition, which is based not so much on different values but on a 
different valuation of these values. This will be discussed in more detail in the 
theoretical discussion in this chapter.  
Opposition can also be caused by convictions shared by only few people. In the 
study, some very small groups were identified. Some respondents were of the 
opinion that animals are superior to people (national 9%, vet 0.2% and farmers 
0.6%), some found that people have no moral responsibilities towards animals 
(national 3.6%, veterinarians 1.4%, farmers 0.4%), some found that animals have no 
right to life (national 1.4%, veterinarians 2.9%, farmers 3.5%). Even though these 
are small groups, their views and voice may be strong in a debate.  
Another possibility is that some people are pragmatic, with convictions that depend 
on the case, or perhaps may not have convictions concerning animals at all. This 
means that their judgement is only based on the case and circumstances. Another 
possibility is that some people may as a point of departure always value human 
interests higher than their convictions concerning animals because they do not value 
animals, and don’t feel any or very little or no moral responsibility towards them, let 
alone granting them rights. Their judgement is therefore a weighing of human 
interests and human values. The opposite could also be true, with some people who 
always value their convictions concerning animal higher than human interests. 
 
Theoretical discussion about the dynamics of moral convictions concerning 
animals and judgement  
 
This section presents a theoretical discussion on a three-layered concept of moral 
convictions, the dynamics of judgement, and a three-layered concept of normative 
policy. Figure one gives a schematic representation of this concept of moral 
convictions.  
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Figure 1 Dynamics of a three-layered concept of moral convictions M= value of a 
conviction P=value of a conviction in a case. 
 
A three-layered concept of moral convictions  
In chapter four, a two-layered concept of moral convictions is presented. The first 
layer included deeply felt moral convictions called fundamental moral convictions. 
The second layer included convictions that were relevant in an animal issue.. These 
were called practical moral convictions. However, the results of the surveys indicate 
that a concept of moral convictions should consist of three instead of two layers. 
The first layer includes moral values that are not only important for an individual, 
but are shared in society as a whole and are therefore part of public morality. They 
have a certain importance for society. The second layer includes values, which are 
specific to an individual or a group. They have a certain importance for an 
individual or group. The value of these convictions is called the M value. The third 
layer consists of values that are relevant in a public debate about a certain animal 
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issue, and as such have become arguments in this debate. The third layer does not 
contain the same set of values all the time. It consists of values that are chosen from 
the first or second layer for their relevance in a specific case. In different cases, 
other values that are relevant migrate to the third layer. The value of these latter 
values is called the P value. The results showed a diversity of values: intrinsic, 
relational, functional, religious or other, which can be found in al three layers. 
However, the values of animal life, of sentient animals, and of animals in the 
ecosystem are important values that are highly valued and are found in all three 
layers. 
 
Dynamics of judgement 
In this section differences between people with respect to judgement are discussed. 
Based on the results it is argued that when a person values his or her conviction 
high (M), he or she values the conviction as an argument in a case high and the 
human interest low, and therefore is more likely to disagree with the culling. This is 
explained by the following examples which are based on the results of the case-
study.  
Person A is from the profile A group and person B from the profile B group. 
People from profile A are of the opinion that humans are superior to animals, that 
animals have value, that people should do good to all animals, and that all animals 
have a right to life. People from profile B only differ from profile A in that they 
consider humans and animals to be equal, and that they value their convictions 
higher. For further discussion on the profiles see chapter five.   
Person A and person B both have the moral conviction: all animals have a right to life 
because animal life is valuable. Person A values this conviction M with a value which is 
lower than the valuation by person B (see figure one). This value expresses the 
importance of this conviction for the person. In a case a human interest is at stake, 
for example culling to safeguard the export position of a country. The conviction becomes 
an argument against culling, namely: these healthy animals should not be culled, because 
animal life is valuable, which person A values with a value P which is lower than the 
valuing by person B. The P value expresses the importance of the moral conviction 
in this particular case. It is dependent on the M value of the conviction and the 
value of the human interest (HI) in this case. Based on the results of the surveys (see 
chapter five and six) it showed that the P is valued the same or lower than the M 
value.   
Figure two shows the differences between person A and B in the valuation of P and 
the valuation of HI in the case ‘culling to safeguard the export position of a country’. The X-
axis gives the value of the HI, the Y-axis gives the value of P. The results of the 
case-study showed that the higher the value of HI the lower the value of P.  Person 
A values this HI higher than the P, and therefore is more likely to agree with the 
culling in this case. Person B values this HI lower than the P, and therefore is more 
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Figure two shows the valuation by person A(?) and B (*) in two cases. Case 1: 
‘culling to safeguard the export position of a country’. Case 2: ‘culling to protect 
human life’. HI=the value of the human interests (=export position and human life) 
in these cases. P=the value of the conviction in these cases. The value M, which is 
the value of the moral conviction, is a constant. The values do not reflect the rates 
in the case-study. 
 
 
likely to disagree with the culling in this case. 
The case-study also showed that some respondents - even though they had already 
valued HI higher than P - still only partly agreed. This meant that more information 
was required to reach judgement. This also implies that people are willing to weigh 
all the interests and values before reaching judgement. This will be discussed later in 
this chapter. 
 
Moral change  
To explain moral changes over time, one needs to assume that external factors have 
the potential to change public morality (see figure one). A number of developments 
in animal use (Rollin 2007 Franklin 2007), and people’s impact on the living nature 
had already led to critical reflections in which the intrinsic value of animals was 
increasingly recognised and appreciated. An example is animal biotechnology, which 
has led to a new vocabulary, such as the term ‘instrumentalisation’ to express one’s 
concern about this form of animal use. It was indicative of changes in animal use 
that could not be discussed with the then existing communication tools. The 
concern is the devaluation of animals to mere instruments for human purposes. It 
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reflects unease, which goes beyond animal welfare concerns. It is about the intention 
to respect an animal’s intrinsic value, which is an appreciation of animals, 
independent of their value to people. At present, this term has found its way into 
debates about other forms of animal use, which shows that it was case-born, but is 
no longer case-bound, and has obtained a place in the public morality. 
Moral convictions develop as a result of diversity of changes in society. Society had 
already undergone changes due to developments in agriculture, intensifying livestock 
keeping, and new animal practices emerged, such as backyard animal keeping, 
keeping de-domesticated animals in nature reserves, horseback riding and green care 
farms. Every now and then certain cases such as epidemics speed up this process of 
changing convictions. The epidemics had the potential to reshape and re-value these 
convictions, which will manifest themselves again in future cases.. Only in further 
research can it become clear whether new or changed convictions keep their new 
value in a future public debate (figure one) and therefore should be acknowledged in 
legislation (Mepham 2000). Policy should anticipate that in a future outbreak, the 
value of animal life and of other values important in the culling debate may re-
emerge with a new and higher value, due to their history in previous epidemics.  
 
A normative policy framework of values, freedom and responsibilities 
In a complex society like The Netherlands, animal use has diversified, has often 
become invisible to the public eye, and has given rise to important and fundamental 
ethical questions. These questions have as much to do with oneself and the society 
we live in, as with the consequences for the animal itself. It is almost impossible to 
capture the acceptability of animal use in one conviction. For instance, an animal’s 
right to life, when applied all the time in society as a whole, would make most 
animal use impossible. For a person to make sense of his or her convictions 
concerning animals in a complex society, it is argued that animal use and its specific 
ethical dilemmas are compartmentalised. In each compartment, a specific animal use 
(e.g. livestock farming, animal experimentation, fur-farming) is valued for its merits 
and drawbacks specific for the compartment, and weighed against one’s convictions. 
The moral conviction reflects how one should behave as a vision of the ideal at that 
time. Judgement-per-compartment is the result of a P value set against an HI value 
specific for this compartment (see figure two and three). The P value is not 
independent from the goal of the animal use and expresses morally acceptable 
animal use in this particular context. This explains why the killing of animals is 
deemed acceptable in one compartment, e.g. for food, and is not acceptable in the 
other (Rutgers 2003). It explains why the same animal species as a companion 
animal has a higher status than as a laboratory animal (Pagani 2007). The P value 
therefore is a compromise between one’s convictions and the human interest in a 
compartment. When over time public morality changes, certain animal use may need 
to be re-valued or may no longer be considered morally justified.  
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Policy that is reactive to moral change needs to find a new approach. It should not 
merely focus on moral convictions and their M value, because this disregards the 
importance of cases and other external influences on the valuing and reshaping of 
these convictions. Policy that merely focuses on the P value of convictions in cases, 
is confronted with a diversity of P values between stakeholders and may be based 
on incidents and therefore has insufficient fundament for future policy.  
With a casuistic approach one can discuss animal issues in society with society 
(Jonson and Toulmin 1988). It is an efficient way to identify the value-discussions 
between and within stakeholder groups, by discussing the importance of convictions 
in a practical case. However, I do not advocate pure case-based policy-making, 
because this is a one-level approach. It is only effective at a particular stage of 
policy-making. Cases are meant to clarify an issue in a particular compartment, and 
are a way to shape policy into its practical form by stakeholder participation and 
dialogue. Still this approach is not satisfactory as it takes its justification from the 
nature of the compartment, without critically reflecting on its justification at the 
level of public morality. It bears the risk that solutions of an animal issue are sought 
within the realities of a specific compartment. However, based on the public 
morality, a government should show intention to do good to all animals, irrespective 
of their use. Therefore, policy should be independent of and transcend the 
compartment level. This way justice is done to moral values, showing that an animal 
is not defined by the setting of a compartment, but by its biological nature 
determined by the characteristic of the species.  
In this section a normative policy approach is proposed. This policy connects public 
morality and normative policy. It can respond to strong moral convictions with a 
high M and P value held by different interest groups, to convictions with variable P 
values, and to the dynamics of moral change. This policy anticipates (technological) 
developments which may lead to new animal use and new public debates. 
A normative policy framework is based on values and visions of the ideal society, in 
which to do good to animals for the animals’ sake is the starting-point. With this 
framework one can express values, freedoms and responsibilities of all stakeholders 
at three levels. 
The first and fundamental level includes the minimum norms of animal keeping 
following from the values shared in society, and therefore should be laid down in 
legislation. It sets the norm for animal health and welfare and should refer to 
individual animals as well as to non-domestic animals and animal species in the 
ecosystem.  
The second level includes additional norms set down in regulations, to meet further 
demands by society and stakeholders. It allows for consensus between stakeholders, 
and between stakeholders and society, to equally distribute risks, values, 
responsibilities and freedom.  
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At the third level, individuals and stakeholders can realise their interpretation of 
values. Freedom of action is only realised at this level, allowing animal keepers 
freedom to keep animals in a way they see fit, as long as it is compatible with the 
first and second level. 
 
Relevance for prevention and control policy 
For new prevention and control policy to be supported within society, more needs 
to be known about the dynamics of convictions and judgement. Most respondents 
partly (dis)agreed with the culling to stop the disease from spreading, to safeguard 
the export position, or to avoid eye infections. In this category, the A group had 
already valued the arguments in favour of culling higher than the arguments against 
culling. Still these respondents were not completely for or against culling. This point 
is called the turning-point. This turning-point is relevant because for the 
respondents in order to agree or disagree, more information was required about the 
veterinary, economic and human health risks. This could explain why most 
respondents only partly (dis)agreed. First, for support and for trust in the 
government, information should be made available about these risks and about the 
available knowledge about the spreading and the severity of the disease (for instance 
animals can recover from foot and mouth disease, but highly-pathogenic avian 
influenza can be lethal to animals and people). Second, it should be made clear why 
alternative measures were not taken (such as vaccinating). Third, for a moral 
problem, policy’s basis needs to be normative; therefore its starting-point is the 
moral perspective. From this perspective, attention should be paid to the moral 
values of people, animals and the ecosystem, to values specific to the issue, to the 
moral responsibilities of each stakeholder not only to their own animals, but also to 
the animals of others, to a stakeholder’s freedom of action, and to a just distribution 
of risk.  
With this information, future policy should be able to reflect the three layers of 
normative policy. Certain shared values from its first layer should find their place in 
all possible scenarios, because these are the fundaments of public morality. 
However, policy needs to be developed at the European level first, because animal 
disease policy is an international issue. In is unlikely that all member states share the 
same moral values. The European study showed that preventive measures were 
given priority by most countries. Therefore, prevention policy will gain support 
from most member states, particularly at this level. In fact, one can argue that 
prevention is the best morally justifiable option, because it is based on a reduction 
of risk for all member states, and for the animals and the keepers, and therefore may 
be the best way to acknowledge the diversity of moral values in the different 
member states.  
In chapter seven, a risk-of-harm policy is discussed, which approaches the issue 
from the perspective of case-specific risk, harm, and moral values. Its core message 
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is that policy ought to give consideration to all values of all those involved, and to 
equally distribute risk-of-harm. Member states can only lend meaning to their moral 
responsibilities by being allowed freedom of action to protect themselves against 
disease outbreaks, by means of vaccination or other measures. From this it follows 
that international policy that does not allow for this freedom, is morally wrong. At 
this level, more knowledge about the various human-animal relationships and the 
public morality in the member states is required.  
At the national level, in Dutch society, the shared moral values should not only be 
granted an important place in the realisation of new policy concerning animals and 
their treatment in general. A government should also show the intention to realise 
these values for the people as well as the animals’ sake. This reflects how society, 
from a moral perspective, ought to behave towards living and sentient beings.  
Policy needs to be developed at the second level of normative policy: the level of 
the animal practices, as well. Though the nature of practices may differ, their interest 
not to be harmed by an epidemic is the same. Other than functional human-animal 
relationships should be considered: for instance the personal or recreational bond 
between an animal and its keeper, the experiencing of nature with animals as a way 
of life, and the breeding with a special breed. Morally justifiable policy at this level 
aims to distribute risk-of-harm between the stakeholders. This requires a 
reassessment of the boundaries of stakeholders’ autonomy, versus their 
responsibilities towards others. In its moral context, harm means more than an 
economic harm to the sector. It means that as a result of not being able to care for 
and protect one’s animals against harm done by others, is morally wrong from the 
perspective of moral values. It does not allow keepers freedom to care for their 
animals as they see fit. It also means harming a way of life. This refers to a number 
of moral values. It implies that keeping animals for the production of food, to breed 
a special breed or for company is more than just that. It is freedom to contribute in 
a meaningful way to society, the countryside or to the biodiversity of a region, and 
to feel one with the natural world. However, risk-of-harm means that animal 
keepers have the moral responsibility to reduce harm to their own animals as well as 
for other animals and their keepers. It means that this responsibility takes priority 
over freedom to realise a way of life. This freedom is reflected in the third layer of 
normative policy. 
Morally justifiable prevention and control measures need to weigh the values of all 
stakeholders equally. Reducing risk-of-harm at this level means that these values 
should be weighed against the risk of infecting other animals (Bavink et al 2009), the 
risk to the sector and the export position of a country, the risk of eye infections, and 
the risk to human life. From a moral perspective, giving priority to economic risk 
only is morally wrong, because it runs contrary to a consideration of all values. 
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It is concluded that the public resistance against the culling was not incidental, but 
was the result of the then existing moral convictions in Dutch society. Current 
policy has already acknowledged these convictions by shifting away from a non-
vaccination policy towards a policy based on preventive measures. These measures 
include improved early warning systems and risk assessment in other countries. 
Revised contingency plans for classical swine fever and foot and mouth disease 
allow vaccination, unless the risk of spreading is low. Increasingly, preventives 
measures are being improved by quarantine measures and by means of biotechnical 
solutions, such as biochips and resistance building by immunisation. 
It is concluded that this policy meets the demands of current public morality and 
will therefore gain more support in Dutch society.  
 
General conclusions 
 
This study contributed to new prevention and control policy by describing diversity 
of moral convictions concerning animals in Dutch society, and the role of these 
convictions in judgement on the culling of healthy animals. To this purpose a model 
was developed for empirical research. The model proved to be useful as it gave 
insight into the public morality, and the diversity of moral convictions in Dutch 
society and between livestock farmers and veterinarians. Furthermore, it explained 
how convictions play a role in judgement, and why opinions on the culling were 
opposed. The following conclusions are drawn. 
 
Moral convictions 
 
? There is diversity in moral convictions in the Netherlands.  
 
? Most respondents considered humans to be superior to animals. The one but 
largest group of respondents from the national survey and among the 
veterinarians were of the opinion that humans and animals are equal, 
 
? Most respondents were of the opinion that animals have value, that people 
should care for and protect all animals, and that all animals have a right to 
life. 
 
? Moral convictions are based on a number of values. These are intrinsic 
values; such as the value of animal life, sentience and rationality, functional 
values; such as the usefulness of animals to people, and the importance of an 
animal species in the ecosystem, and relational values concerning the human-
animal relationship. 
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? People with the same convictions may differ in the valuation of these 
convictions. 
 
Judgement 
 
? Moral convictions play a role in judgement. 
 
? Differences in judgement between respondents with the same moral 
convictions were based on differences in the valuation of arguments against 
and in favour of culling healthy animals.  
 
? The most important argument against culling was the value of animal life. 
This argument was valued lower when the argument in favour of culling was 
valued higher. 
 
? Most respondents from the national survey partly (dis)agreed with the culling 
of healthy animals for veterinary and economic reasons, and to prevent eye 
infections. Most veterinarians and farmers disagreed or partly (dis)agreed 
with the culling of healthy animals for veterinary and economic reasons, and 
to prevent eye infections. Culling to protect human life was supported by 
most in both surveys. 
 
? Respondents who considered human to be superior to animals, valued their 
moral convictions lower than other respondents. Therefore they valued them 
as arguments against culling lower, and therefore were more likely to agree 
with the culling. The opposite was also true. 
 
Importance for policy 
 
? For future prevention and control-policy consideration should be given to: 
o shared public morality about animals  
o the moral responsibilities of the stakeholders to their own animals, as 
 well as to other animals and their keepers 
o the interpretation of risk, harm, and values from the perspective 
of each stakeholder 
o stakeholders’ autonomy and freedom of action 
o a just distribution of risk-of-harm  
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Recommendations for future research 
 
? As most legislation concerning animals, their use and treatment is drawn up 
at the European level, it is important to study the diversity of moral 
convictions between the member states. 
 
? Public morality is a dynamic process influenced by social change, animal 
issues and other external influences. Therefore, it is advised to monitor these 
dynamics regularly. 
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Samenvatting 
 
In Europa braken tussen 1997 en 2003 drie hoogst besmettelijke dierziektes uit, te 
weten klassieke varkenspest, mond- en klauwzeer en hoogpathogene vogelpest. De 
toen geldende bestrijdingsstrategie was gebaseerd op economische belangen en 
bestond onder meer uit het ruimen van miljoenen geïnfecteerde en gezonde dieren. 
Dit betrof niet alleen productiedieren, maar ook niet-commercieel gehouden dieren, 
zoals hobbydieren. Tegen deze bestrijdingsstrategie kwamen protesten, niet alleen 
van de direct betrokken dierhouders, maar ook in de samenleving als geheel. Dit gaf 
aan dat het ruimen van gezonde dieren op grond van economische redenen niet 
meer moreel aanvaardbaar werd gevonden. Dit was reden om nieuwe preventie en 
bestrijdingsstrategieën van besmettelijke dierziektes te ontwikkelen die meer 
tegemoet komen aan de heersende opvattingen in de samenleving. Voor dit doel is 
meer kennis nodig over morele overtuigingen over dieren in de Nederlandse 
samenleving. Verder moet duidelijk worden of dierhouders in verschillende 
dierhouderijen verschillende overtuigingen hebben.  
 
Het doel van het onderzoek dat wordt beschreven in dit proefschrift is om de 
diversiteit van morele overtuigingen over dieren in de Nederlandse samenleving te 
identificeren en te beschrijven. Verder werd onderzocht wat de rol van deze 
overtuigingen is op oordeelsvorming over het doden van gezonde dieren in een 
dierziekte-epidemie. De resultaten kunnen bijdragen aan een beter begrip van 
morele overtuigingen, onontbeerlijk voor nieuwe preventie- en 
bestrijdingsstrategieën. 
 
Eerst werd een Europese survey en een survey onder hobbydierhouders uitgevoerd, 
om meer inzicht te krijgen in de kwesties die in dit verband spelen en in de visies op 
toekomstig beleid. De meeste lidstaten vonden de sociale, psychologische en 
financiële kwesties van het hoogste belang en waren van mening dat preventieve 
maatregelen op de eerste plaats kwamen. Nederland gaf dierenwelzijn en de daarbij 
behorende ethische kwesties de hoogste prioriteit.  
In een onderzoek onder hobbydierhouders werd meer inzicht verkregen in de aard 
van deze dierhouderij en in hun mening over dierziektebestrijding. De meeste 
hobbydieren worden gehouden voor gezelschap of om er mee te fokken. Veel 
hobbydierhouders waren tegen het doden van hun gezonde dieren, omdat deze 
dieren niet gehouden werden voor de voedselproductie en meer gezien werden als 
gezelschapsdieren. Verder was men van mening dat deze dieren geen risicofactor 
waren in de verspreiding van de ziektes omdat ze niet werden geëxporteerd. De 
meerderheid was voor preventieve vaccinatie van alle gevoelige dieren.  
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Voor verder onderzoek werd een model ontworpen om morele overtuigingen in de 
Nederlandse samenleving te identificeren en te beschrijven. Ook kon door middel 
van het model de rol van deze overtuigingen in oordeelsvorming over het ruimen 
van gezonde dieren in een epidemie worden onderzocht. Het model als vragenlijst 
was de basis voor een landelijke en een stakeholdersurvey. 
 
De resultaten van de landelijke survey lieten een diversiteit aan morele overtuigingen 
zien, waarvan een aantal dominant waren. De meeste respondenten waren van 
mening dat de mens boven het dier staat, dat dieren waarde hebben, dat mensen 
goed moeten zijn voor alle dieren en dat alle dieren recht op leven hebben. De een 
na grootste groep was van mening dat mens en dier gelijk zijn. Deze overtuigingen 
waren gestoeld op een aantal morele waarden, zoals de waarde van het dierlijk leven, 
de waarde van dieren die pijn en emoties kunnen voelen, en de waarde van dieren in 
het ecosysteem. De verschillen lagen in de verschillen in waardering van hun 
waarden. 
 
De resultaten van een casestudie lieten zien dat de meeste respondenten het 
gedeeltelijk eens/gedeeltelijk oneens waren met het ruimen van gezonde dieren om 
verdere verspreiding van de ziekte te voorkomen, om de exportpositie veilig te 
stellen en om ooginfecties te voorkomen. De meeste respondenten waren het eens 
met het ruimen van gezonde dieren als mensenlevens op het spel stonden. Het 
belangrijkste argument tegen het ruimen was: gezonde dieren mogen niet gedood worden 
omdat het leven waardevol is.  
Verschillen tussen de respondenten werden gevonden in de waardering van de 
argumenten en in oordeelsvorming. Respondenten die hun overtuigingen hoog 
waardeerden, waardeerden deze ook hoog bij de afweging of het ruimen wel of niet 
moreel acceptabel is.  
 
Een stakeholdersurvey onder dierenartsen en veehouders gaf vergelijkbare 
resultaten. Ook hier werd een diversiteit aan overtuigingen geïdentificeerd. De 
meeste dierenartsen en veehouders vonden dat de mens boven het dier staat, dat 
dieren waarde hebben, dat mensen goed moeten zijn voor alle dieren en dat alle 
dieren recht op leven hebben,. Meer dierenartsen dan veehouders vonden dat alle 
dieren recht op leven hebben. Beide groepen baseerden hun overtuigingen op 
dezelfde morele waarden. Ook hier was het verschil gebaseerd op verschillen in 
waardering van deze waarden. 
 
Ook hier lieten de resultaten van de casestudie zien dat de meeste respondenten het 
gedeeltelijk eens/gedeeltelijk oneens waren met het ruimen van gezonde dieren om 
verdere verspreiding van de ziekte te voorkomen, om de exportpositie veilig te 
stellen en om ooginfecties te voorkomen. In vergelijking tot de landelijke survey 
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waren meer dierenartsen en veehouders het oneens met het ruimen. Het doden was 
wel acceptabel als mensenlevens op het spel stonden. Ook hier was argument tegen 
het ruimen dat het leven van dieren waardevol is, van het grootste gewicht. 
Verder gold ook hier dat verschillen tussen de respondenten werden gevonden in de 
waardering van de argumenten en in oordeelsvorming. Respondenten die hun 
overtuigingen hoog waardeerden, waardeerden deze ook hoog bij de afweging of het 
ruimen wel of niet moreel acceptabel is.  
 
Het wordt beargumenteerd dat morele overtuigingen dynamisch zijn, en uit drie 
lagen bestaan. De onderste laag bevat de gedeelde morele overtuigingen van de 
publieke moraal. De tweede laag bevat de morele overtuigingen van een individu of 
een groep. De derde laag bevat de overtuigingen die worden ingezet als argument in 
de oordeelsvorming over een bepaalde dierenkwestie.  
Deze dynamiek en gelaagdheid van morele overtuigingen moet weerspiegeld worden 
in gelaagd normatief beleid. Op deze wijze komen waarden, vrijheden en 
verantwoordelijkheden van alle stakeholders worden meegenomen. De eerste laag 
betreft de minimumnormen die gelden voor het houden van dieren in alle 
dierhouderijen en voortkomen uit door de samenleving gedeelde waarden van de 
publieke moraal. Deze waarden moeten vastgelegd zijn in wetgeving. De tweede laag 
bestaat uit toegevoegde waarden gedeeld door de samenleving en de stakeholders. 
Deze waarden worden vertaald in regelgeving of beleid. Op het derde niveau 
kunnen individuele stakeholders hun interpretatie van hun waardes realiseren, 
zolang deze niet in conflict komen met de waarden van het eerste niveau. 
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Summary 
 
From 1997 to 2003 Europe faced three major animal disease epidemics: classical 
swine fever, foot and mouth disease and avian influenza. In these epidemics millions 
of animals were culled. In the early nineties the European Union adopted a non-
vaccination strategy to control these highly contagious diseases. Stamping out a 
disease, which means culling infected and healthy animals within a radius of 1-3 
kilometres from the source of the infection, was from a financial-economic 
perspective, preferable to vaccination. It stopped the disease infecting other animals, 
and enabled the member states to quickly regain their ‘disease-free’ status. The latter 
was imperative to resume international trade in animals and animal products. The 
rationale behind the stamping-out policy was a weighing of economic pros and cons 
with respect to this international trade. In the Netherlands and the United 
Kingdom, the stamping-out strategy was resisted. This resistance not only came 
from the animal keepers, but also from the general public who had been confronted 
with footage of burning pyres (in the United Kingdom), animal welfare problems 
and the frustration and anger of those directly involved.  
 
At present new prevention and control strategies for contagious animal diseases are 
being developed which aim to better reflect the views in society about justifiable 
culling of animals during an epidemic. This is necessary to avoid further conflict 
between the animal keepers, the government and society as a whole in the case of 
future outbreaks of diseases. For this purpose, policymakers should be 
knowledgeable of the moral convictions about animals in Dutch society, and 
whether different forms of animal keeping each have different convictions which 
are caused by the nature of the animal keeping. For instance the nature of animal 
keeping can be commercial or non- commercial, in that animals can be kept for 
food production, company, breeding or sports. 
 
The aim of the research was to identify and describe the diversity of moral 
convictions about animals in Dutch society and among livestock farmers and 
veterinarians in the Netherlands. These two animal practices were directly involved 
in the epidemics and work with animals on a daily basis. Furthermore, the aim was 
to describe the role of convictions in judgement on the culling of healthy animals 
during an animal disease epidemic. The results may contribute to a better 
understanding of moral convictions, which is important knowledge in the 
development of new prevention and control strategies for contagious animal 
diseases. 
 
First a pilot study was performed in 25 European member states, and among Dutch 
backyard animal keepers. The aim of the European survey was to gain more insight 
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into the social-ethical issues that resulted from the European non-vaccination 
policy, and to learn about views on the preferred future policy. Backyard animal 
keepers were chosen because they were a group of animal keepers that had emerged 
in the Dutch countryside. They keep their animals on a non-commercial basis for 
company or for breeding. Since at the time no distinction was made between 
production and backyard animals, the latter were culled as well. The aim of the pilot 
study was to learn more about this practice, the human-animal relationships and the 
moral values that were at stake in the control of the epidemics. 
 
In the European survey a selection of stakeholders, such as the government (the 
chief veterinary officers), livestock farmers and veterinarians from each member 
state was asked to prioritise issues for the prevention and control of animal diseases. 
There were no differences between member states with or without a history of 
recent epidemics. A majority of stakeholders in the North-western and Southern 
member states considered preventive measures the priority issue. The Eastern 
European member states considered the social-psychological and financial issues the 
most important. The Netherlands chose animal welfare and ethical issues as the first 
priority.  
 
The backyard animal study consisted of a qualitative part, which included interviews 
with 24 representatives of this practice and a survey among 214 respondents. In 
contrast to the livestock practice, backyard animals are kept and valued for their 
company, their value as a rare, Old-Dutch or special breed, their visibility in the 
countryside, or the contribution of certain breeds to the biodiversity, to a region 
with cultural-historical value or in a nature reserve. Backyard animals thus have a 
status which is separate from that of production animals and closer to that of 
companion animals. Furthermore, the moral vocabulary was studied as used by the 
keepers who had experienced the epidemics to describe their moral objections to 
the culling. 
 
These surveys and the literature study yielded relevant results for the design of a 
model to empirically identify and describe moral convictions and judgement in 
Dutch society. The model consisted of two parts. In part one, moral convictions 
were identified and described. In part two, in the form of a case-study, the role of 
these moral convictions in the justification of culling healthy animals was studied. 
Part one of the model was constructed of domains, statements and criteria. The 
domains were: the hierarchical position of animals with respect to people, the value 
(as in appreciation) of animals, doing good to animals (to care for and to protect 
against harm), and animals’ right to life. Each domain included a number of 
statements which reflected a conviction about the domain. Each statement was 
supported by a number of criteria. The criteria clarified what the conviction was 
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based on. A moral conviction was defined as one statement combined with one or a 
number of criteria. With this method, convictions and their diversity are described. 
For domain one, the three statements were: humans are superior to animals, 
humans and animals are equal, and animals are superior to humans. For domain 
two, the two statements were: animals have value, and animals have no value. For 
domain three, the three statements were: doing good to all animals, doing good to 
some animals and no duty to do good to animals. For domain four, the three 
statements were: all animals have a right to life, some animals have a right to life, 
and animals have no right to life.  
The criteria were derived from academic animal ethics theories about the moral 
importance of animals. Some criteria referred to intrinsic characteristics of the 
animal, such as life, sentience (to be able to feel pain an emotions) and rationality. 
Other criteria referred to the functional use of animals for humans and the 
ecosystem, and the relational human-animal bond. One criterion referred to religion 
or a philosophy of life, and one criterion referred to virtuous character: people who 
do good to animals become better people. With this framework, a conviction is the 
combination of a statement combined with one or more criteria, for instance: all 
animals have a right to life, because animals are living beings.  
 
The second part of the model, the case-study, was constructed using four cases, 
three judgement categories and a number of arguments. Each case presented an 
argument in favour of culling and arguments against culling.  
The arguments in favour were: healthy animals should be culled to stop a disease 
from spreading (case one), to safeguard the export position of a country (case two), 
to protect people against eye infections (case three) and to protect human life (case 
four).  
The arguments against culling were: healthy animals (cows and chickens were 
chosen) should not be culled, because: animal life is valuable / cows are highly 
developed (mental capacity to think, feel, and be conscious) / chickens are highly 
developed (idem) / special and rare breeds are valuable (important for a species, a 
region or the ecosystem) / animals have a financial value to people (for instance 
production animals as a source of income for the farmer) / people have a personal 
bond with these animals (relational bond) / killing animals is a bad character trait 
(virtue) / animals are part of Creation (religion). These arguments were the same in 
all four cases. This was done to study whether an argument was rated differently 
according to the case.  
Each of the arguments against culling was a ‘translation’ of a criterion. In this way 
the criterion became an argument against culling.  
 
In the form of a questionnaire, the model was used in two Internet surveys. Per 
domain, respondents were asked to choose only one statement which best reflected 
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their conviction about the domain. Then they rated all criteria that referred to this 
statement with a rate between 0 and 10, with 0 not important at all for the statement 
and 10 very important for the statement. 
In the case-study, the respondents gave their judgement on the culling per case. 
They could choose between: I agree, I partly (dis)agree or I disagree with the culling. 
They motivated their judgement by rating the argument in favour of and against 
culling by a number between 0 and 10.  
 
The national survey was performed among 1999 respondents who were 
representative of the Dutch-speaking population. The results showed a diversity of 
convictions. The conviction humans are superior to animals was chosen by 67% of the 
respondents. The conviction animals have value was chosen by all the respondents, the 
conviction people should do good to all animals was chosen by 85%, and the conviction 
all animals have a right to life was chosen by 87% of the respondents.  
Two groups were identified: group A (50% of the respondents) and B (28%). 
Compared to the B respondents, more A respondents were male, were older and 
lived in smaller communities. The A respondents considered humans to be superior 
to animals. The B respondents considered humans and animals to be equal. These 
two groups, together 78% of the respondents, shared a number of other 
convictions: i.e., animals have value, people have a duty to care for and protect all 
animals, and all animals have a right to life. These convictions were based on a 
number of criteria, such as animals as living beings, the ability of animals to feel pain 
and emotions (sentience), and the importance of animals for the ecosystem. The A 
group rated the criteria (significantly) lower that the B group. 
 
The case-study showed that convictions played a role in judgement because it was 
possible to distinguish between the A and B group on the basis of judgement and 
the rating of the arguments. Fifty percent of the respondents from the A and B 
group partly agreed/partly disagreed with culling healthy animals to protect a 
country’s export position (A: 50%, B: 50%) or to prevent eye infections caused by 
the disease in people who had been in direct contact with infected animals (A: 41%, 
B: 45%). Most respondents (A: 81%, B 61%) agreed with culling to protect human 
life. Most A respondents (53%) agreed with culling to stop the disease from 
spreading (B: 29%). The argument against culling: healthy animals should not be culled 
because animal life is valuable was rated the highest by both groups. The A respondents 
rated all arguments against culling (significantly) lower and arguments in favour 
higher than the B respondents.  
 
A second survey was conducted among 863 veterinarians and 762 livestock farmers 
in the Netherlands.  
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With respect to their convictions, the similarities with the national survey and 
between the veterinarians and the farmers were found in the choice of statements 
and criteria. The differences were found in the percentage of respondents per 
statement and in the rating of the criteria. 
With respect to judgement, the difference with the national survey and between the 
veterinarians and the farmers was that the majority of the veterinarians and farmers 
either disagreed or partly agreed/partly disagreed with culling healthy animals to 
stop an animal disease from spreading and thus infecting other animals, to safeguard 
a country’s export position, or to prevent eye infections in people. Culling to protect 
human life was agreed on by most. As in the national survey, the argument against 
culling: healthy animals should not be culled because animal life is valuable was rated the 
highest by both groups. 
It is argued that a person who values the criterion animal life highly for his or her 
convictions, will value animal life highly as an argument against culling. Arguments 
in favour of culling must be valued higher than the value of animal life for a person 
to agree with culling.  
 
It is concluded that a number of convictions and criteria are shared by a majority in 
Dutch society, upon which animals’ moral importance and society’s moral 
responsibilities to animals are based.  
 
In a next step the results are discussed with respect to their relevance for future 
prevention and control policy.  
The current European animal disease policy finds its justification in a ‘harm-to-
others’ principle. Limiting the freedom of animal keepers by culling their animals is 
justified to prevent harm caused by a spreading of the disease, jeopardising a 
country’s export position. However, both in the prevention of notifiable animal 
diseases and during the control of outbreaks, the government is confronted with 
conflicting claims of stakeholders who anticipate running a risk to be harmed by 
each other, and who ask for government intervention. Therefore the harm principle 
is no longer a sufficient justification for governmental intervention. It is argued that 
policy should shift from limiting ‘harm’ to weighing conflicting claims with respect 
to ‘risks of harm’. A policy that addresses conflicting claims of risks-of-harm needs 
to take into account additional value assumptions.  
 
A three-layered concept for moral convictions and normative policy is proposed and 
discussed.  
The first layer of moral convictions includes values that are not only important for 
an individual, but are shared in society as a whole and therefore are part of the 
public morality. They are based on intrinsic, relational, functional, religious or other 
criteria. The second layer includes values that are specific for an individual or 
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groups. The third layer consists of values that are relevant in a public debate about a 
certain animal issue, and as such have become arguments in this debate. The third 
layer does not contain the same set of values all the time. In a different debate, other 
values may migrate to the third layer.  
An open normative policy approach connects three-layered convictions and 
normative policy. With this concept one can express values, freedoms and 
responsibilities of all stakeholders at three levels in policy. 
The first level reflects the minimum norms of animal keeping following from the 
shared convictions in society, and therefore should be laid down in legislation. It 
sets the minimum norm for animal health and welfare and should refer to individual 
animals as well as animal species in the ecosystem. At this level risk-of-harm is 
understood from the animals’ point of view, as human action can be a risk to the 
animal.  
The second level includes additional norms set down in regulations, to meet further 
demands by society and stakeholders. At this level, consensus can be reached 
between stakeholders and between stakeholders and society, to equally distribute 
risk-of-harm, values, responsibilities and freedom of each stakeholder. At this level 
risk-of-harm is understood from the stakeholders’ point of view. 
At the third level, individual stakeholders can realise their interpretation of their 
values. Freedom of action is realised at this level, allowing animal keepers freedom 
to keep animals in a way they see fit, as long as this does not present a risk-of-harm 
at the first or second level.  
 
It is concluded that in Dutch society there is diversity in moral convictions, some of 
which are shared by the majority. Most people consider humans to be superior to 
animals. The second largest group of people consider humans and animals equal. 
Most people find that animals have value, that people should care for and protect all 
animals, and that all animals have a right to life. These convictions are based on a 
number of criteria, such as life, sentience, and the ecosystem. 
 
It is concluded that moral convictions play a role in judgement. Differences between 
people with differing moral convictions are reflected in differences in judgement 
and valuation of arguments against and in favour of culling healthy animals.  
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Training and Supervision Plan 
 
Nina Eva Cohen   
Basic Package    
WIAS Introduction Course  2005 1.5 
Course on philosophy of science and/or ethics 2005 1.5 
International conferences   
Conference Avian Influenza Ede  2006 0.3 
European Society for Agriculture and Food Ethics (Eursafe) Vienna  2007 0.3 
World Congress Alternatives and Animal Use in the Life Sciences 1996-02 4.5 
Symposium Harlan Dusseldorf  1996 0.3 
Seminars and workshops   
WIAS Science Day 5x 2005-9 1.5 
NVDEC Nascholingsdag DEC leden Rijswijk 2005 0.3 
Diergezondheid: ratio of emotie? The Hague 2007 0.2 
NWO Masterclass Birnbacher Amsterdam 2008 0,6 
NWO Studiedag Ethiek Onderzoek en Bestuur The Hague 2006-08 0.4 
Het Doden van Dieren: Maatschappelijke en Ethische Aspecten, Utrecht 2002  0.3 
Presentations    
Oral presentation Eursafe Vienna  2007 1.0 
Oral presentation workshop Moral convictions about animals The Hague  2009 1.0 
Oral presentation Koninklijke Maatschappij voor Diergeneeskunde Houten 2008 1.0 
Oral presentation WIAS Science Day 2009 1.0 
Oral presentation NWO masterclass Birnbacher Amsterdam 2008 1.0 
Oral presentation NWO Ethiek Onderzoek en Bestuur  Den Haag 2008 1.0 
Poster presentation WIAS Science Day  2008 1.0 
Oral presentation Harlan Dusseldorf 1996  1.0 
Disciplinary and interdisciplinary courses   
PhD course tailor made Animal and Nature Ethics Utrecht University 2005 4,0 
MSc Course Animal and Nature Ethics Utrecht University 2005 3.5 
MSc Course Law, Morality and Policy Utrecht University 2006 7.5 
Professional Skills Support Courses    
Focus op onderwijskundig en didactisch handelen Universiteit Utrecht  2001  0.6 
(WGS Technique for writing and presenting a scientific paper  2009 1.2 
WGS Course Science, the press and the general public Wageningen  2009 1,0 
WGS Inter- and Transdisciplinary Research: Intervision and Com. Skills  2009 1.1 
Research Skills Training    
 New foundations for the prevention and control of notifiable animal diseases  2004 0.8 
Didactic Skills Training    
Article 9 course LUMC and Leiden University  2004-09 3.0 
BSc ARUC    2008-09 0.4 
PhD Course Ethics and Philosophy of Animal Science 2008-09 0.4 
Supervising theses two MSc-students  2005-07 4,0 
Management Skills Training    
Organisation Local Ethical Matrix Workshop Wageningen 2008 1.5 
New foundations for the prevention and control of notifiable animal diseases 2009 1.5 
Membership of boards and committees   
Animal Ethics Committee Leiden University and LUMC  2004-10 16.0 
Werkgroep Primaten  2004-09 1.5 
Werkgroep Dialoog   2004-09 1.5 
Total   69.2 
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Curriculum vitae Nina Eva Cohen 
 
2004-2009 Wageningen Universiteit Leerstoel Dier en Samenleving 
Bij de Wageningen Universiteit deed Nina promotieonderzoek bij de leerstoelgroep 
Dier en Samenleving onder leiding van Prof.dr. Elsbeth Stassen. Het betrof een 
NWO project New foundations for the prevention and control of notifiable animal diseases. De 
resultaten staan beschreven in dit proefschrift 
 
1994-2004 Universiteit Leiden en Universiteit Utrecht Leerstoel Dierproefvraagstukken 
In deze periode heeft Nina gewerkt bij de leerstoelgroep Dierproefvraagstukken, 
onder leiding van Prof.dr. Tjard de Cock Buning. Deze afdeling was tot 1999 
ondergebracht bij de Universiteit Leiden en daarna bij de Universiteit Utrecht. Nina 
hield zich als onderzoeker bezig met ethische en maatschappelijke vraagstukken 
rond dierproeven en proefdieren. Zij heeft diverse projecten uitgevoerd, zoals een 
haalbaarheidsstudie naar een instituut Society and Genomics, inventarisatie van 
Animal Ethics Committees in de Europese lidstaten, analyse van beslismomenten 
van de Commissie Biotechnologie bij Dieren, de toekomst van het 
primatenonderzoek in Nederland, gezondheid en welzijn van transgene dieren, 
elders betrokken transgene organismen, en humaan materiaal als alternatief voor 
dierproeven. 
 
1989-1992 Wetenschapswinkel Universiteit van Amsterdam 
Wetenschapswinkels hebben tot doel om wetenschappelijke kennis beschikbaar te 
stellen voor maatschappelijke organisaties. Nina werkte als onderzoeker en 
projectbegeleider. Ze deed onderzoek naar de effecten van voedseldoorstraling op 
de gezondheid, en de afschotproblematiek van knobbelzwanen.  
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Dankwoord 
 
Promotieonderzoek doe je niet alleen en ik ben veel mensen dankbaar die mij op 
allerlei manieren geholpen hebben. 
Ten eerste mijn promotoren Elsbeth, Frans en Arjan. Elsbeth is een kei. Ze was er 
altijd voor me in moeilijke tijden, terwijl zij het zelf ook niet altijd gemakkelijk had. 
Ik heb heel veel van haar geleerd over het opzetten van onderzoek, de analyse van 
de resultaten en het schrijven van wetenschappelijke artikelen. Ze spaarde mij 
daarbij niet (ze vond dat ik ‘draken van zinnen’ maakte en riep regelmatig uit ‘Wat is 
dit nou weer?’, terwijl ik steenvast riep: ‘Ja maar, dat STAAT er toch?). 
Frans bewonder ik omdat hij op een hoog abstractieniveau denkt. Hij gebruikte vaak 
de term ‘helder’ in de zin van: duidelijk voor ogen hebben wat ik wil met mijn 
onderzoek en wat mijn bijdrage is aan de wetenschappelijke discussie over dit 
onderwerp (vaak vroeg ik me hetzelfde af). Trouwens iemand die van Amsterdam, 
klassieke muziek en wijn houdt kan bij mij niet stuk. 
Bij Arjan konden we altijd terecht aan zijn grote tafel om de voortgang van het 
onderzoek te bespreken, gezeten naast een grote vitrine met tientallen 
kippenbeeldjes. Hij had de kennis over de epidemiologie van dierziektes, die ik zo 
hard nodig had. Hoewel hij niet mijn dagelijkse promotor was stond hij altijd klaar 
met advies, en zijn rustige uitstraling maakte mij ook rustig. 
Naast mijn promotoren was mijn collega Fokje de belangrijkste steun en vraagbaak 
en met haar heb ik heel veel gezellige uren doorgebracht. Natúúrlijk hadden we het 
over mijn onderzoek, maar ook vaak over worteltaart, Sinterklaas, vlees eten: 
ja/nee/geen mening, keukens, vakantie, fotografie, zingen, zielige beestjes, 
verliefdheden, kinderen en kleren. Maar vooral heeft Fokje mij enorm geholpen met 
de statistische analyse van mijn resultaten. Zij liet mij zien dat statistiek niet eng is 
(nou ja een beetje dan). Ik stam nog uit de tijd van de rekenliniaal dus van SPSS had 
ik nog nooit gehoord. Ik dacht dat het een nieuwe omroep was.  
Niet alleen bij de statistiek maar ook bij de lay-out van mijn proefschrift heeft zij mij 
enorm bijgestaan. Liever gezegd, Fokje deed de lay-out en ik zat ernaast voor de 
mentale steun.  
Ook mijn andere collega’s Simon, Leo, en Bart waren altijd bereid om mij te hulp te 
bieden of advies te geven. Hartelijk dank! 
Met Iteke heb ik de vragenlijst die in de surveys werd gebruikt opgesteld. Iedereen 
die denkt dat vragenlijsten maken eenvoudig is, heeft het fout. Inderdaad: pas als je 
helder voor ogen hebt wat je precies wilt weten, kan je de juiste vragen formuleren, 
en dat kan wel even duren. Het was na een gesprek met Franck, de eerste auteur van 
een van de artikelen, dat ik de eerste ideeën kreeg voor het theoretisch kader van de 
vragenlijst.  
Als onderzoeker moet je niet alleen onderzoek doen, maar moet je ook kunnen 
schrijven en wel in het Engels. Omdat het schrijven van wetenschappelijke artikelen 
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in het Engels iets heel anders is dan het bestellen van een pint of Guinness, heb ik 
de hulp gevraagd van mijn slimme en trouwe vriendin Sue. Zij heeft bijna alle 
manuscripten nauwkeurig gelezen en het Engels gecorrigeerd. Dit was een enorm 
karwei en ik ben haar daarvoor heel dankbaar. Soms als Sue geen tijd of gelegenheid 
had, kon ik terecht bij mijn andere Engelse vrienden Johan, Jane en Mike. 
De prachtige afbeeldingen die op de omslag staan en de hoofdstukken inleiden zijn 
gemaakt door mijn lieve vriend en kunstschilder Andrew en prachtig gefotografeerd 
door Gerda. Andrew heeft zich laten inspireren door de prehistorische 
grottekeningen in Frankrijk en Zuid-Afrika. Deze grottekeningen laten zien dat 
dieren al heel lang een belangrijk onderdeel uitmaken van de mensengemeenschap. 
Fokje en Daniel, mijn broer, heb ik gevraagd om mijn paranimfen te worden. Fokje 
als mijn vriendin en collega en Daniel als een van de fundamenten van mijn leven. 
Last but absoluut niet least mijn vriendin en zangbuddy Irene: zij kan niet alleen goed 
zingen en acteren, zij kan ook heel goed organiseren, en dat is wel handig als je de 
ceremoniemeester bent. Haar moeder Riet heeft weer andere talenten en heeft de 
sjaals en cummerband gemaakt voor de paranimfen, de ceremoniemeester en voor 
mij. Mocht het niks worden met de openbare verdediging, dan zien we er in ieder 
geval goed uit. 
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APPENDIX 1 QUESTIONNAIRE 
 
 
DOMAIN ONE POSITION 
Statements and criteria 
 
Rating 
0-10 
Category 
Animals feel less pain and emotions  
Animals cannot think  
Animals cannot distinguish between right and wrong  
Intrinsic 
Humans are more important in the ecosystem  Functional 
Humans are 
superior to 
animals,  
because: 
Open answer 
 
  
Animals are living creatures as well  
Animals feel pain and emotions as well  
Animals can think as well  
Animals can distinguish between right and wrong as well  
Intrinsic 
Animals and humans are equally important in the ecosystem  Functional 
Humans 
and animals 
are equal, 
because: 
Open answer 
 
  
Animals can experience more feelings of pain and emotions  
Animals have a higher ability to think   
Animals can better distinguish between right and wrong   
Intrinsic 
 
Animals are more important in the ecosystem   Functional 
Animals are 
superior to 
humans,  
because: 
Open answer 
 
  
 
 
 
 
DOMAIN TWO VALUE 
Statements and criteria 
 
Rating  
0-10 
Category 
Animals are useful to people  Functional 
Animals are important in the ecosystem   
Animals are living beings   Intrinsic 
Animals have a personal relationship with people  Relational 
Animals 
have value, 
because  
Open answer 
 
  
Animals 
have no 
value 
 
Open answer   
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DOMAIN THREE TO DO GOOD 
Statements and criteria Rating  
0-10 
Category 
Animals are living creatures  
Animals can feel pain and emotions  
Animals can think  
Intrinsic 
Animals are important in the ecosystem  Functional  
It makes people better people  Virtue 
People have a 
responsibility to do 
good to all animals, 
because: 
Open answer 
 
  
Animals that can feel pain and emotions  
Animals that can think  
Intrinsic 
 
Animals that are important in the ecosystem  Functional  
Animals with an economic value to people  Functional: 
Animals with an emotional value to people  Relational 
People have a 
responsibility to do 
good to some 
animals, namely: 
Open answer 
 
  
Animals feel insufficient pain and emotions  
Animals are insufficiently capable of thought  
Intrinsic 
 
Animals are not important in the ecosystem  Functional 
People have no 
responsibility to do 
good to animals, 
because: Open answer 
 
  
 
 
DOMAIN FOUR RIGHT TO LIFE 
Statements and criteria 
 
Rating  
0-10 
Category 
 
Animals need to fulfil their natural life-cycle  
Animal life is valuable   
Animals can feel emotions  
Animals can think  
Animals have an urge to live  
Intrinsic 
Animals are important in the ecosystem  Functional  
All animals have a 
right to life, because: 
 
Open answer   
  
Animals that are capable of feeling  
Animals that can think  
Animals that know the difference between life 
and death 
 
 
Intrinsic 
Animals that have an economic use for 
humans 
 Functional  
Animals humans have a relationship with  Relational 
Animals that are important in the ecosystem  Functional  
 
Some animals have a 
right to life, namely: 
Open answer   
  
Animals have insufficient feelings  
Animals are insufficiently capable of thought  
Animals do not know the difference between 
life and death 
 
Animals have no urge to live  
 
Intrinsic 
 
Animals are not important in the ecosystem  Functional  
 
Animals have no right 
to life, because: 
Open answer 
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Schematic representation of the four cases 
 
During an animal disease epidemic, healthy cows and chickens are culled in the stamping-
out strategy to eradicate the disease.  
Do you agree with the culling of these healthy animals, when they are culled:  
- Case 1: to stop the disease from infecting other animals  
- Case 2: to safeguard the export position of a country  
- Case 3: to protect human health (eye infections) 
- Case 4: to protect human life  
I disagree / I partly (dis)agree / I agree with the culling of these healthy animals for this 
purpose, because 
   
Arguments in favour of culling 
 
Rating  
0-10 
Culling is necessary to stop infecting other animals 
/ to safeguard the export position / to protect 
human health / to protect human life  
 
  
Arguments against the culling based on value 
 
Rating  
0-10 
An animal’s life is valuable; therefore these cows 
and chickens should not be culled 
 
Life  
Chickens are highly developed animals; therefore 
these animals should not be culled 
 
Mental capacity*  
Cows are highly developed animals; therefore 
these animals should not be culled 
 
Mental capacity  
Cows and chickens that are of a special or rare 
breed should not be culled 
 
Functional value for a 
species, region or the 
biodiversity 
 
 
Cows and chickens that have a financial value to 
people should not be culled 
 
Utility for people 
 
 
Cows and chickens that have an relational value to 
people should not be culled 
 
Relational value for 
people 
 
 
Culling healthy cows and chickens is a bad 
character trait; therefore these animals should not 
be culled 
 
Virtue  
Cows and chickens are part of Creation, and 
therefore should not be culled 
 
Religion   
*Refers to a degree of development of the animal to think, reflect and draw conclusions about oneself or 
others 
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